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Abstract
The thesis analyses the regional labour market dynamics and effectiveness of 
active labour market policies in Poland. The main research focus is to assess the 
effectiveness o f the elem ents o f ALMPs and to suggest possible explanations of the 
heterogeneity in their outcomes. I am interested in establishing how effective are the 
various components o f ALM Ps in alleviating the regional differences in 
unemployment.
The objective is to arrive at recommendations regarding the appropriate mix of 
policy response to the unemployment problem. The lessons that relate to Poland may 
also be applied to other countries undergoing a process o f deep structural changes. In 
particular, I am interested in establishing how effective are the various components of 
ALMPs in alleviating the regional differences in unemployment.
The experiences of the Spanish labour market reforms are used to understand the 
likely trajectory induced by a similar liberalisation process and labour market 
institutional reform in Poland. I argue that the institutional reforms in Spain led to 
better labour market performance and the same outcome may be expected in Poland if 
similar reforms are implemented.
In the econom etric part o f thesis, I investigate the persistence o f unem ploym ent in 
the Polish and Spanish labour markets, which demonstrate that the unemployment 
problem is more serious than indicated by the aggregate figures. I also measure the 
effectiveness of the labour m arket policies and draw conclusions for policy makers, 
arguing that the unem ploym ent problem can be alleviated if the appropriate policy mix 
is applied.
In particular, I have shown to what extent regional employment, unemployment 
and participation rate dynam ics are common to all regions in Spain and Poland. The 
results indicate very strong regional unemployment persistence, especially in poorer 
regions in both countries. Both o f the investigated markets reacted to shocks in a 
similar way. However, higher persistence in the response of unem ploym ent to shocks 
has been measured in Spain than in Poland. On the other hand, Polish regional labour 
markets are more dissim ilar than the Spanish ones, indicating m ore inequality in 
access to employment.
The results on the efficiency of ALMPs also demonstrate differences between 
agricultural, modern and industrial regions and different patterns o f impact in line with 
the results on the regional labour market dynamics. The agricultural regions, with 
higher unemployment respond to the ALMPs weaker than the other regions. These 
findings are in line with the results of VAR analysis of regional labour market 
dynamics, which show a great persistence in unemployment, especially in the poorer 
regions, indicating that they do not respond in the same way as the other regions. I 
now offer a novel explanation to this structural outcome: the existing persistence in 
inter-regional differences in unemployment may be (partly) resulting from the fact that 
the policy measures are not adjusted and are not used selectively consistent with the 
local economic environment.
The results permit the drawing out of a tentative conclusion that ALMPs in 
Poland should be reassessed as for their efficiency. The policies should be carefully 
designed and should take into account the different types of regions, which might have 
different needs and requirements. A troublesome result is that the regions where policy 
support is most needed are also those, which are least responsive to policy tools.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
The thesis analyses the regional labour market dynamics and effectiveness o f active 
labour market policy (ALM P) in a regional cross-section in Poland. The main research 
focus is to assess the effectiveness of the elements of ALMPs and to suggest possible 
explanations of the heterogeneity in their outcomes, stressing the structural/sectoral 
characteristics of skills and of demand for labour.
Based on that, I also aim to arrive at some recommendations regarding the appropriate 
mix of policy responses to the unemployment problem. The lessons are general. W hile 
I focus on Poland, I expect that the conclusions may also be applied to other countries 
undergoing a process o f deep structural changes.
In short, I am interested in establishing how effective are the various components of 
ALMPs in alleviating the regional differences in unemployment. I find that they play 
different roles in different types of regions, and see this result in the context of a 
broader view of the transition process, where the implications for the sectoral 
restructuring process are seen as critical.
In addition, I wish to draw some lessons on the role which can be played by structural 
labour market reforms. The discussion is based on:
a) Economic theory as applied to the labour market
b) Experience of Spain which was facing problems similar to Poland when 
undergoing its structural market transition.
c) The Polish experience.
d) My own empirical results measuring regional dynamics and persistence in the 
labour market as well as the effect of active labour market policy tools that can 
be placed in the wider context of structural reforms.
W hile the obtained results are particularly relevant for Poland, they also apply to other 
countries facing sim ilar economic circumstances.
Poland’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a m arket-based economy has 
had a multitude o f effects on all aspects of individuals’ lives not least in terms o f their 
experience o f a newly em erging labour market. Unemployment emerged and grew 
rapidly in Poland as a result o f the transformation of the political system in 1989, the 
rationalisation of the econom y and the structural shock in demand, in particular, a 
decrease in the demand for Polish products in the form er Soviet countries. Dealing 
with unemployment, poverty and social exclusion for some vulnerable social groups 
have been some of the most important challenges that have emerged after the 
transition. However, it seems that the transition elites have not been able to propose an 
optimal solution to these problems and then to implement them. As a consequence 
Poland was confronted by serious labour market dislocations reflected in high 
unemployment figures and popular dissatisfaction.
W hile the issue of unemployment is associated with the post-com m unist
deindustrialisation process, the impact o f the latter is not uniform and remain closely
linked to the growing regional differences in labour market adjustment. The
unemployment rate in Poland rose rapidly during the early 1990s deepening regional
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discrepancies. This phenom enon has been due to the inherited socio-econom ic 
structures of the central planning system. In particular, after the transition, many of the 
regions in Poland privileged by the former system (those, which had a high 
concentration of nationalised farms, mining and natural resources extraction industries 
and implicitly access to soft finance) suffered from high unemployment. M oreover 
some of these effects were long-term as these regions are characterised by a labour 
force, which is not easily adaptable to a free market economy.
The Spanish labour m arket reforms experiences are also used in the dissertation to 
understand the likely trajectory induced by sim ilar liberalisation processes and labour 
market institutional reform in Poland. I argue that the institutional reforms ultimately 
implemented in Spain led to better labour market performance and the same outcome 
may be expected in Poland. Through investigating the similarities o f the Polish and 
Spanish labour markets I aim to draw conclusions for policy makers.
The Spanish experience in this process constitutes a valuable lesson for Poland, both 
from the perspective o f economic transition and from that of the EU integration and 
coherence perspective. Therefore, policies undertaken by Spain are analysed in terms 
of their relevance to the Polish labour market.
Spain after its accession to the European Union had the most persistent unemployment 
problem in Europe, with an unemployment rate that reached 24.6 percent in early 
1994. A demographic shift in recent years has produced a large rise in female labour 
force participation and a decrease in agricultural jobs, which were blam ed for part of 
the problem. In addition, generous unemployment benefits and the large underground 
economy contributed to this phenomenon. However, the biggest problem, similarly to 
Polish case, constituted failures and rigidities in the labour market.
W e can encounter many similarities in the Spanish and Polish liberalisations. In Spain 
this process started alm ost fifteen years before the Polish transformation took place, in 
the second half o f the 1970s. However, these two countries have a sim ilar economic 
capacity and very sim ilar labour markets, including their institutional framework. 
From the labour market perspective, the initial Franco era economic system had some 
common characteristics with the Communist command economy in Poland. One o f the 
major problems that the two countries had in common was the relocation o f the labour 
force from the agricultural and manufacturing sector to the service sector. In Poland, 
this transition was accom panied by an intense program of privatisation. Although on a 
different scale, Spain has also been through an intensive program o f liberalisation 
during its transition. Similarly to Spain, the accelerated deindustrialisation still 
constitutes a severe problem  for the Polish economy. Sectoral employm ent shares in 
Spain in 1975 (the year o f Franco’s death) were very similar to those in Poland in 
1989. The transition in Poland was accompanied by a programme of privatisation of 
state owned enterprises, which was characterised by high levels of labour hoarding. 
The transformation into a market-based economy was accom panied by a sharp 
decrease of employment in both o f the above mentioned sectors. After the accession to 
the European Com m unity in 1986, the labour market in Spain was initially 
characterised by a high rate of creation of new jobs and a decline in unemployment 
figures, which started to grow again in 1990s. Similarly, Poland experienced an initial 
period of strong job creation, filling the gap in the service sector, yet the process faded 
away after a few years, with the unemployment rate growing beyond 20% in 2004. 
The recent years have brought some recovery, with the unemployment rate decreasing 
to 10% in 2007. More interestingly, recently, the Spanish elites found a way to reduce
unemployment, by introducing labour market reforms, again, sim ilar to those 
discussed at present in Poland. Nowadays, the Spanish economy is characterised by 
quite a low level of unemployment by comparison with the situation in 1990s. Thus, 
the Spanish experience should provide Poland, as an EU new m em ber country, with an 
invaluable lesson.
In order to respond to the empirical research question, and compare the quantitative 
characteristics of the regional dynamics in the two countries, I have investigated the 
persistency o f the regional unemployment patterns in Poland and Spain, measured the 
effectiveness o f the labour market policies in Poland and drawn conclusions for policy 
makers.
The results indicate very strong regional unemployment persistence, especially in 
poorer regions in both countries. Both of the investigated markets reacted to shocks in 
a very similar way, which supports the hypothesis and provides grounds for 
suggesting that Poland should adopt similar policies to those undertaken in Spain. 
However, higher persistence in the response of unemployment to shock has been 
measured in Spain than in Poland. On the other hand, Polish regional labour markets 
characteristics indicate more inequality in access to employment.
I analyse the developments o f regional labour markets in Poland and Spain since their 
transition to democracy and to the opening to the international market. I concentrated 
on investigating the extent to which labour market shocks are shared by all regions 
and how regional employment, unemployment and labour force participation adjust to 
labour demand shocks which are region-specific. Overall, the results permit to
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conclude that the behaviour of regional relative variables is very sim ilar in Poland and 
Spain.
Having supported the argument of the similarities in behaviour o f the labour m arket 
variables in Poland and Spain, I can suggest that similar measures o f fighting 
unemployment could be applicable in both countries. However, given the data 
limitations, I can only test the effectiveness of the active labour market policies in 
Poland.
The effectiveness o f the labour market policies has been widely discussed in the 
literature. M any results suggest that ALMPs are not always a solution for labour 
market problems. The standard approach in assessing the effectiveness o f these 
methods is to measure their influence on the future employment prospects o f their 
participants. It is also important to consider the macroeconomic context, as the 
efficiency of the program m es on the micro level does not necessarily translate into 
their macroeconomic effect due to the indirect macroeconomic effects resulting from 
these policies. ALMPs may not only have an effect on the participants themselves, but 
may also have effects on the non-participant and unemployed populations or even on 
the employed population. I aim to capture some of these external effects in the 
empirical design.
Thus, assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs is crucial for policy m akers as these 
efforts may have no effects on the labour market at all, constituting a deadweight loss 
(when programme participants are primarily the unemployed who could find a job 
even without their assistance), create a substitution effect (when programme 
participants are employed at the expense of other unemployed, namely those excluded
from the programme) or a displacem ent effect (when programme participants are 
employed at the expense o f the people employed in this job  before, and who as a 
consequence become unemployed).
To analyse the effectiveness of the ALM P in Poland the augmented m atching function 
model is used. Overall, the results suggest that the ALM P in some cases have a 
negative substitution effect (intervention works) or a displacement effect. The policy, 
which has the strongest positive external effect, is public works and the worst negative 
external effect relate to intervention works. Training has a positive, but weak effect. 
The results on the efficiency o f ALMPs also demonstrate differences between regions 
split into agricultural, m odem  and industrial and different patterns o f impact in line 
with the results on the labour m arket dynamics. The agricultural regions, with higher 
unemployment respond to the ALM Ps more weakly than the other regions. The overall 
effects of training, unlike in the other types, are negative, while the effect o f 
intervention works is positive. Policies such as training are the most efficient in the 
modem voivodeships, where the efficiency o f intervention works is the lowest. These 
findings are in line with the results of regional labour market dynamics, which showed 
a great persistence in unemployment, especially in the poorer regions, indicating that 
these regions do not respond to ALM P in the same way as do other regions.
The results obtained perm it the drawing out of a tentative conclusion that ALM Ps in 
Poland should be reassessed as for their efficiency. The policies should be carefully 
designed and take into account different types of regions, which might have different 
needs and requirements. A troublesome result is that the regions where policy support 
is most needed are also those, which are least responsive to policy tools.
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Chapter 2 Literature review
In this chapter I do not aim to make a contribution to the general theory of 
unemployment. Nevertheless, the theory of unemployment is important for us as a 
point of reference and this brief overview is intended to establish a theoretical context 
for the empirical work presented subsequently. I start with general models and move 
to those that are most related to the empirical work based on spatial data: matching 
function and the wage curve. Based on this, subsequently I discuss labour market 
policies and empirical evidence on their effectiveness.
2.1 Theories of unemployment
Unemployment, according to the ILO definition, is a situation experienced by persons 
of working age who lack em ploym ent (or have not worked more than one hour during 
the short reference period o f the previous week or day) and who are actively seeking 
work and are ready to take it immediately (www.ilo.org). In the simplest 
microeconomic terms, unemployment may be interpreted as the excess of labour 
supply over labour demand.
Burda and W yplosz (2005) split the concept of equilibrium unemployment into 
frictional and structural. The equilibrium unemployment is defined as the 
unemployment, which would occur in the absence of short-term cyclical disturbances. 
Frictional unemployment is caused by normal occupational mobility in an economic 
system based on freedom of labour and economic initiative (also see Dawson, 1992). 
Structural unemployment is caused by a mismatch o f supply and dem and of labour. 
(Burda and W yplosz, 2005; Layard, et al., 1991, Layard, et al., 2005).
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In this chapter I will first discuss the determinants of short-term unemployment, i.e. 
around the Philips Curve. Next I will move to the key theories that describe the 
equilibrium rate. Finally, I will present the key insights of m odem  unemployment 
m odelling that focus on labour market flows directly and macroeconomic foundations. 
This modelling is important for us, as it forms the basis for the empirical part o f this 
project on ALMPs and regional differences in unemployment.
2.2 Inflation, wages, unemployment. Discussions around the Philips 
Curve
2.2.1 Philips Curve
According to Card (1995), the Philips curve relationship is one o f the most durable 
and controversial hypotheses in post- W orld W ar II economics. Professor A.W. 
Phillips (1958) basing his work on the study of the United Kingdom in 1861-1957, 
raised the question of the relationship between unemployment and the rate o f change 
in money wages. He postulated the existence of a negative relation between the rate o f 
change of wages and the unemployment rate. The original relationship was set out 
between unemployment and wages but later economic generalisation related 
unemployment with the rate of change in prices (inflation), due to the general 
assumption that these two series move in the same direction.
The Phillips argument implied a trade-off between production / em ploym ent and 
inflation. This relationship was accepted by economists until criticism by Friedman 
and Phelps led it to being discredited.
Friedman criticized Philips’s point o f view saying that it is wrong to relate a real 
variable (unemployment) with a nominal one (prices). “W hat must be done is to relate 
unemployment and real wages” (Friedman, 1976). According to Jossa and M usella 
(1998), the strongest of Friedm an’s criticisms of the Philips curve was the argument 
for the existence o f a natural rate of unemployment, which is hardly affected by 
Keynesian policies o f aggregate demand.
Friedm an’s argument against the Phillips trade off was that empirical evidence in the 
seventies showed high levels of unemployment and inflation, so it was difficult to 
accept the Phillips’ hypothesis as a general one. Similarly, evidence based on the 
countries not included in the Phillips paper, had implied results that seriously 
questioned the existence o f the Phillips trade off.
Friedman (1968) in his accelerationist Philips curve hypothesis correlated the 
expected real wage inflation with the unemployment rate. He provided evidence that 
for each expected level o f prices there is a Philips curve. Any change in expectations 
causes a shift in the Philips curve (Jossa and Musella, 1998). Assuming that workers 
would bargain their real wages, it was impossible to keep the inflation-unem ploym ent 
trade-off in the long-run. Thus he restored the argued Phillips hypothesis but only in 
the short run. According to this theory, the reduction of unemployment by macro 
policies is only possible in the short run but not in the long run, as unemployment 
returns to its natural level. The Phillips curve is completely vertical in the long run.
New Classical M acroeconomics moved even further in its criticism of the Philips
Curve. Economists like Lucas (1973), disproved the assumption that “policy makers
have any option between inflation and unemployment, even in the short run.” Their
theory is based on rational expectations concerning the inflation level, based on the
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information available. They claim that unemployment is caused by the inability of 
markets to transmit correct information. Once a macroeconomic model is based on 
rational expectations, the “surprise effect” of inflation is not possible. Therefore, even 
in the short term, an expected increase in money supply, will not affect either output, 
or employment level and the short run Philips curve may become vertical under these 
conditions.
2.3 Determinants of equilibrium rate of unemployment
2.3.1 Unemployment in the long run
As mentioned in the previous section, Friedman has introduced the relationship of 
inflation and unemployment in the long run, claiming that unemployment in the long 
run returns to its natural rate (Friedman, 1977).
The theories of unem ploym ent in the long run may be divided into two groups, those 
based on flow models and those based on stock models. Pissarides (1990) and 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) provide good surveys o f the former model type. 
Blanchard and Katz (1997) present a general model for the latter type. In general, all 
the models have the same implications. First, unemployment in the short-run and in 
the long-run is determined by real demand. Furthermore, in the long term, real demand 
and unemployment generally converge towards the level consistent with stable 
inflation (the equilibrium level). The equilibrium level of unemployment is affected 
first, by any variable which influences the ease with which unemployed individuals 
can be matched to available job  vacancies, and second, by any variable which tends to 
raise wages in a direct fashion despite excess supply in the labour m arket (Nickel, et 
al., 2002).
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Nickel, et al. (2002) also expand the subject of the variables which may influence 
equilibrium unemployment because o f their impact on the effectiveness with which 
the unemployed are m atched to available jobs or their direct effect on wages. In their 
opinion, the variables which we might expect to influence equilibrium unemployment 
include the unem ploym ent benefit system, the real interest rate, em ploym ent 
protection laws, barriers to labour mobility, active labour market policies, union 
structures and the extent of co-ordination in wage bargaining, labour taxes, terms of 
trade changes and shifts in trend productivity growth. Below, I present the key 
approaches that aim to explain the equilibrium (long run) rate o f unemployment.
2.3.2 Natural rate of unemployment
Friedman, (1968) and Phelps (1968) developed the theory of the natural rate of 
unemployment, also called equilibrium  unemployment. It includes classical, frictional 
and structural unemployment. The natural rate is typically interpreted as the rate o f 
unemployment consistent with constant (non-accelerating) inflation. (Blanchard and 
Katz, 1997). According to the natural-rate hypothesis, “the equilibrium  point is 
independent of the adjustment path taken by unemployment and thus of all current and 
past monetary variables.” (Coakley, et al., 2000).
However, the labour-demand curve can shift because of changes in real interest rates 
(Phelps 1994; Blanchard 1999), rate o f productivity growth (Pissarides, 1990), real 
costs (Oswald, 1999), and stock prices (Phelps, 1999).
2.3.3 NAIRU
The concept of NAIRU -non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment- stems from 
the equilibrium level o f unemployment at the level o f unemployment where inflation 
stabilizes. It is argued that there is a long-run equilibrium in which level of
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unemployment and inflation will be stable. (Layard, et al., 1991; Layard, et al., 2005) 
Yet, it is hard to measure the exact value o f the NAIRU as it changes over time.
Ball and Mankiw (2002) in their paper discuss why the NAIRU changes, with a 
special emphasis on the reason as to why it fell in the United States during the 1990s. 
Their hypothesis is that “the decline in the NAIRU is attributable to the acceleration in 
productivity growth” , (p. 2). NAIRU is approximately a synonym for the natural rate 
of unemployment. Changes in monetary policy, and aggregate demand push inflation 
and unemployment in opposite directions in the short run. Given this short-run trade­
off, there must be some level of unemployment consistent with stable inflation. When 
unemployment is below the NAIRU, inflation can be expected to rise, and when it is 
above the NAIRU, inflation can be expected to fall.
The failure of monetary neutrality to hold in the world is explained in many ways by 
different economists. Friedman (1968) and Lucas (1973) blamed short-run non 
neutrality on imperfections o f information (unanticipated inflation). Fischer (1977) 
attributed it to long-term labour contracts, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) to costs of 
price adjustment.
According to Ball and M ankiw (2002) Friedman meant the concept o f NAIRU even 
though he did not use this term.
Haffner, at al. (2001) investigated the relationship between the institutional and policy
factors influencing the structure o f product markets and those affecting the functioning
of labour markets. They argue that there are reasons to expect a higher employment
level as the result of an increase in product market competition (which can be caused
by market liberalisation), at both the firm level and at the aggregate level. To
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conclude, a comparatively high degree o f product market competition will make 
labour demand more elastic and shift it outwards. Therefore, we should observe higher 
employment rates in countries with higher overall levels o f product m arket 
competition. Similarly, more intense product market competition can similarly result 
in higher wages.
2.3.4 Efficiency Wage v. Insider - Outsider Theory
W hile labour market and wages were already at the core of the unemployment theory 
that originated from the Philips curve and its critique, the more recent approach 
elaborates on the m icro-foundations of the labour market going far beyond the original 
macroeconomic discussion. Efficiency W age and Insider- Outsider theories assume 
that there is a long-term em ploym ent relationship between a firm and its employees. In 
both theories insiders, who are experienced employees, have a protected position in 
their employment because o f the costs of firing them and hiring new entrants in their 
place.
The Insider-Outsider Theory is most closely associated with Blanchard and Summers 
(1986, 1987) and Lindbeck and Snower (1988). The key element in the theory is the 
wage rigidity and wage-setting mechanism between the firm and its employees. Their 
position allows them to exercise higher wage pressures than the market equilibrium 
would indicate. It assumes that the firm and the insiders will set wages without regard 
for the interests o f the outsiders.
Blanchard and Summers assume the ability of insiders to ignore the unemployed in 
wage setting. They focus on the implications of insider power in defining the insiders’ 
status in the presence of shocks that alter the size of the insider group. Lindbeck and
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Snower, in addition to this, explore the implications o f the insiders’ power for 
unemployment hysteresis and persistence. According to them, the insiders’ power 
comes from a range o f turnover costs that make it costly for firms to replace current 
employees with outsiders. The turnover costs include hiring and firing costs, morale 
effects of excessive turnover, and the ability of insiders to support new employees in 
the process of training. The labour turnover costs give power to the “insiders” as these 
costs cannot be entirely recuperated in the form of wage reductions of the new 
potential workers. Therefore, the employers are more willing to retain the “insiders” 
with higher wages, than to employ the “outsiders” with lower wages (Linbeck and 
Snower, 1988). Outsiders are those who remain unemployed or work in informal 
sector which does not offer them job security. Because of insiders’ experience in a 
firm, it is expensive for a company to replace them by outsiders, as they require 
additional training, time and some other additional costs to work as well as insiders. 
Moreover, costly firing procedures including severance payments may be involved. 
The bigger the firm ’s turnover costs, the greater the power the insiders have to 
exercise their wage pressure. The consequence of this phenomenon is involuntary 
unemployment.
Lindbeck and Snower (1988) base Insider -  Outsider Theory on the following 
assumptions:
Insiders have some market power that arises from labour turnover costs.
Outsiders and entrants have less market power than insiders.
Insiders use their power in order to pursue their interests in wage negotiations.
Insiders’ power to exercise an upward pressure on wages generates unemployment.
According to Lindbeck and Snower (1988) the shift in wages happens as long as the
firm remains profitable (absolute profitability constraint) and at least as profitable as
27
the new entrants on the product market (relative profitability constraint). Accordingly: 
“the insiders’ wage cannot exceed the marginal revenue product o f the firm ’s 
incumbent workforce plus the marginal firing costs. In the case where the incumbent 
workforce is sufficiently large, the entrants’ marginal revenue product falls beneath 
their reservation wage and consequently entrants are not profitable to the firm .” 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). In the opposite case, some entrants can be fired and 
therefore the insiders set their wage expectations in accordance with the relative 
profitability constraint. Insiders’ wages exceed the new entrants wage correspondingly 
to the sum of marginal hiring and firing costs. The authors emphasize that the insider -  
outsider theory is not connected with trade union power, as firing and hiring costs 
occur without the unions’ presence.
The efficiency wage theory  was developed by Stiglitz (1976) and form alised by Solow 
(1979). Solow’s starting point was that the firm will hire workers until the marginal 
cost o f labour is equal to the marginal unit productivity o f labour, where profits are 
maximised. The theory is based on the belief that the level o f real wages has a positive 
impact on labour efficiency. Therefore it is profitable for a firm to pay more than 
supply and demand would indicate, as it increases labour productivity and decreases 
labour costs. (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986, Akerlof, 1982). According to the adverse 
selection approach, by paying salaries above average wages, they attract the best 
employees to the organization. This theory assumes that the em ployers do not have 
enough information about workers productivity. Therefore they may use wage offers 
as a “screening device” (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) and by this mean attract better 
and more efficient candidates.
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Lindbeck and Snower (1988) underline the difference between the two above theories. 
Both theories have different assumptions and different implications. The first one 
concentrates on w orkers’ influence on wage determination, while the latter focuses on 
the firm s’ influence on wages. The authors state that these theories can be considered 
as complements, not substitutes.
2.3.5 Institutional determinants of unemployment: labour markets
One of the main institutional factors influencing the labour market consistent with 
Insiders -  Outsiders Theory is the employment protection law, which may make firms 
more cautious about filling vacancies (Bertola, 1998).
Institutional structure o f wage determination is a factor which has a direct impact on 
wages. W ithin every country there is a variety of structures. In some sectors wages are 
determined more or less competitively but in others, wages are bargained between 
employers and trade unions at the level of the establishment, firm or even industry 
(Nickel, et al., 2002). The outcome depends on union power in wage bargains, union 
coverage or unionisation and the degree of coordination of wage bargains. In general, 
the greater the union power and coverage, the greater the upward pressure on wages 
can be expected and hence the raising of equilibrium unemployment. As the authors 
note, it may be argued that “wage setting institutions impact directly on wages without 
influencing the efficiency of job  matching or the separation rate into unem ploym ent.” 
However, where union coverage is high, coordinated wage bargaining leads to lower 
unemployment. (Calmfors, et al., 1988). The importance of collective bargaining has 
been also emphasised by Blanchard (2007). He claims that labour markets are 
determined by the nature of collective bargaining and by the degree o f trust between
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social partners (labour, firms, and the state). “Countries with high reported trust 
between labour and firms have had a lower increase in unemployment than others, and 
the correlation appears to reflect in part causality.”
The final group o f variables which directly impacts on wages, presented by Nickel et 
al. (2001) are connected with real wage resistance. In this case while workers attempt 
to sustain recent rates of real wage growth, the rate consistent with stable em ployment 
may shifts unexpectedly. In the case o f an adverse shift in the terms of trade, real 
consumption wages fall if employment is not to decline. If workers continue to 
bargain rates of real wage growth, which take no account of the m ovem ent in the 
terms of trade, this will tend to raise unemployment. Exactly the same situation takes 
place if there is an unexpected fall in trend productivity growth or an increase in 
labour taxes. If labour taxes (payroll tax rates plus income tax rates plus consumption 
tax rates) go up, the real post-tax consumption wage falls if real labour costs per 
employee facing firms are not to rise.
Any resistance to this fall will provoke a rise in unemployment. This fact suggests that 
increases in real import prices, falls in trend productivity growth or rises in the labour 
tax rate may lead to a tem porary increase in unemployment.
Botero and others (2004) offers a comprehensive empirical investigation o f the impact
of labour market institutions, including employment regulation, collective relations,
and social security laws in 85 countries. They found that . . . “the political power of the
left is associated with more stringent labour regulations and more generous social
security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries
have sharply higher levels o f labour regulation than do common law countries.
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(...)H eavier regulation o f labour is associated with lower labour force participation 
and higher unemployment, especially o f the young.”
Consistent with this, OECD (1994), Layard, Nickell and Jackm an (1991), Nickell 
(1997), Nickell and Layard (1999) find that high unemployment is to a considerable 
extent caused by job  protection, labour taxes and trade union power. In addition, 
Oswald (1996, 1997a, 1999) and OECD (1999b) focus on one core indicator of wage 
‘inflexibility’, which is inversely proportional to unemployment.1
Another factor which influences unemployment is product market and capital market 
competition and integration (Blanchard and Philippon, 2005). However, the impact of 
the changes in the nature of product market competition is again mediated through the 
behaviour of the institutional labour market participants. In particular, in the last 40 
years European countries have experienced a steady increase in both product market 
competition and capital mobility. According to the authors:
. . . ’’these changes are likely to increase efficiency and output in the long run, but it 
may take time for economic actors to fully understand them and adapt. In the presence 
of collective bargaining and slow learning by unions, these changes can generate first 
a rise, then a decline in unemployment.” ...
Higher competition, coming from product market deregulation, is unlikely to generate 
an increase in unemployment, even if unions do not understand the change. Higher 
capital mobility, on the other hand, is likely to lead to lower unemployment if unions 
understand the change, but to higher unemployment if they do not. As the process of
1 A ccording to Layard. N ickell and Jackman (1 9 9 1 ), unskilled labour markets have in flex ib le  w ages and 
elastic dem and. The more flex ib le  w ages are and the less elastic  is dem and, then the labour tax rate 
should be higher.
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understanding these changes is different in different countries, it can explain cross­
country differences in the evolution o f unemployment.
2.3.6 Labour Market Policies: passive policies -  unemployment benefits
The unemployment benefit system directly affects the readiness of the unemployed to 
fill vacancies. The important aspects are: the level of benefits, their coverage, the 
length of time for which they are available and the strictness with which the system is 
operated. Related to unemployment benefits is the availability of other resources to 
those without jobs (Phelps, 1994). According to Layard, et al. (2005), the structure of 
unemployment benefits has an influence on equilibrium  unemployment. This has been 
confirmed by many researchers. Cross-country macro evidence is provided by 
Scarpetta (1996), Nickell and Layard (1999) and Carling et al. (1999). In addition, it 
has been shown that the shorter the duration o f benefits, the shorter the unemployment 
duration period (Katz and Meyer, 1990). The evidence based on research on Portugal 
and Spain from Bover (2000) suggests that the unemployed not covered by any 
benefits exit unemployment much faster than those covered by some assistance.
Countering this - Blanchflower (2001) argues that despite some evidence that 
generous benefits can increase unemployment, there is a weak correlation in the data 
supporting this fact. The proof of this theory is the case of Italy which has high 
unemployment and low benefits.
2.3.7 Comparative institutions and unemployment: Europe versus the US
Much of the discussion of the impact of institutions on unemployment centred on the 
comparison between Europe and the US. The unarguable fact is that unem ploym ent in 
Europe is higher than in the US. Western Europe has more job  protection, higher
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unemployment benefits, more union power and a more generous welfare state. 
Blanchard and W olfers (2000) argue that “the interaction of shocks and institutions 
does a good statistical job  of fitting the evolution of unemployment both over time and 
across countries” .
However, Blanchflower (2001) questions this view because it is obtained in “an over­
fitted model -few data points and lots of variables- and the results appear to be driven 
by the cross-section variation rather than by any time series changes.” In many OECD 
countries we could notice a rise in unemployment, which was accompanied by the 
decrease of unemployment benefits and union power weakening. (Blanchflower, 
1996).
Blanchflower (2001) argues that recent research suggests that supply shocks caused by 
changes in commodity prices in general and the oil price in particular are some of the 
causes of movements in unemployment.
Blanchard and W olfers (2000) emphasize that labour market rigidities cannot explain 
why European unemployment is much higher than US unemployment because the 
institutions generating these rigidities were much the same in the 1960s as they are 
today. In the 1960s, unemployment was much higher in the United States than in 
Europe, which in their eyes excludes this theory from being universal and true.
2.4 Medium run unemployment, wage curve, regional heterogeneity of 
unemployment
2.4.1 Medium run unemployment
Blanchard and W olfer’s (2000) criticism just discussed is related to the observation 
that the dichotomous short-term v. long-term distinction may be too crude to
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approximate the real dynamics well. Accordingly, the discussion on determ inants of 
unemployment shifted from the dual distinction between the short-run fluctuations and 
long-run equilibrium rate. In particular, Coakley, et al. (2000) explain the nature of 
medium run unemployment dynamics. There are two competing schools of thought on 
this subject. Authors call them the persistence and the structuralist schools, 
respectively.
The persistence approach em phasizes the role of slow dynamic adjustment towards the 
natural rate o f unemployment. In this view unemployment is caused by transitory 
nominal and real shocks, where slow adjustment is usually referred to as persistence or 
hysteresis. The latter is seen as a failure of a system subjected to an external influence 
to return to its initial conditions after the influence has been rem oved.2 An economy 
experiences hysteresis, when its long run equilibrium depends on the path it follows in 
the short run. The concept o f hysteresis in unemployment was first introduced by 
Phelps (1972) and later used by Blanchard and Summers (1986). It denotes situations 
where transitory shocks have perm anent or very persistent effects.
According to Burda (1995), causes of long-term persistence or hysteresis in labour 
markets are controversial. Hysteresis may be caused by several institutional factors. 
Among them he enumerates social insurance and unemployment insurance, which 
through the interaction with tax system can depress the demand for labour by firms. 
Other factors leading to hysteresis might be labour force status or fixed costs
' For a review  on the subject see: Franz (1990)
^Hysteresis in the labour market w ould arise if  the natural rate U* depended on past unem ploym ent U.
A change in aggregate dem and w ould first influence unem ploym ent by causing U to deviate from U *, 
but then w ould have a persistent effect on unem ploym ent as U* changed. A recession  that raises 
unem ploym ent effects econ om y in a perm anent way and thus U* is higher even  after the initial shock  
that caused the recession has disappeared. (B all and M ankiw . 2002)
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associated with change o f occupation. Burda (1995) also delivers an alternative 
interpretation of hysteresis, which is the existence of multiple equilibria, as the 
unforeseen shocks move the economy from one equilibrium to another.
ILO (1995) opinion on this matter is consistent with the hysteresis hypothesis:
"The foregoing review of the evidence suggests that labour market rigidities have not 
been an underlying cause o f past labour market performance. Labour market 
performance has deteriorated since the first oil shock irrespective o f differences in 
labour market regulation, suggesting that a more fundamental common factor (or 
factors) has been at work." (1995, p.20)
In contrast, the structuralist school theory is more interested in movements or shifts in 
the natural rate due to the interplay of changes in real macroeconomic variables and 
institutions. According to the persistence school, temporary shocks such as cyclical 
movements in unemployment often constitute the cause of medium-term 
unemployment.
In the view of the structuralist school, the main variables affecting short-term and 
medium-term unemployment are the natural rate and the associated equilibrium. They 
have derived a m oving-natural rate theory of changes in actual unemployment (see 
Pissarides, 1990; Phelps, 1994).
2.4.2 Long-term unemployment
Long-term unemployment (unemployed over 12-month-period) represents one o f the 
most persistent, and also in quantitative terms, serious, social issues facing many 
industrialized economies. It may lead to hysteresis effects (see below and 2.4 above 
for more details). As reported by Layard, et al. (1991), its incidence is correlated with
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the unemployment levels. W ith the rise of unemployment, the share o f long-term 
unemployed increases as well.
Unemployment induces a process of de-motivation or habituation, leading to 
reductions in job search activity and therefore to a declining probability o f leaving 
unemployment. Furthermore, long-term unemployment leads to skill deterioration and 
loss of work habits. This process downgrades the value of the worker on the labour 
market. Employers may use unemployment duration as a signal for the quality of the 
worker and therefore rank candidates for work according to their unemployment 
duration (Blanchard, 1991 and Blanchard and Diamond, 1994, M ickiewicz and Bell, 
2000). Long-term unem ployed are unable to compete with short-term unemployed, 
due to a lack of downwards pressure on wages. Long-term unemployment is 
connected to hysteresis effect, (see 2.1 for more details).
2.4.3 Labour market immobility
Another cause of unem ploym ent might be labour market immobility o f the population 
and the role of home ownership which seem able to explain at least some of the 
upward trend in unemployment.
Oswald (1997a) suggests that the large rise in European home ownership may be a 
factor causing the rise in unemployment. European governments have made concerted 
efforts to reduce the size of the private rented sector and to increase home ownership 
(Oswald, 1997a). This fact immobilizes homeowners, partly because they find it much 
more costly than private renters to move around. Unemployment rates have grown 
most rapidly in the countries with the fastest growth in home ownership. This was the 
case in Spain which has the highest unemployment and the highest rate o f home 
ownership and Switzerland the lowest unemployment and the lowest rate o f home
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ownership. However, the UK, which also has a high level of home ownership, did not 
suffer from high unemployment problem. One o f the reasons for that might be the 
flexibility o f the UK labour market and its lack in Spain.
Yet, in the 1950s and 1960s the US had the highest unemployment and the highest rate 
of home ownership (Oswald, 1999). Moreover, high home ownership rates block 
young people’s ability to enter an area to find a job. Oswald (1999) has suggested 
some links explaining this correlation. First, there is a direct effect from home 
ownership. Selling a hom e and moving is expensive, thus many homeowners who lose 
their jobs are willing to comm ute to find work instead of moving. Hence owners are 
less mobile than renters, and therefore more vulnerable to economic downturns in their 
region.
Moreover, in such a situation, when people are not eager to move in order to find a 
suitable job, workers do jobs for which they are not ideally suited. This inefficiency 
raises costs of production and lowers real incomes in a country. Prices thus have to be 
higher, and real wages lower, than in a more mobile society and jobs get destroyed. 
(Nickel, et al., 2002).
2.4.4 Wage Curve and spatial distribution of unemployment
The discussion of home ownership is one important example of how the search for 
better modelling of microeconom ic foundations of unemployment led to the focus on 
spatial effects. I now discuss the spatial aspects in more detail. In particular, the 
discussion on the relationship between the level of unemployment and the level of 
wages initiated with the Philips Curve is seen from a new angle, once the spatial 
perspective is introduced. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) found a spatial link
between these two variables based on m icroeconomic evidence from more than a 
dozen countries. Holding other factors constant, the relation says that in the regions 
with higher unemployment, wages will be lower. The relationship constitutes the wage 
curve.
According to the wage curve theory, a worker employed in an area o f high 
unemployment, will earn less than an identical individual working in a region o f low 
unemployment. Card (1995) states that: “the tendency for the wage curve to show up 
for different kinds o f workers, in different economies and at different times, suggests 
that the wage curve may be close to an empirical law o f  economics.” (p. 27).
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) provide the comparison between the W age Curve 
and the Philips Curve. The Philips Curve links the rate of change o f pay to the 
aggregate unemployment rate. On the other hand, the wage curve links the level o f pay 
to the local unemployment rate. The Philips Curve concentrates on the effect of 
aggregate unemployment and the wage curve on the local unemployment. The Philips 
Curve is estimated on time-series macroeconomic data and the wage curve on pooled 
cross sections of m icroeconom ic data.
In their book, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) have challenged the empirical
foundations of Philips Curve. They argue that “microeconomic evidence of a low
auto-regression coefficient in real wage regressions invalidates the m acroeconom ic
Philips Curve” . However, W helan (1997) demonstrates that constant prices and
adaptive inflation expectations are sufficient to derive the accelerationist Philips curve.
They claim that it is not necessary to make Blanchflower’s and O sw ald’s assum ption
on auto-regression coefficient in real wage. His argument is that “macro-level real
wages will not display the dynamics of micro-level real wages.” Therefore, m icro­
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level dynamics of real wage may be irrelevant to prove the validity o f the 
accelerationist Philips curve and NAIRU. Similarly, Blanchard and Katz (1997) 
challenged this conclusion and defended the traditional accelerationist Philips curve. 
They presented evidence that provided a good empirical fit between the change in real 
prices and unemployment rate.
On balance, the contribution by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, 1995) does not 
invalidate the earlier theory, yet introduce an important new dimension, which is also 
important from the policy point of view, as regional differences are a point of concern 
for policy makers.
2.4.5 Regional labour market dynamics
Parallel to the focus on the static aspect of regional unemployment, the regional 
dynamics was first analysed by Blanchard and Katz (1992) who examined regional 
evolutions in the US. They were followed by Decressin and Fatas (1995), who 
compare the results obtained for European states to those obtained from a similar 
analysis of region-specific (state-specific) evolutions in the US (Blanchard and Katz, 
1992). They examine whether labour market disturbances are distributed less 
symmetrically across the regions in Europe and whether they trigger less interregional 
migration than in the US. The aim of their research is to analyze to what extent 
regional employment dynamics are common to all regions in Europe and to all states 
in the US. It finds that a larger proportion of movements in employment growth are 
common to all US states than to all European regions. In their study o f the adjustment 
mechanisms to a typical region-specific shock, they show that for Europe, in the first 
three years, most of the shock is absorbed by changes in the participation rate while, in 
the US, it is immediately reflected in migration. In both cases, the unem ploym ent rate
plays a small role suggesting the presence of natural unemployment rates at the 
regional level (Decressin and Fatas 1995).
In chapter 4 I analyze developments o f regional labour markets in Poland and Spain 
since their transition to democracy and the open market. I concentrate on investigating 
the extent to which labour market shocks are shared by all regions and how regional 
employment, unemployment and labour force participation adjust to labour demand 
shocks which are region-specific. Therefore, it is also useful to discuss briefly the 
contributions that focus on Spain.
Spanish regional labour market dynamics has been investigated by Jimeno and 
Bentolila (1998). They examined the degree of persistence o f regional relative 
unemployment. Jim eno and Bentolila (1998) have built a theoretical model to explain 
the role of migration, labour force participation, and real wage flexibility at the 
regional level, in determining such persistence. The model is used to account for the 
observed degree of persistence o f regional relative unemployment in Spain, as 
compared to the US and the European Union, also providing new estimates on real 
wage flexibility in Spanish regions.
The research carried out by Jim eno and Bentolila (1998) and also Decressin and Fatas
(1995) demonstrates that European regional relative unemployment rates -  with
respect to the average European unemployment rate are scarcely persistent. So,
although Eichengreen (1990) finds that the speed of adjustment o f national
unemployment in nine EU countries to the average in this area is about 25 percent
lower than in US states, Decressin and Fatas (1995) find that the persistence of
regional relative unemployment is actually lower in Europe than in the US. According
to Blanchard and Katz (1992), regional persistence is low in the US because workers
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migrate in response to region-specific shocks. In the European case, the low 
persistence results, according to Decressin and Fatas (1995), from large m ovem ents in 
and out of the labour force in response to changes in regional circumstances. Jim eno 
and Bentolila (1998) also highlighted the role of wage rigidity and low migration as 
the main factors introducing a wedge between persistence at the two levels. According 
to them:
. . . ’’Increased wage flexibility will, under some conditions, lead to less 
unemployment persistence. Since there are reasons to believe that wage flexibility is 
higher at the national than at the regional level see below, regional relative 
unemployment would tend to be more persistent than aggregate unemployment. 
However, even if wages are rigid, as long as interregional migration is very elastic as 
in the US or regional labour force participation is highly cyclical as in the EU, the 
persistence of regional relative unemployment will be low. W age flexibility, 
migration, and participation interact in interesting ways, we can show that the 
reduction of unemployment persistence due to increased wage flexibility will be 
higher the higher is the elasticity o f either migration or participation to relative wages, 
but it will be lower the higher is the elasticity of these two variables to relative 
unemployment. Therefore, establishing which mechanisms induce people to migrate 
and participate in the labour force is important for the effectiveness of policies aimed 
at achieving lower regional unemployment persistence through higher wage 
flexibility.” ...(p.2)
This contribution is important, as it demonstrates that the relationship between the 
macro level and regional level labour market variables is not trivial, and some
aggregate level rigidity may in fact lead to higher oscillations at the regional level.
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2.4.6 The (Augmented) Matching Function Approach
The modem modelling o f the labour market dynamics relies on the m atching function 
approach. The assumption of the model is that it takes time to reallocate and to match 
workers and jobs. Also, there is an assumption o f continuous job destruction and job 
creation, layoffs and new vacancies. The model makes predictions about how different 
shocks affect unemployment, vacancies and wages. It enables the m odelling of 
frictions with the minimum of added complexity. It captures the effects of frictions in 
the economy on equilibrium  outcomes in terms of a small number of variables and 
with the reference to the source o f the friction (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001).
As described by Puhani (1999), new work contracts (matches) are the outcome of a 
complex search process, in which workers look for adequate jobs and firms look for 
adequate workers. The matching function is a macroeconomic concept which aims to 
summarise the outcome of this complex reality. This is done by relating the hiring of 
workers to a minimum set of determining variables. The basic principle of the 
matching function is to model matches of unemployed workers with vacancies as 
outcomes of a production process which has stocks of unemployed and vacancies as 
its main inputs (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; 1990; Pissarides, 1990).
Pissarides (1990) developed a macroeconomic model o f equilibrium unemployment 
with the matching function as a main ingredient to it. In Pissarides’ (1990, Chapter 4) 
model, constant returns to scale in the matching function are assumed to ensure the 
uniqueness of equilibrium. There is empirical evidence showing that the constant 
returns to scale matching function of a Cobb-Douglas form is an appropriate model 
with convincing explanatory power for many economies. The matching function has 
thus become an attractive tool for analysing labour market flows empirically.
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As also explained by Puhani (1999), the microeconomic foundation o f the matching 
function is that both workers and firms have to search for their appropriate match in a 
world of uncertainty. The inclusion of uncertainty is an extension to the standard 
neoclassical model where all information in the economy permeates instantaneously 
through to all agents. W ith uncertainty and transaction costs, a worker will receive a 
number of job  offers in a specific interval which is drawn from some known or 
unknown distribution. He or she then has to decide whether to accept that offer or wait 
for a better one to arrive. Similarly, a firm with a vacancy will receive a num ber o f job 
applications and has to decide whether to employ somebody from among the 
applicants or whether to leave the vacancy open and wait for a more qualified worker 
to apply for the job. Clearly, the more unemployed people and vacancies there are in 
the economy, the more contacts will be established between workers and vacancies. 
As a consequence, the expected number of matches will increase.
A weakness of the m atching function concept is that it does not consider job-to-job 
transitions. The assumption is that vacancies are filled only with unem ployed people. 
However, there is evidence that job  to job flows are important. For example, in 
Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics many workers move from the public to 
the private sector without any intervening unemployment spell (Boeri, 1994a; 1994b). 
This also seems likely for Poland. However, as data on job-to-job transitions are not 
available, previous empirical implementations of the matching function had to exclude 
this phenomenon.
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2.5 Active and passive labour market policies
The dynamic approach to unemployment and focus on transfers between the labour 
market states is a natural approach to analyse the active labour market policies that 
aim ot facilitate the transfers from unemployment into employment. In this section I 
will discuss the concept o f labour market policy and empirical results on its 
effectiveness. Government policies should be concentrated on increasing the readiness 
and ability of unemployed to take up new jobs, through the developments o f ALMPs 
(Layard, et al., 2005). However, in order to be effective, they need to be well 
designed. Otherwise, they can even have a negative effect on unemployment, as 
suggested by Nickell (1997), Scarpetta (1996), Nickell and Layard (1999). The 
evidence of the positive influence of ALMPs can be found in Blanchard and W olfers 
(2000), Katz (1998), M artin (2000). The results of my own research will be presented 
in Chapter 5.
ALMPs might have an im portant role to play in combating unemployment in general 
and especially long-term unemployment. These policies are meant to boost outflow 
rates from unemployment, in particular from long term unemployment, thus raising 
labour turnover and improving the performance of the labour market. Active measures 
in the labour market are designed to introduce an early identification o f needs o f 
unemployed persons and to promote programmes leading to the im provement of 
human resources quality (training courses, practical training of a vocation, and 
subsidised employment). This includes a requirement to conduct regular research and 
analyses of the effectiveness of individual programmes. (Sztanderska and Piotrowski, 
1999).
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Some of the most commonly used ALM Ps are training, intervention works and public 
works. Puhani (1999) mentions that policies aimed at training and re-training are 
designed to solve skill m ismatch in the labour market. Subsidized employm ent in 
private and public firms and direct public job  creation are instruments used in order to 
rebuild human capital o f the long-term unemployed. Intervention works is a 
programme that gives wage or jobs subsidies in the amounts o f the level of 
unemployment benefit. These wage subsidies are given to firms in the private or 
public sector if they hire an unemployed person. Public work jobs are jobs created by 
the government, in particular by the municipalities, targeted mainly at the long-term 
unemployed.
According to a study by M eager and Evans (1997), schemes that have the best 
employment effects are those which provide experience close to working life (e.g. 
schemes run by or involving enterprises).
Most active labour market measures focus on the reintegration into the labour market 
of people who have already become long-term unemployed. The policy literature 
suggests that policies, rather than intervening to improve the labour m arket position of 
the long-term unemployed, should be focusing on preventing people from becoming 
long-term unemployed, by identifying and taking preventive actions towards those 
groups which are at risk of becoming long-term unemployed. A preventative strategy 
may be for example, counselling and advice offered by specialized agencies.
The biggest threat to the long term unemployed is the fact that their skills may begin 
to deteriorate and lose their relevance to changing employer requirem ents. As for the 
social consequences of this phenomenon there is the loss of m otivation and self­
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confidence o f unemployed persons, and following this they may be the subject of a 
range of physical, emotional and health problems, with the associated costs to 
themselves and society. However, the major problem is that there is no reliable 
method of identifying at an early stage those individuals with a high risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed. Such preventive strategy is very difficult to pursue and 
economists such as M eager and Evans (1997), show considerable scepticism, that an 
effective early identification process can be found.
The impact of ALM P has also been compared with the impact of passive policies. In 
particular, the design o f unemployment benefit schemes has been criticized, as these 
schemes have been created at a time when high and structural unemployment did not 
exist. “They aimed at providing insurance against the risk of temporary income loss 
caused by involuntary lay-off. They were not designed to deal with the persistent 
income loss facing the current jobless. ( ...)  there is a widespread belief that it is partly 
the benefit scheme itself that causes a ‘culture’ of benefit dependency and therefore 
persistent unemployment.” (Cockx, 1998).
Therefore, in recent years, it has become a common theme in the political debate on 
remedies to tackle the unemployment problem, that governments should shift the 
balance of public spending on labour market policies away from passive income 
support towards more active measures designed to get the unemployed back into 
work.( Martin, 1998).
In general, M eager and Evans (1997) developed a categorization of the various policy 
measures at a macro level as follows:
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• “Demand-side-oriented approaches, which attempt to increase the volume of 
labour demand or to bias that demand towards the recruitment o f the long­
term unemployed. This category includes measures which do this directly  (e.g. 
through the creation o f jobs for the long-term unemployed), as well as those 
which do it indirectly  (e.g. through offering subsidies or incentives to 
employers to recruit the long-term unemployed;
• Supply-side-oriented approaches, which attempt to improve the chances of the 
long-term unemployed on the labour market, by increasing their skills and 
human capital (e.g. through training), their ability to access available jobs, or 
their motivation for job-search (through advice, counselling and assistance 
with job search), or indeed their willingness to take up certain job  
opportunities (through benefit conditionality, reduction in the ‘benefit trap’ 
etc.)”
Furthermore, they break down the range of measures into more detailed categories.
• Incentives or subsidies for employers (these include demand-side measures, 
which tackle job  creation indirectly, through subsidies or other incentives to 
employers to encourage them to recruit the long-term unemployed).
• Direct employment/job-creation schemes (includes initiatives which create 
employment directly for the long-term unemployed). They offer work 
experience, with participants normally undertaking socially-useful activities. 
Among this category of measures they include traditional job-creation 
schemes, which create (usually short-term) jobs in the public or quasi-public 
sectors for the unemployed and small scale, often local or com m unity-based
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programmes aimed at generating employment in the ‘intermediate labour 
m arket’.
•  W ork-sharing/reducing labour supplies (tackles unemployment from the 
supply-side, and tend to be focused on unemployment in general, rather than 
long-term unemployment). W ithin this group we can identify:
Subsidies to those in employment to reduce their labour supply, to 
share work with the (long-term) unemployed 
- Subsidies to the (long-term) unemployed to reduce their labour supply, 
and in the extrem e case, to become economically inactive (e.g. by early 
retirement).
• Vocational training-based schemes account for an extremely high proportion 
of active labour m arket policy expenditure for the long-term unemployed. 
They are supply-side oriented, and may be classroom-based, and/or may 
involve job training in a work placement.
• Job-search training, counselling (a measure already introduced by many 
countries). Are designed to improve participants’ employability and 
‘m otivation’ and the ‘work attitudes’ of the long-term unemployed.
• Tackling information deficits and labour market “friction” (delivered through 
the public employment services (PES), aim to address market failure and 
information deficits in the job-hiring process.
targeted job-m atching or broking services 
subsidised short-term placements with employers.
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•  Incentives or subsidies to individuals include supply-side m easures to reduce 
the costs to the job-seeker in finding, accepting or keeping a job. Am ong them 
the following can enumerate:
•  Provision of ‘in work benefits’, either to all low paid workers, or to newly 
employed entrants from unemployment.
Subsidies to the individual unemployed person to support the costs o f 
job-related training/re-training/education.
Subsidies to offset the individual’s costs of finding and entering a job  
(e.g. expenses incurred in job  search, such as travel-to-interview 
expenses);
Subsidies to support unemployed people becoming self-
• Measures aiming to ‘activate’ the unemployed
Supply side approaches aiming to reduce the ‘reservation w age’ of the 
unemployed, by providing a disincentive for them to refuse low-paying 
jobs. Often works through a time-limit of the receipt o f unemployment 
benefit.
‘W orkfare’ approaches (used in the USA and Australasia), in which the 
unemployed are required to work as a condition for the receipt of 
unemployment or social security benefits.
2.5.1 Studies on policy impact based on Augmented Matching Functions for 
Transition Economies
The applied literature relying on augmented matching functions is typically focused on 
the estimates of the effects of active labour market policy (ALM P) programmes. So 
far it has been mainly concentrated on transition economies. There are studies on the
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Czech and Slovak Republics (Burda and Lubyova, 1995; Svejnar, et al., 1995; and 
Boeri and Burda, 1996) and there is also some evidence on Poland in Lehmann 
(1995), Gora, et al. (1996), Puhani and Steiner (1996; 1997), and Kwiatkowski and 
Tokarski (1997).
The results of the estimates o f the effectiveness o f ALMPs from augmented m atching 
functions in Central Europe are mixed. Some researchers suggest a significant positive 
effects (Burda and Lubyova, 1995; Svejnar, Terell, and Munich, 1995; Boeri and 
Burda, 1996; Kwiatkowski and Tokarski, 1997), while others like Lehmann (1995), 
Gora, Lehmann, Socha, and Sztanderska (1996) and Puhani and Steiner (1996; 1997) 
claim that these m easures have no impact at all. Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997) 
find negative effects o f public works and loans to enterprises on outflows from 
unemployment.
Puhani (1998) in his research o f the effectiveness of ALMP evaluated by m atching 
function and traditional econometric modelling in the form of duration models with 
unobserved individual heterogeneity provided evidence that training programmes 
increase the re-employment chances o f the unemployed. On the other hand, 
intervention and public works programmes have a negative employment effect in the 
medium run. According to the author, intervention works prolong unemployment. 
There are several explanations of these findings. One of them is the fact that a lack of 
qualification is one of the main reasons of unemployment.
Training may work better because it addresses the cause of the problem. Another
explanation is based on institutional factors. In the 1990s participation in intervention
or public works renewed the entitlement period to unemployment benefits to another
full term of 12 months. This in turn allowed many people to move between the work
programmes and unemployment benefits. In addition these finding can be explained
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by stigma effects of works programmes related to employers having bad opinions of 
works programmes, and consequently seeing participation in such a program me as a 
negative indication of a em ployee’s productivity. Policy conclusions made by Puhani 
suggest that the policy makers should increase the expenditure share o f training in 
active labour market programmes and should separate unemployment benefit 
entitlement from participation in an active programme.
The results of the regional analysis of the Polish case by Puhani (1999) based on data 
from 1992- 1996 show that the costs involved in reducing unemployment through 
training are higher in the industrial voivodeships (between € 500 and € 900), than in 
the agricultural ones (around € 100). He found no effects of training in the modern 
voivodeships. He could only find some positive training effects when using register 
data. According to model specifications that use Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 
data, the results suggest that training has no effect on the outflows from 
unemployment.
The results of the research presented in Chapter 5 indicate that some forms of ALMPs 
are effective (public work and a weak effect o f training) and other have a negative 
effect (intervention works).
2.6 Conclusions
The chapter has introduced a literature review of theories of unemployment, a 
discussion around Philips Curve, determinants of equilibrium rate o f unemployment, 
regional heterogeneity of unemployment, labour market policies and empirical 
evidence on their impact on unemployment. I have highlighted the institutional 
determinants of unemployment and concentrated on the discussion around the regional
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labour market dynamics and the matching function approach. This provides the 
background for my empirical analysis of the Polish and Spanish labour market and the 
analysis o f the effectiveness of the ALMPs, which follow in Chapter 5 and 6.
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Chapter 3 Review of the labour market in Poland
This chapter reviews the Polish labour market characteristics, developm ents and 
trends. First, it introduces the labour markets in transition economies, followed by an 
overview of the transition o f the labour market in Poland, the resulting labour market 
characteristics in the country and causes o f unemployment. In this context it describes 
the existing labour m arket policies and the social security system in Poland and 
suggests possible policy improvements. The latter links with the empirical chapters, 
which follow.
3.1 Labour markets in Transition Economies
The transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy in Central 
and Eastern Europe has caused a rapid increase in unemployment, which replaced 
labour shortages and labour hoarding. The emergence of unemployment in the region 
was inevitable due to both macro and micro factors. The first group of factors includes 
the short-term impact o f output collapse (where the state sector declined rapidly and 
the private sector took time to grow) and a medium-term impact o f an outdated 
institutional framework, which was reformed slowly. W ithin the micro factors, the 
most important are the skills mismatch, lack of adequate training, lack o f mobility and 
effective housing market.
Expressing the same ideas in a slightly different way one may say that unem ploym ent 
has been due to the fact that the process o f transformation from central planning to a 
free market has still not been concluded and the reallocation o f resources from an 
inefficient allocation of labour and capital to more efficient one is still not in place.
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Related to this, there is a legacy o f unemployable workers (either with the wrong skills 
or located in inadequate regions). Furthermore, the reason behind high unemployment 
might be the choice o f wrong institutions, which increase the long term equilibrium  
rate of unemployment (Faggio, 2007): not just that the initial institutional setting was 
not conducive to the efficient labour market outcome, but also the paths of 
institutional change were not necessary converging on efficient solutions.
Both sectoral change and shift in demand for skills can be described as restructuring4. 
The communist countries were characterized by a very high share o f industry in 
employment, which as a consequence o f transition became the subject o f a far- 
reaching reorganisation. Rising unemployment was one o f results of 
deindustrialisation, especially due to skill mismatch and inadequate job creation in the 
“new” sectors (M ickiewicz and Zalewska, 2006).
Some of the most important strengths o f the old system were the facts that it offered 
job security, guaranteed essential social benefits, and labour force participation was 
very high. On the other hand, the system was characterized by a low productivity rate 
of growth. Once this job  security was removed, and both possibility and incentives for 
restructuring were introduced, the unemployment emerged (Jackman, 1994).
The causes of emerging unemployment can vary in intensity through time and by 
transition countries, nonetheless we may distinguish the main dim ensions of 
unemployment, which require different policies to fight this phenomenon. In the short 
to medium term, unemployment is the result o f aggregate shocks. Am ong them, we 
can enumerate the impact of macroeconomic stabilization, the collapse o f central 
planning arrangements, the fall in aggregate demand and a large increase in the prices
4 M ore on deindustrialisation and structural d ifferences in section  3 .2  and 3 .4 .5 .
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of imported energy and raw material inputs. Because of these shocks, the demand for 
labour in the country falls, having stronger effects on some particular sectors.
Exposure to modem  technology and world trade constitute medium term causes o f 
structural unemployment, which results from sectoral imbalances and restructuring, 
caused by changes in relative prices. These shocks typically occur during the 
transformation process, and can be counteracted by labour reallocation throughout 
sectors, and accompanied by the implementation o f active labour market policies 
(Jackman and Fretwell 1994). Active labour market policies in transition econom ies 
have been an integral part o f labour market policies, but still remain, relatively under­
developed (see section 3.5.2 for more details on active labour market policies).
At the same time, one the most important challenges o f the transition included m aking 
the labour market more flexible and an improvement of education and training. Both 
were important for reduction o f unemployment (Barr, (1994). Structural 
unemployment may result from a geographic mismatch between the location of jobs 
available and the location of jobseekers, or by the gap between the skills possessed by 
jobseekers and skills needed for the available work places (M cConner and Brue, 
1995).
An additional complication is that we may face some feedback effects between
unemployment and other macroeconomic variables. Some other authors like Boeri
(1999) suggest that unemployment growth in transition is, on the one hand, influenced
by the speed of the removal of state subsidies, on the other hand, high unemployment
may strike back on this speed because of fiscal effects related to the funding o f
unemployment benefits, with political economy factors eroding the consensus
gathered around the reform effort or other mechanisms. Similarly, Aghion and
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Blanchard (1994) in their model argue that the basic feedback mechanism  raising 
unemployment is coming from the fiscal side. High unemployment means large 
outlays to fund unemployment benefits, hence higher payroll taxation. This reduces 
job  creation in the private sector.
In addition to a narrow economic perspective, one needs also to take into account 
inter-linkages between social and cultural variables and both policies and economic 
outcomes. Accordingly, a different perspective is taken by Blanchflower (1994), who 
examined the attitudes o f workers in traditional communist societies toward working 
conditions, wage inequality, the role of unions and the role of the state in determining 
labour market outcomes. He found that in former communist countries comm unism  
left an identifiable comm on legacy in the labour area. The citizens of form er 
communist countries tend to be less satisfied with their jobs, and are more supportive 
of state interventions in the job  market.
All the above arguments are re-examined in the following section on the Polish labour 
market situation.
3.2 The transition of the labour market in Poland - an overview
The Polish labour market after the political and economic change in 1989 has gone 
though an intense transformation. The impact of the transition has translated into 
change in both the level and structure of employment and the level and distribution of 
wages (Barr, 2005). Unemployment in Poland emerged at the initial period o f its 
political and economic transformation. In the previous era the problem was a shortage
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of human resources, and after 1990, their relative surplus. Unem ploym ent rose from 
virtually zero to a peak of around 16% at the end of 1993, declining to the level o f 
around 10% in 1998 and since then rising again to the level o f 20% in 2004 (GUS, 
2005).
Three years after the EU accession (in 2004), the labour market is still characterised 
by the highest unemployment rate and the lowest employment and economic activity 
rates among the EU m em ber states.
In addition, the Polish labour market situation is characterised by strong regional 
differences, the high unemployment of the rural population (see section 3.4.4), high 
youth unemployment, a high percentage of uneducated people in the population o f 
unemployed, a high percentage o f women in the total number of unemployed (see 
section 3.4.2) and finally significant long-term unemployment (see section 3.4.3).
The main problem for the economy as a whole has been to maintain a high rate of 
growth and at the same time a high rate o f labour productivity growth relative to wage 
growth, which is a condition for maintaining high employment. However, choosing 
right policy instrument to affect wage dynamics was not a trivial issue. Sztanderska 
and Piotrowski (1999) emphasized that in the first stage of transition the restrictive 
taxation of wage growth proved to be an efficient instrument of anti-inflation policy, 
but at the same time it made the wage structure more rigid. This instrum ent was 
relatively quickly abandoned and has been replaced by collective labour agreements 
and minimum wage regulations. The taxation of labour, high social insurance 
contributions and other em ployers’ obligations resulting from the labour law clearly 
raise labour costs, which is an obstacle to increasing employment and reducing the 
grey sphere.
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In turn, high labour taxation has been one of the factors fuelling the existence o f the 
“grey economy” . The latter comprises not only illegal activities but also hidden 
activities, breaking the law but not infringing the criminal code. It includes companies 
which are not registered, do not pay obligatory taxes do not reveal all incomes or hire 
informally. Table 1 provides some estimates on the size of the grey economy in 
Poland. On average, em ploym ent in the grey economy amounts to an additional 15% 
of GDP. As it is quite difficult to measure it, the data shows the lowest estimates. 
However, it is considered that its size can amount to even as much as 30% of GDP. 
(GUS, 2004, M inistry o f Labour and Social Policy, 2006). Obviously, the existence o f 
the grey economy may distort the registered unemployment statistics.
Table 1 Size of Grey Economy (GE) in Poland in 1994-2004 (a).
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2 004
GDP with GE (b) 117.2 116.6 115.9 115.2 115.3 114.5 117 116.3 115.3 115.4 114.4
S ize of GE a s  % loss of GDP 17.2 16.6 15.9 15.2 15.3 14.5 17 16.3 15.3 15.4 14.4
G E in Trade 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1 0.9 1.2
GE in Construction 3 3.1 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.1
GE in o ther serv ices 10.7 10.2 9.8 9.7 9.7 9.2 10.1 10 9.3 9.5 8.4
GE in o ther sections of econom y 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 3.1 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7
Source: G U S, National Statistical O ffice , 2004 .
(a) Years 20 0 0 -2 0 0 4  are not com parable w ith the rest o f  the series due to an updated o f  estim ates  
carried out by G U S in 2006.
(b) 100 represents the reported G D P figure. A ny ex cess above the 100 level represents potential gain if  
the grey econom y disappeared.
The process of transformation o f the labour market differed in its various stages. One 
can distinguish five principal stages in labour market transform ation after 1989 
(Bukowski 2005). Since the beginning of the transition in 1989 until 1994-1995, the 
employment rate and activity rate were declining while the unem ploym ent rate was 
increasing. The main reason for this was the process o f restructuring in state 
enterprises and the elimination of labour hoarding which could not be absorbed in the
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short term by dynamically emerging private enterprises. During the first two years 
(1990-1991) unemployment surged at a pace exceeding on the average one million 
people annually. The subsequent years (1992-1993) were characterised by a further 
growth of unemployment, although at a slower rate (by approx. 400,000 people 
annually). In the first quarter of 1994, unemployment encompassed more than 
2,950,000 people. In 1994 the employment rate for the group aged 15-64 years was at 
a level of 58.3%, the activity rate at 68.4% and the unemployment rate at 14.8%.
The second period o f labour market transformation was during the rapid economic 
expansion of 1995-1998. The labour market situation improved significantly. 
Employment rose and the unemployment rate fell to 10.8%. Unemployment decreased 
from 2.8 million at the end o f 1994 to 1.8 million at the end of 1998. The main area 
absorbing manpower was the private sector, which at the end of 1990 employed 49% 
and at the end of 1994, as much as 60.6% of the total working population. The 
decrease in the unemployment rate between 1994 and 1998 was mainly the result of 
rapid economic growth but also o f legislative changes concerning employm ent as well 
as anti-unemployment measures like the definition of the em ployment contract, a 
tightening of the unemployment eligibility criteria, setting unemployment benefits as a 
percentage of the statutory minimum wage, and excluding high school graduates from 
the list of persons eligible for unemployment benefits (for the details on labour market 
law reform in Poland please see Appendix 4), as well as a set-back in the restructuring 
processes in many branches and sectors of the economy (including steel, defence and 
mining industries).
However, the response o f employment to output growth was not proportional, which is
consistent with the problem observed in Central and Eastern Europe. Econom ists
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explain this as “productivity catch up”, where the increased demand was largely met 
by increased productivity and only a small increase in employment. (Rashid, 
Rutkowski and Fretwell in N. Barr, 2005, p.61).
The third stage of changes in the labour market started in late 1998, when the trend 
was suddenly reversed despite the fact that year-to-year economic growth continued to 
be high. In 1999 employm ent fell by almost 700 000 persons, reducing the 
employment rate by about 4 percentage points to 54.9% and raising the unemployment 
rate by more than a half to 16.4%. A major factor of deterioration of the Polish labour 
market in this period was due to the adverse demand shock of 1998, triggered by the 
Russian financial crisis. However, its impact was amplified due to some structural and 
institutional factors o f the labour market in Poland (see section 3.3). The 2001-2002 
slowdown in economic growth caused a further deterioration of the labour market 
situation. In this period the employment rate fell by 3.5 percentage points while the 
unemployment rate increased by more than a quarter, reaching 20.1% in 2003. In these 
years, unemployment rose in total by almost 600 000 while employment fell by about 
760 000. It was also accompanied by a faster decrease in the activity rate than in 
1999.
The Polish labour market entered a new phase o f transformation at the beginning of
2003, since when it is slowly recuperating. The activity rate and em ploym ent rate
stabilized and the unemployment rate started to decrease. Between 2004 -2007, the
registered unemployment rate fell from 20.6% to 11.4%, which is an outstanding
improvement both from a European and global perspective. The num ber of
unemployed dropped from 3.5 million at the start of 2004 to 1.45 million in the last
quarter of 2007. Foreign migration in search of employment is often cited as the main
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cause for the tightening in labour market conditions5. However, the m igration is not 
the only reason for shrinking unemployment. Poland in the last three years has 
experienced very high job creation. Since the start of 2004, the number of employed 
increased by over 2 million (more than 600,000 in 2007 alone) to 15.5 million, the 
highest reading in nearly a decade. Roughly 2.2 million jobs were created in industry 
and services, while employment in agriculture continued to decline. On the downside, 
the population count o f the economically inactive has continued to rise, from 14.1 
million in 2004 to 14.4 million at the end of 2007 (Eurostat methodology).
The scale of changes in the Polish labour market after transition is particularly well 
illustrated by comparing Poland to other EU member states, (see Figure 1 for 
employment rates in EU and USA and Figure 2 for unemployment rates in the same 
countries).
Figure 1 Employment rates in selected countries 1992-2004.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004











Source: O ECD 2005
5 According to the M inistry o f  Labour and Socia l P o licy , in the period 2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 6  around lm ln  P o les  
em igrated to other EU countries.
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As described at the beginning of the section, open unemployment under comm unism  
was practically non-existent and hence very low at the start of transition. From the 
beginning of the transition, a major reallocation and inter-sectoral restructuring of 
labour was needed in order to adjust to a competitive market economy. Some o f that 
emerged in the first wave of rising unemployment in the early 1990s and eased 
towards the 1998. Up until 1998 the Polish labour market situation was in nominal 
terms still comparable to that o f EU15 members. From 1998 a second-stage post­
communist adjustment occurred resulting in the fall in employment in 1999 and in 
subsequent years resulted in a huge gap between Poland and EU15, where an increase 
in employment and activity and a decrease in unemployment were observed. The 
negative performance of the Polish labour market is only comparable to the situation 
in the Slovak Republic, however in Slovakia despite the high unemployment rate, the 
employment and activity rates are higher than in Poland. Figure 3 presents annual 
employment growth in the selected countries in the period of 1991-2004. Poland is the
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worst performer with a rate of -1.2% and Spain with Ireland the best performers with 
+ 1.4% and +1.9% annual employment growth.
Figure 3 Employment rates in selected countries. Average annual growth in percentage, 1991 
2004.
2 i -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------— — .
Source: O ECD 2005
At the time of writing (mid 2008), despite the improving situation reflected in a fall in 
unemployment, it will take many years before the labour market situation becomes 
comparable to that o f EU15. M eeting the Lisbon goal of 70% employment rate for the 
age group between 15-64 years, is still a distant goal.
3.3 Causes of unemployment in Poland
Thus, as discussed, Poland experienced a sharp increase in unemployment after 1989. 
A decline in the number of people employed in the state economy sector was triggered 
mainly by the processes of ownership transformation, the restructuring of certain areas 
of the economy, organisational changes in enterprises and new technical and 
technological developments. Accordingly, in the initial period, unem ploym ent had a
63
transitional character, being affected by elimination of labour hoarding and the 
intensity of the sectoral demands shocks (transition crisis). However, it was later 
transformed into structural unemployment, characterised by a high level o f long-term 
unemployment and major regional disparities. One of the main factors causing this 
situation were lack o f skills or a skills mismatch for the labour force due to changes in 
employment among sectors (Mickiewicz, 2003, for more detail see section 3.4.5). 
Other factors included immobility o f people, who were finding it difficult to adjust to 
the new market conditions. These characteristics were especially present in the 
agricultural and mining areas. According to F. Bomhorst and S. Com m ander (2004) 
this reflects a more general phenomenon of low mobility across the European and 
Russian regions (investigated countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
Romania and Russia). Their results suggest that . . . ’’exit from the labour force and 
hence high non participation rates are features common to regions with high 
unemployment. W ages, although responsive to regional disparities, only partially help 
to accommodate shocks. Lagged employment creation has as yet not helped 
equilibrate unemployment over regions, leaving depressed regions persistently lagging 
behind. Regional mobility, even though it seems to be driven by economic 
considerations, remains very low.” ... (page 2). There was very limited evidence of 
other equilibrating mechanisms, which would lower regional em ploym ent imbalances 
and their persistence. They demonstrate that exit from the labour force and high non 
participation rates are common to regions with high unemployment. I will explore this 
further in Chapter 5.
As discussed in the previous section, the economic recovery o f mid 1990s contributed
first to the stabilization o f the unemployment rate and only later to a certain decline,
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supported in part by restrictions in national unemployment benefit schem es (see 
Appendix 4 for more details). As mentioned earlier, the largest part o f the total fall in 
employment and increase in unemployment occurred in two phases. According to 
Bukowski (2005), the different character o f economic slowdown in these two periods 
suggests that a likely cause of the changes in the Polish labour market after 1998 were, 
apart from structural causes, brought about by two adverse shocks which affected the 
Polish economy. The first shock was caused by a short-term breakdown of product 
markets especially in export, which resulted in a certain fall in investment and in 
labour demand (caused directly by an exogenous, transitory demand shock resulting 
from the Russian financial crisis). As a result the Polish economy experienced a fall in 
aggregate productivity, and subsequently a breakdown in investment, a curb on wage 
increases, and a fall in consumer demand.
The second shock was due to a slowdown of economic growth in 2001-2002, which
reduced capital productivity. According to Bukowski (2005), another argum ent in
favour of this interpretation is the finding that the deterioration of the labour market
indicators in 1998 was not limited only to Poland, whereas the slowdown of growth
between 2001-2002, even if noticeable also in other Central European countries (and
in EU15 as well), was nowhere as deep and enduring as in Poland. At the same time
countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia experienced changes o f a
very similar nature. As mentioned by the author, in Poland between 1998-1999 there
were no institutional or internal economic changes which could have triggered this
shock. The state deficit rose from about 2.6 percent of GDP to 3.2%, interest rates fell
nominally by about 7 percentage points and in real terms by about 3 percentage points,
state revenue in both years slightly exceeded 41% while expenditures rose, increasing
deficit. Thus, similarities of changes in Central Europe point to an adverse supply
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shock, connected with the financial crisis in Russia in m id-1998. Poland, unlike other 
Central European countries with the exception of Slovakia, experienced a significant 
increase in structural unemployment and suffered from strong unem ploym ent 
persistence.
3.4 Labour market indicators and sectoral reallocation
The transformation o f the system in Central and Eastern Europe has influenced and 
changed the composition o f employment in these countries, including Poland. As 
indicated by N. Barr (et al. 2005), the changes occurred along four dimensions: 
industry and agriculture to services; public to private sector, perm anent to more 
flexible contracts; formal to informal sector.
According to the W orld Bank study on Poland (2001) the rates of job  creation and job  
destruction have been relatively high in Poland, especially at the initial stage o f the 
transition in early 1990s, and again, after a temporary decline, in the late 1990s. 
Unemployment resulted from an acceleration of job  destruction in the context of 
intense economic restructuring, but did not have a negative effect on job  creation. 
However, the created jobs were different to those being destroyed. New jobs required 
better skilled workers, leaving low skilled workers unemployed. According to the 
above mentioned study the Polish labour market has exhibited a significant degree of 
dynamism with relatively high rates of job  creation and job destruction by OECD 
standards. The downside is that job turnover in Poland results largely from job 
destruction, while in other countries it results from job creation. This difference 
implies that the welfare costs of the given rate of job  reallocation are higher in Poland
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than in developed market economies. M ost of the new jobs are being created in the 
relatively underdeveloped service economy and in fast growing industries like 
transport, and a few selected branches of manufacturing (coke and petroleum  products, 
motor vehicles, rubber and plastic products, publishing). Interestingly, the industries 
with the highest job  destruction levels include several of the industries and services 
with the top job  creation. Also, results obtained by Mickiewicz (2003) indicate that at 
least part of unemployment may be explained by turbulence created by inter-sectoral 
restructuring processes. Other results from the W orld Bank study support the low 
mobility argument, suggesting that 86% of the job reallocation happened within the 
same region (voivodeships), with only 14% happening between regions. It also 
supports my view that the Polish regions are relatively independent labour markets. 
For more details on regional differences see 3.4.4)
3.4.1 Gender specific labour market characteristics
The descriptive statistics on Polish employment and unemployment rates and levels 
and on participation rate, including gender breakdown are presented in Table 3. From 
the beginning of the 1990s we can observe continuous job  destruction with 
employment rates and participation rates falling steadily over time from the level o f 
62% for employment rate and 72% for the participation rate in 1992, towards 53% and 
65% in 2005 respectively. In 1997-1998 they recovered slightly to start decreasing 
again from 1999 onwards. In the period 1992-2004 there were 1.4 million jobs lost. 
The year 2005 was marked by a recovery and a 1% increase for both ratios. The 
employment rate increased to 54% and participation rate to 66%. It is expected that 
this positive trend will continue.
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As far as the gender-specific indicators are concerned, the situation for women looks 
much worse than that for men. In the period 1992-2004 there was a continuous 
decrease of both employment and participation rates. From the level o f 55% for 
employment rate and 65% for participation rates, the ratios deceased to 47% and 59% 
correspondingly. Again, the year 2005 brought about a slight recovery and a 1% 
increase for employment rate and no change in participation rate.
Table 2 Employment and unemployment levels and rates and participation rate in Poland in the 
period 1992- 2005 in Poland.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Employment rate 62 61 60 60 60 61 61 59 56 55 53 53 53 54
Participation rate 72 71 71 69 69 68 68 68 67 67 66 65 65 66
Unemployment rate 13 14 14 13 12 11 11 13 16 18 20 20 19 18
Employment levels (thousands) 15,182 14,909 14,658 14,791 14,968 15,176 15,355 14,941 14,526 14,206 13,782 13,616 13,794 14,115
Unemployment levels (thousands) 2,333 2,427 2,475 2,277 2,110 1,916 1,835 2,140 2,787 3,170 3,431 3,329 3,230 3,046
Women
Employment rate 55 54 54 54 54 53 54 53 50 49 47 47 47 48
Participation rate 65 64 64 63 62 62 61 61 61 61 60 59 59 59
Unemployment rate 15 16 16 15 14 13 12 13 18 20 21 20 20 19
Source: O ECD online database, w w w .o ecd .o rg .
3.4.2 Unemployment characteristics by age and education
Another important feature of employment is its structure by age. The initial period of 
transformation of the Polish labour market was characterised by a high share of youth 
unemployment. The detailed statistics are provided in Figure 4. In the years 1991- 
1995 the share of people between 18-24 years of age was on average about 30%. From 
1995 onwards it started to decrease to the level of 23% in 1998 and started to increase 
again to the level of 44% in 2002. Since then it is on a slow downward trend. The age 
group of 25-54 years until the year 1999 was maintaining a level of 11% on average. 
However after 2000 its share started to increase and reached its highest level of 17.5%
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in 2002. In 2005 this age group accounted for 16% of unemployed. Another worrying 
trend in the Polish labour market is the continuous increase in the share of 
unemployment of the oldest age group of 55-64. In 1990 its share of total 
unemployment was 13% and in 2004 18%. However, Poland is not an isolated case. 
The same indicator for the Euro Zone was 18%, while in the US 11%.
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Source: O ECD online database, w w w .oecd .org .
Polish labour market experiences a high divergence o f unemployed depending on their 
level of education. The group with the highest unemployment levels in Poland consists 
of people with the lowest level of education (basic vocational, primary and lower 
secondary). They constitute around 70% of unemployed. This is also the group which 
is the most vulnerable to the unfavourable changes in the economy. During the slow 
down of economy in 2001 this group’s share of unemployment in the total 
unemployment was reaching around 80%. The group with the lowest unemployment 
and least reacting to changes is the group with higher education (around 5% of all
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unemployed). However, it is worth noting that from 1999 its share is also continuously 
growing, which is a worrying trend.
3.4.3 Long-term unemployment
According to Gora and Schmidt (1998) and Lehmann (1998), the make-up of those 
who dominate long-term unemployment numbers are individuals with unfavourable 
demographic and skill characteristics (we discuss it in more details below).
As discussed, one of the features o f labour markets in Central and Eastern Europe was 
a combination of high inflows into unemployment and low outflows to employment. It 
resulted in the long average duration of unemployment spells. (Barr, 2005). Boeri 
(1994) described unemployment in transition countries as a "stagnant pool". This is 
due to very low outflow rates from unemployment, which led to unemployment 
persistence and a large share of long-term unemployment.
The duration of joblessness is of particular importance for the unemployed, because it 
affects not only their economic situation, but also may have an essential impact upon 
morale and social attitudes o f job  seekers. W aiting too long for a job  may result in 
economic inactivity. However, it seems to be the problem in the whole of the 
European Union and not necessarily transition specific. In 2005 the Polish labour 
market was characterised by a very high 52% share of persons who were job  seeking 
for a period longer than one year (see Table 3 and Figure 5 for more details on the 
structure of unemployed by the length of searching for a job  and Figure 6 and Figure 7 
for the structure in selected OECD countries).
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Source: OECD online database, w w w .oecd .org .
Table 3 Unemployment structure by the length of unemployment in the years 1992 -  2005 (in %).
length of unemployment 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Less than 1 month 6 5 7 8 8 8 9 8 7 7 6 6 6 6 7 8
1 - 3 months 14 14 12 13 13 14 14 15 12 11 9 9 10 9 10 12
3 -6  months 17 16 16 16 17 16 16 19 18 16 15 14 15 14 14 15
6-12 months 28 26 25 23 24 24 23 22 25 23 22 21 21 19 19 18
More than 12 months 35 39 40 40 39 38 37 35 38 43 48 50 48 52 50 46
Source: O ECD online database, w w w .oecd .org .
The period of transition was characterised by an increasing share o f the long-term 
unemployed in unemployment in Poland. In 1992 it amounted to 35%, it increased to 
40% in 1994-1995, to fall again to 35% in 1999. Over recent years, starting from the 
year 2000 we can observe a dramatic rise in the share of long-term unemployed, from 
35% in 1999 to 52% in 2005. At the time of writing (mid 2008) there have been some 
signs of recovery with the share of long-term unemployed starting to decrease.
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Comparison with other OECD and EU countries produces a similar picture. In the 
initial stage of transition Poland had a relatively low share of long term unemployed in 
total unemployment among OECD countries (see Figure 6 for the 1994 data) at a level 
of 40% while the EU15 share was of 48% and Spain’s 56%. The lowest ratio o f 12% 
was recorded for the USA.
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Source: O ECD 2007
The situation changes over time. By 2005 (see Figure 7) many of EU15 countries 
managed to lower the share o f long term unemployed in total unemployment. Spain 
fell from 56% to 33%, the UK from 45% to 22%. The overall EU15 average fell from 
48% to 44%. Poland and other post communist countries like Poland, Czech Republic 
and Slovak Republic started from the bottom of the table in 1994 but moved to the 
worst performers in 2005. The only example of a comparable level o f long term 
unemployed among the old EU countries is that of Italy (52% in 2005).
United Czech France Poland Slovak Portugal UK EU15 Spain Italy 
S tates Republic Republic
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3.4.4 Regional differences
Strong regional differences can be observed in practically all domains of Polish 
society and economy. They are especially evident in the labour market employment 
and unemployment levels. Some of these regional patterns are based on history, 
different cultural heritage or asymmetric economic shocks. But the main division is 
between urban and rural areas. However, again, this problem is not only transition 
specific and other countries suffer from it as well. The best examples within the EU 
are Spain and Italy.
At the same time, the regional unemployment pattern in Poland is strongly affected by 
a set of factors that operated on a macro level, as discussed in the previous sections. In 
particular, Newell and Pastore (2000) showed that regions with higher unemployment 
were those experiencing a greater change in industrial structure. They also argued that 
regions of high unemployment were those with higher inflow rates to unemployment
United UK Spain France EU15 Portugal Poland Italy Czech Slovak 
S tates RepublicRepublic
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rather than longer spells of unemployment, suggesting that the effect o f restructuring 
was critical.
Accordingly, while the unemployment rate in Poland rose rapidly during the early 
1990s, the regional discrepancies also deepened. In particular, after the transition, 
many of the regions in Poland privileged by the former system (those, which had a 
high concentration o f nationalised farms, mining and natural resources extraction 
industries) suffered from high unemployment (Mickiewicz and Bell, 2000; Newell and 
Pastore, 2000). These regions are characterised by a labour force, which is not easily 
adaptable to the free m arket economy. The regions most affected are the northern 
regions which were dom inated by State farming, agricultural north-eastern regions and 
industrial regions like textile and clothing in Lodz, and coal mining in the South. The 
highest unemployment is therefore reported in the economically backward, m ainly 
agricultural, areas.
More generally, the W orld Bank study o f the Polish labour market (2001) found the 
following factors accounting for most of the regional differences in job creation and 
explaining 83% of variance in hiring rates across regions:
■ The economic structure of the region, where regions with a developed service 
sector hire many more workers than regions where the service sector is less 
important.
■ The quality of human capital in the region, since the hiring rate is higher the 
larger the proportion of the population with secondary or higher education.
■ The level and structure o f wages, since the hiring rate is significantly higher in 
regions where productivity is high relative to wages.
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■ The wage dispersion in the region, which is an indication of wage flexibility at 
the lower-end o f the earnings distribution.
The preponderant factors determining differences in the hiring rate were education and 
the sectoral structure o f employment.
The regional disparities in unemployment that emerged in the early 1990s have proven 
to be very persistent. Regions with high unemployment at the beginning o f 1990s 
continue to have high unemployment in 2000 and later. I will explore this issue in the 
empirical chapter on the regional employment dynamics (see Chapter 5) and will 
provide the analysis o f sim ilar problems in Spain in Chapter 4. M oreover, these 
disparities deteriorated. These results are due to the fact that most of the decline in 
unemployment is happening in regions where unemployment was already relatively 
low, widening the dispersion in unemployment rates between regions. In Table 4 we 
can see how regional unemployment rates change over time, indicating the lowest and 
the highest rate and the ratio o f the highest to the lowest rate. In 1993 the highest 
regional unemployment rate was 4 times higher than the lowest, with the Suwatki 
region -  30.3% to W arsaw region -  7.6%. From 1994 when the national level of 
unemployment was decreasing, the geographic disparity intensified. In 1996, the 
disparity was more than six fold (Warsaw region -  4.1%, Slupsk region -  25.7%), 
while in 1997, it was eightfold (Warsaw region -  2.7%, Suwalki region 21.2%). By 
1998 the ratio had increased to almost 8 times, with Slupsk region at 20.5% and 
W arsaw region at 2.6%. This situation did not change significantly after the 1999 
administrative reform which reduced the number of voivodeships from 49 to 16. After 
this change we can notice a reduction in unemployment differences across regions as a 
result of higher unemployment rates at the lower-end of the distribution due to their
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spreading over a larger area. Generally, larger regional units imply smaller differences 
in unemployment rates between them. After the year 1999 the differences remained at 
the same level, with the maximum  unemployment rate being the double the minimum 
unemployment rates in the voivodeships.
Table 4 Regional unemployment rate in Poland. Maximum and minimum values in 1991-2004.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Maximum 18.6 26.6 30.3 29.8 28.4 21.2 20.5 21.4 24.5 26.0 26.6 25.6 26.7
Minimum 4.2 6.4 7.6 6.5 5.4 2.7 2.6 8.7 11.1 14.1 16.1 15.2 14.7
Max/Min 4.4 4.2 4 4.6 5.3 7.9 7.9 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8
Source: Central Statistical O ffice , Annual Statistical Yearbooks.
Obviously, the change o f regional administrative units has not caused any change in 
the measured geographic distribution o f unemployment. M azury and Pomorze 
Zachodnie voivodeships are still most affected by unemployment, while the big 
metropolitan areas are the least affected. Almost 50% of unemployed persons are 
inhabitants of the rural areas. Rural unemployment is still generated in the south and 
south-east Poland, where the rural population predominates in total population.
3.4.5 Structural differences
The Polish labour market has faced a very difficult task in the restructuring of 
agriculture and of certain industrial branches such as coal, mining, metallurgy, energy 
production, the arms industry, the shipbuilding industry, and rail transport. Ownership 
transformation caused a decline in the number of people that can be efficiently 
employed in these branches.
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The restructuring of the agriculture sector has brought about a situation, where the 
highest unemployment is reported in the economically backward, agricultural areas. 
Because of ownership transform ations a great number of the form er state-owned 
farm s’ employees have become unemployed. These are mostly people with low skills, 
for whom the opportunities o f finding jobs, both within and outside o f their area of 
residence, are particularly limited. Lehman, O ’Flaherty, W alsh (1997) in their study 
provide some evidence to believe that less developed regions have a higher incidence 
of long term unemployment. They argue that this situation is caused by a lack of 
restructuring in existing jobs and a lack o f growth in private sector jobs.
The sectoral structure o f the economy is defined by the contribution o f agriculture, 
industry and services to both employment and the aggregate value added. In most 
developed countries, the share o f agriculture in the creation of value added dropped in 
the last few decades to only 2-5 percent and the share of employment in services has 
grown to 60-70% (see Table 5 for agriculture, Table 6 for services and Table 7 for 
industry share of creation of value added by selected countries).
Table 5 Value added created by agriculture as % of GDP in selected countries.
agriculture, value 
added as % of GDP 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Poland 5 5 4 5 5
Czech Republic 4 3 3 3 3
Hungary 4 4 3 4 n/a
Italy 3 3 3 3 2
Slovak Republic 4 4 4 4 3
Spain 4 4 4 3 3
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1
Ireland 3 3 3 2 n/a
HU 15 3 3 2 2 2
Source: World Bank, Doing Business, 2007, www.doingbusiness.org
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Table 6 Value added created by services as % of GDP in selected countries.
services, value added 
as % of GDP 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Poland 65 67 66 64 64
Czech Republic 58 60 61 59 60
Hungary 64 66 66 65 n/a
Italy 69 70 70 70 71
Slovak Republic 66 68 67 67 67
Spain 67 67 67 67 67
United Kingdom 72 73 74 74 73
Ireland 55 56 60 60 n/a
EU15 70 70 71 71 73
Source: World Bank, Doing Business, 2007, www.doingbusiness.org
Table 7 Value added created by industry as % of GDP in selected countries.
Industry, value added 
as % of GDP 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Poland 29 29 30 31 31
Czech Republic 38 37 36 37 37
Hungary 32 31 30 31 n/a
Italy 28 28 27 27 27
Slovak Republic 30 28 29 30 29
Spain 29 29 29 29 29
United Kingdom 27 26 25 25 26
Ireland 42 41 38 37 n/a
EU15 28 27 26 26 26
Source: World Bank, Doing Business, 2007, www.doingbusiness.org
Poland has started the transform ation o f sectoral employment at the beginning of 
1990’ but as shown in Table 8, in 2003, a year before the EU accession, the share of 
agriculture was still a two digit number. The table below presents a comparison of 
sectoral division and value added created by sectors in EU15, and in the new mem ber 
states excluding Poland (NM S9) and Poland. However, the problem  of these 
economies is that the initial structure was distorted. Mickiewicz and Zalewska (2006) 
in their study of structural change in employment found, that the structural distortions 
in the command economies were most acute for those countries that were already at a 
higher level of development. Thus, “the economic development led to the 
amplification of structural distortions, moving these economies further away from the 
efficient path.” (Page 20).
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Table 8 Sectoral structure of employed and value added in EU15, NMS9 and in Poland in 2003.
Sector variable EU15 NMS9 Poland
Agriculture
employment 3.7% 7.1% 18%
value added 2% 3.4% 4%
Industry
employment 26.6% 32.7% 30%
value added 26% 35.2% 29%
Services
employment 71.4% 63.9% 66.5%
value added 71% 57.8% 66%
Source: European C om m ission  (2 0 0 4 )
As reported in Table 8 Polish agriculture was producing in 2003 4% of added value 
while having an employment share o f all employed of 18%. In comparison, in EU15 
countries, the agricultural sector with its employment share o f only 3.7% was 
producing 2% of value added. The NMS9 average employment share was more than 
half of the Polish, producing value added of a comparable level to Poland. In addition, 
the share of employment in services is low in comparison with the EU15 and NMS9. 
This is consistent with the high share o f both agriculture and industry.
In Table 9 we can see the evolution o f sectoral employment over the period 1994- 
2005. We can observe a steady decrease of employment levels in agriculture, a slight 
decrease in industry and an upwards trend of employment levels in services.
Table 9 Employed persons by economic sectors in the years 1994-2005 in thousands and as % of
total employment.
Employment 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total 14,658 14,791 14,969 15,177 15,356 14,941 14,526 14,207 13,782 13,617 13,795 14,116
in agriculture 3,514 3,331 3,298 3,104 2,914 n/a 2,727 2,719 2,663 2,509 2.484 2,452
in industry ind. construction 4.682 4,728 4,739 4,846 4,921 n/a 4,481 4,332 3,948 3,892 3,976 4,127
in services 6,462 6,732 6,932 7,228 7,520 n/a 7,319 7,156 7,171 7,216 7,335 7,537
in agriculture as  % 24 23 22 20 19 n/a 19 19 19 18 18 17
in industry ind. construction a s  % 32 32 32 32 32 n/a 31 30 29 29 29 29
in services as  % 44 46 46 48 49 n/a 50 50 52 53 53 53
Source: O ECD online database, w w w .o ecd .o rg .
The high share of agricultural employment reflects rural over-employment. These are 
persons with very low qualifications. The situation will be further complicated by a 
complex system of subsidies to farm products, introduced at the time of Polish EU
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accession in mid 2004. However, analysis of the EU subsidies impact on structural 
change will be left for further research.
3.5 Labour market policies in Poland
After 1989, the need to form ulate a completely new labour market policy arose and the 
fundamental legislative acts regulating the functioning of the labour market was 
passed by the Parliament on 29 December 19896. It introduced market regulation into 
the area of employment enabling economic subjects to take flexible decisions on 
employment and the protection o f the interests of any groups which could suffer from 
it. (Piotrowski and Sztanderska, 1999, M inistry o f Labour and Social Policy, 2005, 
Bukowski, 2006).
In addition, the new situation in the Polish labour market required a unification of 
labour relations. Therefore, in 1996, the Labour Code was passed, increasing the rights 
of private sector em ployees and equalizing them with the rights of the people 
employed in the public sector. In 1990, the State budget decided to finance passive 
and active labour market policies.
Since the beginning o f the transition to a market economy the Polish government has 
applied a wide menu of Active Labour M arket Policies (ALMP) to combat 
unemployment and long-term unemployment. Those of most importance in terms of 
expenditures are: training, intervention works and public works. (Kluve, et al., 1999, 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 2005; Bukowski, 2006).
However, during the initial period of creating labour market policies the majority of 
attention was focused on social protection measures for the unemployed instead of
6 See A ppendix 4 for a detailed review  o f  labour market reform s in Poland.
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ALMPs. As a consequence, around of 2 million working people left the labour market 
using early retirement schemes (Golinowska, 2004).
In 1990, for the first time, financial resources have been separated in the State budget 
and allocated to finance passive and active labour market policies (i.e., Labour Fund). 
A contribution to the Labour Fund, equal to 2% in 1990 from net wages, was raised to 
3% in 1993 from gross wages and reduced to 2.45% in 1999. Premiums for the Labour 
Fund are paid in relation to remuneration, which cover half of the cost of the labour 
market policy (Sztanderska, Piotrowski, 1999). Because the principal revenue source 
of the fund is an earmarked payroll tax, its revenues tend to fluctuate pro-cyclically. In 
contrast, its mandatory expenditures (essentially unemployment insurance benefits) 
move counter cyclically and as a result funding for active labour market policy falls 
precisely at the point in time when it is most needed. During the period of 
accumulation of the second wave o f unemployment in 1999-2002, ALM Ps did not 
have too much influence. This was a period of decentralisation, where a new tier of 
local self-government (powiat) took over the responsibilities relating to ALMPs. 
Indeed, as shown in Table 10 and Figure 8, we can observe a fall in ALM Ps spending 
(the share of ALMPs spending as % of total Labour Fund). We can see the level of 
policy activism, after an initial fall in 1991, rising until 1998. Afterwards the ALM Ps 
spending was falling until 2002, when the share of active programmes in total labour 
market programme spending declined from 19.2 to 5.4 %. During the same period, 
spending on passive measures almost doubled, with almost all of the increase coming 
in the form of increased spending on pre-retirement pensions. This can be interpreted 
as the crowding out effect discussed by M ickiewicz & Bell (2000) and Burns & 
Kowalski (2004).
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Table 10 Expenditure on ALMPs and PLMPs as % of GDP in Poland.
Y ears A LM Ps a s  %  of GDP PLM Ps a s  % of GDP P olicy  A ctiv ism  (a)
1990 0.21 0.34 38.1
1991 0.12 1.38 8
1992 0.09 1.71 5
1993 0.23 1.72 11.8
1994 0.27 1.72 13.6
1995 0.26 1.93 11.9
1996 0.21 1.75 10.7
1997 0.2 1.1 17.2
1998 0.2 0.5 23.9
1999 0.2 0.6 19.2
2000 0.1 0.8 11.1
2001 0.1 1 7
2002 0.1 1.1 5.4
2003 0.2 1.1 12.8
2004 0.1 0.8 14.3
Source: Polish M inistry o f  Labour and Social P olicy  2006 .
(a) P olicy activism  is defined as the share o f  A L M P expenditures in total Labour Fund expenditures
Figure 8 Expenditure on ALMP and PLMP as % of GDP in Poland.
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Source: Polish M inistry o f  Labour and Social P olicy  2006. 
3.5.1 Passive L ab o u r M a rk e t Policies
Labour market programmes are implemented by the National Labour Office (NLO) 
and a network of over 500 municipal (powiat) labour offices (PLO). Over 85% of the 
funding for these programmes comes from a 2.45% payroll tax for the Labour Fund. 
The remaining amount is covered by the State budget and other sources. In Poland we
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can distinguish two forms of passive labour programmes: unemployment benefits and 
pre-retirement benefits and allowances.
The pre-retirement programmes are designed for individuals at pre-retirement age and 
are meant to allow them to withdraw from the labour market before reaching 
retirement age. Unem ploym ent benefit is available for a limited duration to the 
unemployed.
From the beginning o f the transition, as benefits were easily obtainable, many people 
abused them, raising the cost o f the social protection. Later on, changes in the 
definition of unemployment and in the restriction of rights to benefits resulted in a 
sharp decline in the num ber of the registered unemployed receiving benefits after 
1992. In 2003, only 15 per cent o f the unemployed were receiving benefits.
3.5.2 Active Labour Market Policies
Poland from the beginning o f the transition in 1989 until the present has been 
spending less than one per cent of GDP on active labour market policy. This 
constitutes one of the lowest ratios among the OECD member countries, despite 
having the highest unemployment rate and the lowest employment rate in the OECD. 
Data on share of public spending on active measures as a percentage o f GDP in 
selected OECD countries is shown in Table 11. A wide disparity in spending on active 
measures can be observed, ranging from a low of 0.1 per cent of GDP for Poland 
followed by the United States and the United Kingdom, to a high level o f around 1.5 
per cent for Sweden and Denmark. There has been almost no trend since 1985 in the 
OECD average spending devoted to active measures, compared with a slight upward 
trend in the EU.
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Table 11 Spending on active labour market policies in selected countries as % of GDP, 1985-2001.
ALMFs as percentage of GDP 1985 1990 1995 1999 2001
Denmark 0.9 1.1 1.9 1.8 1.5
France 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.3
Germany 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1
Hungary 0.4 0.4 0.5
Ireland 1.5 1.4 1.6 0.9 0.7
Italy 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
Poland 0 0.4 0.3 0.1
Portugal 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6
Spain 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.8
Sweden 2.1 1.7 2.2 1.7 1.4
United Kingdom 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3
United States 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
OECD 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7
EU-15 0.8 1 1 0.9
Source: O ECD (2004), Socia l Expenditure Database (SO C X , w w vv.oecd .org/els/socia l/expenditure).
There is a wide range o f active labour market programmes available. They include 
individual counselling, group counselling, career information, job seeking workshops, 
job exchange and fairs, and job  clubs, training, training loans, loans to set up a 
business, loans to create new jobs, grants to individuals to continue education, 
intervention works, public works, special programmes, work o f public benefit, refunds 
of commuting costs.
There has been little research done to examine the net impact of these programmes. 
OECD studies suggest that targeted subsidies, like the school leaver programme, can 
have a positive impact on participants’ employment prospects, but that more general 
programmes, like the public works programme, tend either to lower the em ployment 
chances of participants or to generate substantial deadweight losses by subsiding jobs 
that would have been filled anyway (Bums, Kwiatkowski, 2004). One of the few 
studies to examine Polish active labour market programmes, that by O ’Leary (1998), 
found that participation in Polish public works programmes actually hurt individual’s 
job prospects (O’Leary, 1998). For more research on the effectiveness o f ALM Ps in 
Poland please see Chapter 6.
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ALMPs in Poland mainly operate through wage subsidies. They include:
■ Public works programmes (75 per cent wage subsidy) available to sub-national 
governments.
■ Intervention works offering a discount to the wage cost o f hiring unemployed 
workers by as much as their unemployment insurance benefit. They also offer 
a further signing bonus if their employer signs them on after the expiration of 
the 12 month programme.
Special school leaver programmes that pay firms hiring eligible individuals, 
the labour and social security costs of a worker up to those associated with the 
minimum wage.
■ Apprenticeship program m es that provide recent graduates with a scholarship 
equal to the amount o f unemployment benefit if they are accepted in an 
employment-office certified programme. Social security contributions are also 
covered by the office, while a designated mentor receives an honorarium equal 
to 10 per cent of the scholarship value.
■ Subsidised loans for individuals hiring the long-term unemployed and for 
unemployed individuals that start their own business.
■ Another very popular type of ALMPs is training such as in superm arket check­
out assistance, forklift truck driving, foreign currency assistance and other jobs 
in the emerging services sector.
Public works were introduced in 1992, loans for employers in 1993, the active 
programmes for graduates (apprenticeships, scholarships) in 1996. Since 1997, the
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local labour offices concluded contracts with the employers, where they were covering 
part of the expenses for social insurance.
Some ALMPs were especially targeted at the unemployed with a particularly difficult 
situation in the labour market. Among them the following groups have been included: 
women, long-term unemployed, single parents, families with both parents 
unemployed, persons deprived of employment as a result of liquidation o f national 
farms, school graduates, those released from prison, and those returning from military 
service.
In Table 12, Table 13 and Table 14 we can see the overall statistics for the most 
important programmes in the period 1999-2005. Training was the most popular for o f 
ALMPs with the highest and the most stable level of participants. It was also the 
cheapest form of aid to the unemployed. As for its effectiveness measured by the 
number of persons who com pleted the programme to the number of persons who 
received a job after the programme, its effectiveness was decreasing over time. In 
2005 37% of people who participated in training obtained a job, comparing to 51% in
1999.
Table 12 Training as ALMP and its efficiency.
Training 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
number of participants (1) 146,037 108,711 51,176 51,472 126,600 137,815 150,925
number of persons who completed the programme (2) 129,409 101,743 48,841 43,873 117,514 130,180 147,837
number of persons who received a  job after the programme (3) 65,476 49,912 21,727 19,575 47,228 34,932 54,378
efficiency of the programme (2/3) 51% 49% 44% 45% 40% 27% 37%
expenses in PLN (4) 104,797 84,365 57,096 50,828 113,862 127,671 174,590
cost of the programme per participant in PLN (4/1) 718 776 1,116 987 899 926 1,157
cost of re-employment of a participant in PLN (4/3) 1,601 1,690 2,628 2,597 2,411 3,655 3,211
Source: M inistry o f  Labour and Socia l P olicy  2006.
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Intervention works were very popular in 1999, but over time the level o f participants 
decreased more than half. However, it was much more efficient by comparison to 
training with the average of above 60% over the measured period. The participation 
cost per person in 2005 was more than twice as high as training. In 2005 the cost was 
PLN 2,736 per person, while the training cost was PLN 1,157 per person. The cost o f 
re-employment per participant was of PLN 3,211 for training and PLN 5,179 for 
intervention works.
Table 13 Intervention works as ALMP and its efficiency.
Intervention Works (IW) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
number of participants (1) 174,669 132,930 64,846 58,314 122,867 115,334 70,878
number of persons who completed the programme (2) 134,253 107,766 60,187 40,874 97,382 96,082 60,517
number of persons who received a job after the programme (3) 87,335 71,522 40,791 27,795 68,130 64,212 37,443
efficiency of the programme (2/3) 65% 66% 68% 68% 70% 67% 62%
expenses in PLN (4) 271,938 155,704 153,742 93,475 223,520 232,768 193,921
cost of the programme per participant in PLN (4/1) 1,557 1,171 2,371 1,603 1,819 2,018 2,736
cost of re-employment of a participant in PLN (4/3) 3,114 2,177 3,769 3,363 3,281 3,625 5,179
Source: M inistry o f  Labour and Social P o licy  2006 .
Public works was the ALM P with the lowest level of participants. It was the most 
expensive programme of all in terms of participation costs per person (PLN 4,254 in 
2005) and re-employment costs per participant (PLN 14,898). Being the most 
expensive programme it was also the least effective, with its efficiency growing 
however over the years. In 1999 only 13% of participants in public works could find a 
job, while in 2005 it was more than doubled to the level of 29%.
Table 14 Public Works as ALMP and its efficiency.
Public Works 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
number of participants (1) 77,881 56,328 32,874 34,368 103,440 86,244 69,180
number of persons who completed the programme (2) 69,592 51,982 30,008 25,853 89,202 75,832 68,119
number of persons who received a  job after the programme (3) 9,201 7,357 3,986 4,634 14,708 15,337 19,756
efficiency of the programme (2/3) 13% 14% 13% 18% 16% 20% 29%
expenses in PLN (4) 207,963 146,536 111,886 88,372 297,057 279,848 294,321
cost of the programme per participant in PLN (4/1) 2,670 2,601 3,403 2,571 2,872 3,245 4,254
cost of re-employment of a participant in PLN (4/3) 22,602 19,918 28,070 19,070 20,197 18,247 14,898
Source: M inistry o f  Labour and Social P olicy  2006 .
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3.6 Conclusions
The Polish labour market has been subject to transformation during the past 18 years. 
The introduction of market principles, apart from its positive results, was accompanied 
by certain side effects, most significantly unemployment. The Polish labour m arket 
suffers from high levels of regional, youth and long-term unemployment. Another 
point of concern is its structural character. The main challenge for the economy as a 
whole is to maintain a high rate of growth while keeping wage growth in line with a 
(high) rate of labour productivity growth. It also still faces restructuring challenges in 
certain industrial branches like coal mining, metallurgy, energy production, the arms 
industry, the shipbuilding industry, rail transport and agriculture.
Improving the Polish labour market is an enormous challenge for the country’s 
government, alongside higher incomes, reducing poverty, faster growth and more 
rapid convergence. It can be met successfully. Over the past 30 years, there were a 
number of OECD countries (Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United 
States) that have succeeded in raising overall employment rates by 10 or more 
percentage points. The nature o f those countries problems was different in each case. 
Nevertheless, the improvements were typically the results of a fundamental labour 
market reform. In particular, the active and passive labour market policies should be 
reassessed and treated as one of the main tools in fighting unemployment and 
improving the labour market conditions in Poland. A detailed empirical study on 
effectiveness of the active measures that may lead to some recom mendations for 
reform is described in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4 The labour market in Spain
Spain has long been regarded as a case of mass unemployment. However, over the last 
few years some improvement has taken place. Spain’s initial labour market conditions 
were very similar to those of the post-communist Poland. Through a series o f m ajor 
labour market reforms making it more flexible and efficient, the policy makers 
managed to reduce the unemployment rate substantially. In this chapter I highlight 
some of the remaining challenges and some general lessons from the Spanish 
experience, which should help us to understand the Polish case better.
Among the OECD countries, the performance of the Spanish labour m arket has been 
among the worst as far as employment activity is concerned; with unemployment rates 
during the 1990s exceeding 20%, employment creation has been one of the prim ary 
challenges facing the Spanish government (Gil Martin, 2002).
Nevertheless, over the last two decades Spain has made significant progress in reducing 
unemployment levels and creating employment. This has been achieved by strong and 
sustained economic growth and through effective reforms of labour market policies.
The chapter is organised as follows. First, I discuss the nature of the unemployment 
problem in Spain and explore its main causes. Secondly, I provide the historical context 
and analyse the transformation which the labour market in Spain has undergone since the 
political liberalisation in 1975. Afterwards, I survey the current state of the Spanish 
labour market, its reforms and passive and active labour market policies.
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4.1 The transition of labour market in Spain -  an overview
The developments o f the Spanish labour market can be divided into four stages, not 
dissimilar to the Polish post-liberalisation trajectory discussed earlier. The initial 
transformation stage falls into the period o f 1977-1985. Similar to the Polish transition 
experience, it is a period characterized by intense employment destruction. Around 
1.8 million jobs were lost. Between 1976 and 1981, in spite of a slow increase in the 
active population, there was a strong decrease in employment and a strong increase in 
unemployment. Between 1981 and 1985 employment destruction slowed down, but 
there was an increase in the active population, and as the result, unemployment 
continued to grow in a spectacular way. In 1985 the number of unemployed reached 
the 3 millions, approximately 22% of the active population. It is also worth pointing 
out, that this period was in the pre-EU run-up. Spain formally entered EU in 1986, 
albeit, similar to Poland, Spain was already on its way to re-integrate with the 
European and world economy before the formal accession.
The second distinctive phase of the Spanish transformation occurred between 1985- 
1991. During this stage robust employment creation took place, recovering the 
employment losses during the previous decade. In these years a large num ber of 
women entered the labour market. The active population also grew at a fast pace, 
mainly due to the increase o f female activity rate. As a result, unemployment 
diminished to some extent but continued to be very high: in 1990 the num ber of 
unemployed exceeded 2.5 millions and the unemployment rate reached 16%. 
Moreover, a significant increase in temporary jobs took place (from 15% to 30%). The 
labour market entry o f women is specific to Spain; in Poland female activity rates
90
inherited from the command economy system were high at the initial point of 
transformation.
The next stage of transition in the Spanish labour market took place during 1991-1994. 
Between 1991 and 1993 the economic depression caused a loss of around 0.8 million 
jobs. Although the growth in the active population slowed down, the num ber o f 
unemployed at the beginning of 1994 exceeded 3.8 millions, around 25% of active 
population. During 1994 employment destruction however slowed down. At the end of 
1994 the number of unemployed was lower as compared with the num ber for the 
previous year. (M. Castro, J. Tomas, 1998). This brief phase is somehow sim ilar to the 
Polish economic slowdown at the beginning of 2000s.
The last distinctive stage commenced in 1994 and continues to the present (at the time 
of writing in mid 2008). Similar to the most recent phase in Poland, it is characterised 
by a sustained increase in employment, much higher than the EU average. However, 
the methodological changes in the Economically Active Population Survey- EPA 
(Encuesta de la Poblacion Activa) impede a proper analysis o f the period and 
overestimate the tendency. The growth in the active population has been sm aller and 
the unemployment rate has diminished to the level of 14% in 2001 (11% according to 
the new methodology). In this period a very significant increase in the female 
employment rate has taken place (from 32% to 44%). However, the rate o f temporary 
jobs has remained stable, at the level of 32-33%. (Jimeno and Bentolila, 2003, 
Domenech and Gomez, 2004).
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4.2 Causes of unem ployment in Spain
Examining the potential causes o f unemployment is essential in understanding the 
scope of the reforms undertaken in Spain. It is typically asserted that the lack o f 
flexibility was among the major causes which exerted an upward pressure on labour 
costs back in the 1980s (Gil Martin, 2002).
In addition to the labour market institutional setup, another important reason is the 
outdated product market institutional framework. In addition, two major shocks took 
place in the mid-70s, the oil price shock and - following the political transition - the 
period of high inflation, again, not dissimilar to the Polish case. M oreover, the 
industry shakeout o f the 1975-85 period alongside declining job opportunities in 
agriculture, led to the highest unemployment rate in Europe at the level o f around 20% 
throughout the whole decade of 1980s, as already discussed. Between 1976 and 1985, 
overall employment levels declined by almost 25%. The sharp slowdown in labour 
demand, following the first oil shock, coincided with growing migration from rural to 
urban areas. However, the real wage growth did not slow down before 1980. As a 
result, real wages surpassed productivity between 1976 and 1979 by 22% (Tascon, 
2000).7 Similarly, Bentolila and Blanchard (1990) indicate a decrease in capital 
accumulation due to wage increases and monetary contractions as one of the main 
causes of high and persistent unemployment:, in their interpretation, long spell of 
unemployment led to a hysteresis effect, which resulted in higher equilibrium 
unemployment, hence persistence.
7 http://w w w .eurofound.eu .int
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W e will now present a more detailed discussion, starting with the product m arket and 
next the labour market.
Initial structural features o f the Spanish industry shared some comm on characteristics 
with the Polish case. In Poland, at the initial point, the low energy and energy-related 
products prices constituted the main price distortion (eliminated at time of 
liberalisation), and hierarchical and centralised production structures faced little 
competition both from inside and from outside. Similar to this, in the early 1970s the 
product markets in Spain were characterized by the presence of quasi-monopolies. 
Many producers were protected through high import barriers or export subsidies. The 
result was a high consumption of oil and not surprisingly the product m arket was hit 
very seriously by the oil price shock (R. Torres, 2001).
On the labour market side, rigid laws and regulations had been adopted in the 1940s 
and 1950s. There was very limited freedom of association, at both the enterprise and 
national levels. The government provided its employees with high employm ent 
protection. That model lasted until the early 1970s. (Tascon, 2000) In point o f fact the 
Fascist institutional setup of the labour market was not that different from that of 
Communist Poland.
After Franco’s death in 1975, freedom of association and trade union rights were 
reintroduced. However, labour laws were not reformed. In Spain at that time 
employment protection was one of the strictest among OECD countries. It was very 
difficult to fire a permanent worker. Therefore, employers were not eager to hire 
anybody. In addition, wages were inflexible; they were determined through a complex
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system influenced by organised labour. In practice it meant that it was very difficult to 
differentiate wages across both occupations and industries (R. Torres, 2001). In 
general, the political liberalisation resulted in an inconsistent set of institutions.
Some researchers point to the wage negotiation process as one of the causes of high 
unemployment in Spain. Core workers exert upward wage pressure, which in turn 
leads firms to make job  conditions o f outsiders more precarious in order to make up 
for the high insider wage-costs. Not only does this process help to explain the high 
unemployment rate, as noted by Bentolila and Dolado (1994), but it is also responsible 
for the segmentation o f the Spanish labour market, since firms often make up for the 
high insiders’ wages by cutting outsider’s wages down, (see also the discussion in the 
theoretical chapter, On Efficiency W age v. Insider - Outsider Theory; and Lindbeck- 
Snower (1998) & Calmfors et al. (1988). Similarly, Toharia (1997) identifies the role 
of increasing wages as one o f the reasons behind the unemployment explosion in 
Spain, especially in the 1980’s. However this interpretation runs contrary to claims 
made in Layard, Nickell and Jackm an (1991) and repeated in OECD (1994) as to the 
role of these variables. Similarly, Blanchflower (1999) claims that there is relatively 
little evidence from Spain that firing costs, unemployment benefits, unions, the size of 
the tax wedge (the difference between take-home pay and the cost of labour to 
employers), skills mismatch or labour unions had much to do with the rise in 
unemployment in this country.
Dolado and Jimeno (1995) aims to combine these conflicting perspectives. They 
suggest that unemployment results from the combination of a series o f adverse shocks,
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compounded by disinflationary policies and a system of labour m arket institutions. 
Inefficiencies inherited from the old autocratic system were bound to be reformed, but 
unfortunately the political reform coincided with the two oil price shocks. To offset 
the initial rise in unemployment, a neo-corporatist arrangement (social pacts) was 
implemented. In order to ensure the unions' participation in the agreement, the 
government provided much more generous welfare benefits and m aintained 
employment protection from the past. This led to an increasing discrepancy between 
the employed and the unemployed.
Thus, adverse shocks to the economy triggered undesirable adjustments. In addition, 
greater numbers of inactive people meant less tax revenue, more benefits to be paid 
and, consequently, higher tax rates and non-wage costs. This causes further inactivity 
and an increase in the fiscal wedge, thereby lessening the incentive to create jobs (J. 
Dolado, J. Jimeno, 1995).
W e can encounter m any similarities of the causes of high unemployment in Spain and 
Poland. The most important ones include the outdated labour market institutional 
framework, and lack of flexibility. Both of the markets were also subject o f a very 
radical labour m arket restructuring including a major shift of employm ent from 
agricultural sector to services.
4.3 Internationalisation, EU integration, and labour market reforms
The Spanish employm ent strategy commenced in the early 1980s, however it was 
preceded by the external and internal product market liberalisation. In the process o f 
European Union accession, the government undertook a major programme of trade
95
liberalization. Import barriers were reduced, obstacles to foreign direct investment 
were suppressed, product markets were liberalised. (Tascon, 2000)
Signing the accession treaty in 1986 symbolized for Spain a definitive end to its political 
and economic isolation and of its international recognition as a democratic, market 
economy country. EU accession has been one of the most important factors in the 
evolution of the Spanish economy and its labour market.
However, the process of economic opening up had begun many years before and it 
will still take some more time to be completed. In 1959, still during Franco 
dictatorship, the first steps were taken through its Plan of Stabilization. A unique 
exchange rate was introduced and measures were put in place to adopt a market 
economy and to make way for foreign investments.
The Preferential Agreement with the UE was signed in 1970. It was of exclusively 
commercial content, and clarified the future of the relationships between Spain and the 
UE. The liberalisation of trade was more intense for the UE side than for Spain, which 
still maintained some advantages in exports.
The decade of the 70’s was marked by a severe economic crisis, which had devastating 
consequences for the Spanish economy. Between 1974 and 1985 the Spanish economy 
hardly grew at all, at best 1.7% annually. This had a strong negative effect on the creation 
of jobs. The annual job  destruction reached more than 18% of employment and 27% in 
the case of manufacturing.
The EU accession was negotiated in these highly unfavourable economic conditions. For 
Spain, EU integration had a strategic and high-priority character, while for EU it was not
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the most important topic. After EU accession, a liberalisation o f fixed-term labour 
contracts was introduced. Before 1984 it was difficult to hire employees under fixed- 
term contracts. As a result, Spain came to have the highest incidence of temporary 
work in the EU. Am endments in employm ent protection legislation were also 
adopted. Since 1994, the cost o f dismissal has been reduced from 45 days to 33 days, 
and the maximum severance pay was cut by almost half (from 42 months to 24 
months).
Another element of the reform was the reduction in social security contributions by 
almost half. Moreover, obstacles to part-time work have been removed. Before EU 
accession part-time workers did not have equal social security rights compared to 
fulltime jobs (e.g. in respect to pension rights). Therefore people were not eager to 
take up part-time jobs. Under new regulations part-time employment has increased 
and allowed for a greater incorporation of women into the labour market. Finally, 
active labour market policies (ALMP) have been introduced to a wider extent. In 
general, employment policy had shifted from passive towards more active elements 
(see 4.6 for more details) (Tascon, 2 0 0 0 ).8
4.4 The Outcomes: labour market indicators
4.4.1 Labour supply and participation rates
The Spanish labour force participation rate has been rather stable for the last 31 years 
(i.e. since Franco’s death). It tended to decline from the second half of 1970s and 
started to rise slightly in second half of 1980s. Since then it has been rising steadily 
from the level of 49% in 1986 to 59% at the beginning of 2007.
x For the detailed overv iew  o f  the labour market reforms in Spain please see appendix 5.
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Nonetheless, there have been significant differences between male and female 
participation rates as well as between particular age groups. Figure 9 shows us clearly 
the discrepancies between female and male labour participation rates.
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Source: Labour Force Survey (L FS), IN E, Instituto N acional de Estadistica, Madrid, 2007.
In the female participation rate we can observe a constant increase from a level of 
28.8% up to almost 45% in 2004. On the other hand, the male participation rate 
experienced a significant decrease from 78% in 1976 down to a level of 64% in 1997. 
Since then it has been growing slightly to a level of 67.5% in the second quarter of 
2004.
There are also different trends in age groups. In Spain, participation rates of people 
under 25 started to decline in the mid-1970s, as a response to the economic crisis 
which hit the Spanish economy during the late 1970s and early 1980s. It corresponded 
to the increase in school enrolment at all levels due to the lack o f jobs, and the
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reduction of the opportunity cost of education. In the 1980s compulsory education
was extended until 16 years (previously, 14) and universities started to develop all 
over Spain. Subsequently, despite the strong employment recovery in the late 1980s, 
school enrolment has kept on increasing until the time of writing.









Source: Labour Force Survey (L F S), IN E, Instituto N acional de Estadistica, M adrid, 2007.
As for female participation (see Figure 11) in the early 1980s it was regarded as pro­
cyclical, (decreasing during recessions and increasing during booms). However, from 
the sociological point of view the situation was seen as being due to generational 
changes (Toharia, 2001). The increase in labour participation (and the decline in the 
birth rate) was one of the factors contributing to the situation. The most significant 
change in the female participation rate can be observed in the age group of 25-54. It 
has almost doubled from a level of 28% in 1976 up to 72% in 2007. A constant 
decline in participation rates has been observed in the age group above the age of 55 
for both men and women until 2004, increasing slightly over the last two years. This is
10 H i l l
1 6 - 1 9  y ea rs  old 
25 - 54 years  old
20 - 24_years old 
above 55 years old
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due to the setting up of the retirement at age 65 along with early retirement schemes 
introduced by government.
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Source: Labour Force Survey (L F S), IN E , Instituto N acional de Estadistica, M adrid, 2007.
As for the male participation rate, it also varies significantly between different age 
groups (see Figure 12). A sim ilar pattern as seen for the female participation rate has 
been followed in the youngest and oldest age group. For the youngest group, the 
cyclical characteristic is more visible than in the case of women. We can observe that 
in the second half o f 1980s, the participation rate for this group increased following 
better employment prospects but began to decrease again, as young people returned to 
education again due to deteriorating labour market situation.
Responding to the growing unemployment rate in the older people age group, in the 
early 1980s, specific early retirement sector plans were implemented. (Toharia, 2001).
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4.4.2 Employment
Since the transition in 1975, the Spanish economy has experienced significant shifts in 
employment structure. The changes have been both in terms of sectors, gender and 
regional distribution.
4.4.3 Gender cross-section of employment
In Figure 13 we can observe the cyclical character of the employment rate by sex. 
Women have experienced a greater increase in employment than men due to the 
reasons explained as above.
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Figure 13 Employment rate by sex and period in Spain. 1976-2007.
60  -
Men W om en
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), INE, Instituto N acional de Estadistica, M adrid, 20 0 7
The employment rate in 1976 was 50% overall, 74% for men and 27% for women. All 
of these indicators were falling gradually as Spain moved towards EU accession in 
1986, when the overall employment rate was only 39% with a male em ploym ent rate 
of 57% and a female rate of 21%. The government programmes, such as the 
strengthened Employment Promotion Programmes, led to the hiring o f more than 1 
million people in 1987, which constituted more than double the average of about 
450,000 per year between 1979 and 1984. However, these programmes did not alter 
the level of joblessness. At the initial stage of EU membership employment rose 
steadily to decrease again at the beginning of the nineties. Overall male employment 
reached its all time lows between 1993-1994, plummeting to 39% and 52% 
respectively. After this date the Spanish labour market recuperated and there has been 
a sustained increase o f employment levels. At the beginning o f 2007 the overall
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employment level reached 54%, male 65% and female 43%. However, it should be 
noticed that the male level has never recovered enough as to reach the levels seen at 
the beginning of the transition.
4.4.4 Sectoral cross-section
As for the sectoral division, there have been very significant shifts in its structure. 
Figure 14 shows the evolution of employed population by sector as a percentage 
change of the index base of the year 1976 and presents the employment rate by sectors 
in the period of 1976-2007. The sector, which has accounted for the strongest drop is 
agriculture. It has been historically a very important sector of the Spanish economy 
with a consistently higher employment rate. Nonetheless, due to the economic 
transition, it has experienced a very powerful downward trend from the level of almost 
22% in 1976 down to 5% in 2007. This process was accompanied by a strong 
migratory flow to the cities, especially of young people and by those reaching 
retirement age, or going to early retirement, of those still working in agriculture.







■Agriculture  Industry "Constructions S erv ices
Source: Labour Force Survey (L FS), INE, Instituto N acional de Estadistica, M adrid, 2007.
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The strongest decline in the agricultural employment took place in the second half of 
1980s coinciding with the accession of Spain to the European Union. The industry 
sector has also experienced a decline in its employment rate. It was not however as 
significant as in case of agriculture. The greatest falls coincided with the major 
industrial restructuring at the beginning of 1980s and 1990s. The construction sector 
has behaved cyclically, declining during the 1970s crisis and them again in the middle 
of 1980s. The service sector is the only one that has experienced a strong increase in 
its share, of almost 25% between 1976 and 2007. Thus, Spain has now become a 
service economy. During the 1977-1985 crisis, employment in services remained at 
the same level, while employment in other sectors was decreasing. After 1985, the 
share of employment in private sector services has started to rise very quickly. The 
service sector represented almost two thirds of employment recovery between 1985- 
1991. We can observe the evolution of this type of employment in Figure 16.
Figure 16 Evolution of employed persons with respect to type of employment. 1976-2007.
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4.4.5 Unemployment
Spanish unemployment rates increased in the mid-1970s, after the first oil shock and 
the political transition and remained high until the mid-1980s. From a level of 4.5% in 
1976, they increased to 21%, a year after the EU accession in 1986. With almost 3 
million people unemployed in 1988, the official unemployment level of 20.5% was 
almost double the OECD average. These levels stabilised and decreased after 1986 to 
increase again to all time high levels of 24% in 1994. After this date the labour market 
has seen a sustained period of recovery with unemployment levels decreasing 
substantially (see Figure 17). At the beginning of 2007 the unemployment rate in 
Spain was at 8.5% close to the EU average unemployment rate.
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Figure 17 Unemployment rate by sex and period in Spain. 1976-2007.
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes.
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), IN E, Instituto N acional de Estadistica, M adrid, 2 0 0 7 7
As for the unemployment rates by gender, as mentioned when describing the 
participation and employment in Spain, female unemployment was about one-third 
higher than that for men. In 1987 female rates reached 28%, while male rates were 
only 16%. In 1994 the female unemployment rates was of over 31% and male 20%.
In terms of time of search for a new employment, the Spanish labour market has gone 
though a large evolution as well (see Figure 18). From the beginning o f the transition 
period we can observe a sharp growth of the share of long term unemployed in total 
unemployed. At the moment o f EU accession it reached almost 65% of all 
unemployed to fall back towards the end o f the decade. However, in the period o f the 
highest unemployment levels in Spanish history in 1994, it did not increase to the 
levels o f the 1980s. Since then it experienced a very substantial drop. At the time of 
writing in mid 2008, those unemployed for one year or more accounted for around 
25%, which is one o f the lowest levels in the EU.
9
Labour Force Survey (L FS) The survey’s main objective  is to co llect quantitative data on the 
econ om ic activity o f  the population by sex , age, education level, occupation, etc. T he LFS, conducted  
since 1964, is a continuous quarterly sam ple survey, targeted at fam ily households. The sam ple size  is 
approxim ately o f  6 6 ,0 0 0  dw ellin gs, w hich m eans obtaining inform ation from  about 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  people. 
Data is co llected  by m eans o f  personal interview s.
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Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), INE, Instituto N acional de Estadistica, M adrid, 2007.
In terms of unemployment rate by age groups, youth unemployment was particularly 
high. The under-25 age group accounted for nearly 55% of all unemployed in the mid 
1980’ and mid 1990’. Thus the increasing participation of young people and women in 
the work force contributed to a persistence of high unemployment in the economy of 
the late 1980s. (Dolado and Jimeno, 1995).
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Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), INE, Instituto N acional de Estadistica, M adrid, 2007.
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4.4.6 Regional divisions
Spain is divided into 17 Autonomous Communities and 50 provinces. The poorer 
regions of Spain are Andalucia and Extremandura in the south, and Galicia in the 
north. These regions have always had a proportionally larger share of employment in 
agriculture than the rest o f the country. Mining and heavy m anufacturing are 
concentrated in the north o f the country in provinces such as Cantabria, Asturias and 
Basque Country. These regions underwent significant industrial restructuring in the 
early 1980s. The most developed communities are Catalonia on the M editerranean 
coast and Madrid. Regions that have been experiencing a rapid growth due to services 
development are the provinces at the coast such as Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, 
Navarra, together with La Rioja, Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
As for regional participation rates, strong differences can be observed. The Balearic 
Islands (63%) and Catalonia (59%) have the highest participation rate, while 
Extremadura (51%) and Andalucia (52%) have the lowest. Even more telling 
differences can be observed in regional unemployment rate. The highest level of 
unemployment has been always associated with Andalucia and Extrem adura where the 
rates exceeded 30%. The regions with the lowest unemployment rate are Catalonia, 
Madrid, Navarra.
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Figure 20 Unemployment rate by Autonomous Communities and period. 1976-2004 (selected 
years)
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Source: Labour Force Survey (L FS), INE, Instituto N acional de Estadistica, M adrid, 200 4
4.5 Labour mobility
Job turnover is very high in Spain (at the time of writing in mid 2008), as firms hire 
people on a very short-term basis. To a certain extent the reason for this is the ease 
with which short-term contracts may be used.
On the other hand, the willingness of unemployed workers to move geographically is 
low. This may be attributed to various factors: underdevelopm ent of the rented 
housing market, high housing prices, the social importance of family links to the place 
of origin, instability and low wages at destination. Interregional migration rates,
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around 0.5% of the population, are about a half lower in Spain than in other European 
countries (Bentolila and Jimeno, 2003).
Spain has a high home ownership rate (76%). Home ownership in Spain has increased 
dramatically since the 1960s until by the end of the 1990s it has the highest home 
ownership rate in the world (Oswald, 1997).
However, there is a highly developed labour market for seasonal workers linked to
tourism, notably in the Baleares and along the Mediterranean Coast (especially the
Northern part), filled by temporary migrants from the South of Spain. These people
work 6 or 7 months, earning good money (part o f it going undeclared) and then they
return home for winter, having the right to unemployment benefits.
As far as internal migration is concerned, Blanchard (1995) notes that Spain displays
one o f the lowest rates of regional mobility o f all OECD countries (p. 132). Antolin
and Bover (1997) report that “migration does not seem to be working as a mechanism
for alleviating the very high levels of unemployment in Spain” (1997, p.230). They
also find that higher than average unemployment in Spain barely induces unemployed
workers to migrate. The same view is shared by Gonzalez and Puebla (1996) showing
that during the 1980s less than 1 per cent of the population moved regions, falling to a
minimum of 0.45% in 1981. In the period starting after EU accession in 1986,
migration trends increased annually to affect 1.76% of the population by 1990, while
unemployment fell. They go on to argue that the “two distinct periods in migration
patterns coincide exactly with the turning point in the Spanish economy during the
1980s, when there was an economic crisis and structural adjustment up until 1986,
followed by a very strong growth situation in the second half of the decade” (1996,
p. 180). Bentolila and Dolado (1991) note that inter-provincial migration flows have
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followed a U-shaped path since the 1960s. The interregional m igration rate declined 
steadily through the 1960s in Spain from an average of 1.22% in 1962-9 to 0.92%  in 
the 1976-1986 periods and started to rise again from 1992.
4.6 Active and passive labour market policies in Spain
As reported in the OECD Employment Outlook, the distribution of public expenditure 
on employment policy in Spain over the period 1991-2000 shows that it is markedly 
biased towards passive policies. Active policies currently account for around 1% of 
GDP. Social policies in Spain are undeveloped. In 2001 the ratio o f social protection 
expenditure to GDP was 27.3% for the EU15 and 20.1% for Spain. However, as 
mentioned in section 3.5.2 on Polish ALM Ps and in Table 12, the EU average of 
ALM Ps as a % of GDP is very sim ilar and Spain is in the middle range of the EU 
countries, while in Poland the indicator is much lower.
At the beginning of the transition, social expenditures increased to meet, to some 
extent, the higher demand for social protection. In particular, the coverage and 
duration of unemployment benefits and participation in early retirement schemes were 
extended to provide income support to displaced workers. This resulted in high long­
term unemployment and a drastic fall in the employment rates o f the population close 
to the legal retirement age (Jimeno, 2001, Chozas, 2000).
In the composition of social protection expenditures in Spain, unemployment benefits 
amount to more than 2% of GDP (in 2001), despite reforms in 1992 and 1993 which 
restricted eligibility criteria and lowered replacement rates (unem ploym ent benefits 
amounted to 4.1% of GDP in 1991, 5.2% of GDP in 1993).
In addition to reducing both the level and period for receiving unem ploym ent benefits, 
Spain also moved toward activating benefits by trying to increase the em ployability of 
job-seekers, mainly though training.
Expenditures on old-age pensions amount to almost 9% of GDP. Early retirem ent 
schemes very often connected to labour shedding in sectors with declining demand or 
going through a technological upgrading, were one of the main factors driving the 
evolution of pension expenditures. (Jimeno 2001)
Unemployment benefits have been established in Spain since 1961 and consolidated in 
1984. In 1993 benefits became taxable. The 1992 reform was a turning point, 
reinforced by the short employment durations caused by temporary employment. 
Benefit coverage, which had risen from 23% in 1984 to 50% in 1992, fell again to 
around 37% in 2001 (Bentolila and Jimeno, 2003).
The Spanish government has focused its labour market efforts more on increasing 
flexibility than on activating unemployed people (Chozas, 2000; Gonzalez- Calvet,
2002). Nonetheless, it has shown a concern with fostering employm ent through active 
policies. However, as mentioned earlier, when describing the situation in Poland, the 
ALM P still amount to less than 1% of GDP.
As for the active measures, the policies applied in Spain include: training, youth 
oriented measures, subsidies towards direct employment creation and measures for 
disabled people. However, labour market training is considered as the most important 




The post-Fascist Spanish labour market has gone through a transform ation over the 
last thirty years not dissim ilar to that experienced by the post-Com m unist Poland. It 
experienced a long period o f a very high unemployment caused by factors such as the 
political transition accom panied by macroeconomic instability, oil shocks, outdated 
products market and above all labour market rigidities and obsolete institutions 
inherited from the Franco regime. Spain had one of the most rigid employment 
protection laws in the EU. Parts of the fram ework included extended unemployment 
benefits, the considerable bargaining power of insiders in wage setting, and a 
segmentation o f employm ent between permanent and temporary workers, which all 
contributed to unemployment.
Spain’s initial political, demographic and economic conditions were very similar to 
those of the post comm unist Poland, except much lower initial participation rate of 
women. In addition, the post-liberalisation labour market trajectory reveals a striking 
resemblance to the Polish transition path, with the initial period of intensive 
restructuring, subsequent period of recovery, a short slow-down caused by external 
shocks, and the final stage o f stable growth. As a result of some m ajor labour market 
reforms the policy makers managed to reduce the Spanish unemployment rates 
substantially in the most recent period. The Spanish unemployment experience shows 
that inadequate labour market institutions can lead to very high unemployment rates, 
but also that the trend can be reversed through the adequate reforms. Some limited 
labour market reforms in the middle o f the first decade of 2000s in Poland offer hope 
that the latter country may follow a similar path.
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Chapter 5 Regional labour market dynamics. Vector Autoregression  
Analysis (VAR)
This chapter investigates the regional labour market dynamics in Spain and Poland. It 
shows to what extent regional employment, unemployment and participation rate 
dynamics are common to all regions in Spain and Poland. It also compares these 
results with those obtained by Blanchard and Katz (1992), Decressin and Fatas (1995) 
who investigate labour market dynamics in US and EU and Jim eno and Bentolila 
(1998) who research the Spanish labour market.
5.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on the research undertaken by Blanchard and Katz (1992) on 
regional (state-specific) evolutions in the US, followed up by Decressin and Fatas 
(1995), who used a sample that contains EU regions and countries. All together they 
include 51 regions: 8 for France, 8 for Germany, 11 for Italy, 7 for Spain, 11 for the 
UK. Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland; the Netherlands and Portugal are treated as 
single regions.
Extending their approach, this chapter analyzes developments o f regional labour
markets in Poland and Spain since their transition to democracy and open market. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, the labour markets in both countries have undergone a similar
transition. From the labour market perspective, the initial Fascist-Corporatist
economic system had some common characteristics with the Com m unist command
economy in Poland. Not only the labour market institutions were similar, but the
labour market composition was alike. The two countries also experienced very similar
problems after the transition started. At the same time, as suggested by Blanchard and
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Katz (1992), it can be assumed that the dynamic mechanisms at work on regional level 
are largely the same and therefore a sim ilar framework can be applied to other 
countries/regions, even if the parameters of the corresponding adjustm ent functions 
may differ significantly due to different structural features.
The data available for Spain include the period 1976-2004 and for Poland, due to the 
data unavailability from the beginning of the transition, the post-transition period o f 
1999-2004. In both cases quarterly data was used. I concentrate on investigating the 
extent to which labour market shocks10 are shared by all regions and how regional 
employment, unemployment and labour force participation adjust to labour demand 
shocks which are region-specific. Then, the obtained results for both countries are 
compared with each other in order to discuss the similarity of labour market behaviour 
in these two countries.
5.2 Vector autoregression models (VARs)
VARs are dynamic systems of equations that examine the inter-relationships between 
economic variables, using minimal assumptions about the underlying structure o f the 
economy. They aim to provide good statistical representations of the past interactions 
between variables. SVARs (structural vector autoregressions) represent an 
intermediate method between basic VARs and the more structural approach of
10 A regional shock, as in D ecressin  and Fatas (1 9 9 5 ), is defined as a shock to a variable w hich equals  
the logarithm  o f  regional em ploym en t m inus the logarithm  o f  country-level aggregate Spanish /P olish  
em ploym ent. T hey fo llo w  p ioneering research o f  Blanchard and Katz (1 9 9 2 ). A  more detailed  
presentation o f  this fram ework can be found in their paper. A s indicated by the authors, the 
fram ew ork's advantage is in its w ide application to different markets, as it can be assum ed that the 
dynam ic m echanism s at work are largely the sam e. H ow ever, it cannot determ ine d irectly , what sh ou ld  
be  the response to shocks for m ovem ent o f  workers or jobs.
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traditional macroeconometric models: they combine the statistical m ethodology of 
basic VARs with a num ber of widely accepted restrictions derived from economic 
theory, and aim thereby to VARs as dynamic systems of equations in which the 
current level of each variable in the system (e.g. GDP, unemployment and official 
interest rates) depends on past movements in that variable and in all the other variables 
in the system. In contrast with traditional models, basic VAR systems make few 
assumptions about the underlying structure o f the economy.
A VAR system can be expressed in the following form:
Equation 1 Z'  = AXZ'~X + A1Z ‘~~ + ... + ApZ'~n + £t
where Z' is a vector o f endogenous variables at time t, Ai  (i = 1, ..., p)  are coefficient 
vectors, p  is the number o f lags included in the system, and st is a vector o f residuals. 
The residuals, ef, represent the unexplained movements in the variables, reflecting the 
influence o f exogenous shocks (i.e. shocks that arise outside the assumed model). The 
residuals represent a composite of the various exogenous shocks affecting the 
endogenous variables in the underlying structural model. It is not possible, therefore, 
to derive any economic interpretation from the residuals without transform ing 
equation.
Since the seminal work o f Christopher Sims (1980) vector autoregressions (VARs) 
have been widely used to address the following macroeconometric tasks: data 
description, forecasting, structural inference (effects of economic shocks) and policy
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analysis. Vector autoregressions are now a standard part of the applied econom etric 
tools. W hile their interpretation in terms o f causal relationships rem ains controversial, 
most researchers would agree that vector autoregressions are very useful means o f 
summarizing time series (Holtz-Eakin, 1988). VARs have been used mostly to analyze 
macroeconomic time series, including labour market related, where there are many 
observations. (See, e.g., Taylor (1980), or Ashenfelter and Card (1982)). In addition, 
as mentioned in section 5.1, this research is based around the fram ework elaborated by 
Blanchard and Katz (1992).
5.2.1 VARs and structural VARs
If movements o f the endogenous variables within a VAR system are viewed as 
reflecting the effects o f exogenous shocks, the VAR can be used as a tool to examine 
these shocks. The error terms in a basic VAR are complex functions o f the shocks 
hitting the system, and have no economic interpretation. However, the different shocks 
and their effects can be disentangled. This is achieved by placing identifying 
restrictions on the VAR to transform it into the ‘structural m oving-average’ 
representation shown in the following equation:
Equation 2 Z' = C0el + C,w 1 + C2et'2 + C/' 3 + ....... + Cme,'m
In Equation 2, Q  (k = 0, ..., m) represent vectors of parameters determining the current 
and lagged effects of the shocks, et-k (k = 0 ,..., m), on the endogenous variables.
SVARs represent an intermediate approach between the almost purely statistical 
method of basic VARs and the more structural approach of traditional econometric 
models. An important difference between traditional models and SVARs is that, 
whereas the former focus directly on the relationships among economic variables,
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SVARs try to obtain information about the shocks driving m ovem ents in the 
endogenous variables and then use this information to make inferences about the co­
m ovements between them.
5.3 Common Labour M arket Disturbances
Section 5.3.1 of the chapter introduces the regional decomposition, data and variables 
used. Section 5.3.2 shows an overview of the Polish and Spanish labour market 
regional differences. It also investigates to what extent quarterly changes in 
employment have been common to all regions in Spain and Poland and how sim ilar 
the response of regions to such common changes has been. Decressin and Fatas (1995) 
in their research comparing Europe and US discovered that there is an equal or greater 
difference in response to comm on changes across regions in Europe than across states 
in the US. Explanations for this finding are that different countries practice different 
macroeconomic policies in Europe and there is also more heterogeneity among the 
European regions than amongst the US ones. Moreover, in Europe, unlike in the US, 
the proportion of annual changes in employment that are common across regions is 
considerably smaller than the proportion of region-specific changes. And in the case o f 
Spain and Poland, the proportion of the common changes in employment is very low 
even when compared with the European average.
In Section 5.3.3 region-specific labour demand shocks are identify and the sizes and 
repercussions of region-specific labour market disturbances in employment 
investigated. According to Decressin and Fatas (1995) the main difference between 
Europe and the US is that region-specific shocks to employment, although sim ilar in 
initial size, have much stronger long-run effects in the US. In turn, the response of
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relative employment level to employment shock is stronger in Poland than in Spain. It 
is mostly due to the initial reaction to the shock being much stronger in Poland than in 
Spain, even if it falls substantially, losing half o f the value of the shock over 3 
quarters. However, the resulting long run effect in Poland is still larger than in Spain.
In Section 5.3.4 and 5.3.6 the reaction of unemployment rate and labour force 
participation in response to the identified shocks is measured. Decressin and Fatas 
(1995) conclude that if the extent of a region-specific shock in the demand for labour 
is not reflected in a change o f the unemployment or labour force participation rate, it 
must have been absorbed by migration. In the case of Europe they observe that in the 
first three years most of the labour demand shock is reflected in changes in regional 
participation rates. In the US labour force participation reacts to a much smaller extent 
and migration responds to a much larger extent than in Europe. Nonetheless, both in 
Europe and the US, the unemployment rate changes only to a small extent and 
transitorily, suggesting the presence of region-specific natural rates of unemployment. 
In the cases of Poland and Spain the reaction of the unemployment rates is ten times 
higher than in the case o f the European region o f EU15 specified by Decressin and 
Fatas (1995) while the reaction o f participation rate is very weak.
5.3.1 Framework and region-specific variables
The main purpose o f this section is to evaluate the extent to which labour market 
disturbances in Poland and Spain are distributed symmetrically across regions.
The three regional variables examined are: employment growth An, with n being the
logarithm of employment, the unemployment u and labour participation rates pa,
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similarly to the earlier mentioned authors. To measure the degree o f persistence of 
national and regional absolute variables, and o f deviations of the latter from the 
national average, I run unit-root tests using the augmented D ickey-Fuller (ADF). 
Because I am interested in analyzing the effects of regional labour dem and shocks I 
need to identify them in some way. Following Blanchard and Katz (1992) I associate 
the “unexpected changes in regional relative employment within the year with changes 
in labour demand, which is a plausible assumption as long as the largest fraction of 
these unexpected changes is not due to exogenous changes in labour supply or 
migration. Consequently, allow current changes in relative em ploym ent to affect 
unemployment and participation rates but not vice-versa.” (p. 1644)
The Framework followed and underlying the empirical analysis o f regional shocks is 
taken from Blanchard and Katz (1992). To determine the extent to which quarterly 
changes in employment, unemployment and participation rate are comm on to all 
regions in Poland and Spain, following Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and 
Fatas (1995), I estimate regression of regional employment growth rate, 
unemployment rate and the logarithm of the participation rate on the same variable on 
national level, for both of the countries as follows:
Equation 3 A log( N it ) = a u +  /?, A log ( N , , ) +
Equation 4 U it =  CX2< + fyU  et +  Pht
Equation 5 A log( Pn ) = + £  log( P , ) + jU,u
where /V,, stands for employment in region / and N e , for em ploym ent in 
Spain/Poland, subsequently U for unemployment rate and P for participation rate.
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The region-specific variables are estimated in the same way as in Decressin and Fatas 
(1995), given by the residuals of the regressions shown in Appendix 1, Table 35, i.e.: 
For regional relative to national employment growth I estimate:
Equation 6 An jt = A log( N jt) — (3 A log( N et)
For relative to national unemployment rate I estimate:
Equation 7 ujt =  U it — SjUct
W here U -t denotes the regional unemployment rate and Ue the national 
unemployment rate.
For regional relative to national labour force participation rates I estimate: 
Equation 8 p jt = lo g(Pj{ ) ~ £  . log (P,t )
W here Pj stands for the regional labour force participation rate (labour force divided 
by the working-age (15-64) population) and Pe for the national labour force 
participation rate. This measure was taken as a logarithm .11
5.3.2 Regional differences
From the estimations o f regressions of the regional employment growth rate, 
unemployment rate and the logarithm of the participation rate (Equation 3, Equation 4, 
Equation 5) I found that in Spain average/?2 for the employment regressions equals 
0.32 (0.10 in a pool sample) and in Poland 0.17 (0.22 in a pool sample). On average 
32% of the changes in regional employment are shared by all regions in Spain and
11 The results based on lev e ls  were insignificant.
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17% in Poland. Similarly, Decressin and Fatas (1995) found that the average R 2 for 
the employment regressions equals 0.20 in Europe and 0.60 in the US. Hence, on 
average only 20% of the year to year changes in regional employment are shared by 
all regions in Europe, whereas in the US 60% of the changes are comm on to all the 
states.12
As for the unemployment rate, in Spain the average/?2 for the unemployment rate 
regressions equals 0.89 and in Poland 0.74, which means that on average 89% of the 
changes in regional unemployment rate are shared by all regions in Spain and 74% in 
Poland. The results from a pool sample for both countries amount to 0.99.
Similarly to the unemployment rate, the participation rate results show great 
persistence in both o f the countries, where R 2 from a pool sample for both countries 
amounts to 0.99. In Spain average/?2 for the participation rate regressions equals 0. 65 
and in Poland 0.46, which means that on average 65% of the changes in regional 
participation rate are shared by all regions in Spain and 46% in Poland.
In both Poland and Spain we can observe strong differences at the regional level o f a 
similar pattern. In Poland coefficients for employment vary between -2.2 (Opolskie) 
and 6.3 (Slaskie) which also has the highest R 2 (0.588) and both are regions with 
relatively low unemployment. The Slaskie voivodeship is a very big region in Poland 
constituting 12% of labour force.13 In the case o f the Opolskie voivodeship an 
interesting reaction can be observed, which indicates that the employm ent dynamics
For more detailed results on  em ploym ent, unem ploym ent rate and participation rate regressions see  
A ppendix I (detailed regional results and average results) and Appendix 2 (pool results)
13 T he detailed breakdown o f  Spanish and P olish population by regions can be found in A ppend ix  3
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were negatively correlated with the rest of the country. Opolskie is the border region 
close to Germany, therefore it might be responsive to German unemployment rates.
D 1The lowest K ' f o r  em ploym ent can be observed in regions suffering from high 
unemployment like Zachodniopom orskie (0.003), W arm insko-M azurskie (0.042), 
Podkarpackie (0.009), which proves just how low is the % o f changes that these 
regions share with all the regions.
In Spain the highest and the lowest em ploym ent coefficients can be observed in the 
regions with the worst labour market situation such as Andalucia (1.432) and Galicia 
(0.575), but in general the regional differences are less diversified than in the case of 
Polish voivodeships. The regions with the lowest unemployment and m ost stabilised 
labour market, have employment coefficients closest to unity (M adrid- 0.922, 
Catalonia-1.026, Com unidad V alanciana-1.082) However, we have to take into 
consideration that this may be just a statistical artefact, as there is a large share of
Spanish employment in these three regions implying a higher correlation.14 R~ for 
employment in Spanish autonomous communities is highest in Catalonia (0.583) and 
wealthy Comunidad Valenciana (0.548) and the lowest in the traditionally poor 
southern regions of Spain like Extremadura and Galicia (0.205). The lowest level can 
be also observed in the northern region of Cantabria (0.102), which suffered from high 
unemployment due to mining restructuring.
14 Population o f  Cataluna constitutes 15% o f  the total Spanish population, o f  C om unidad V alenciana  
10% and M adrid 13%. For m ore details please see: A ppendix 3
5.3.3 Univariate response of employment to employment shock
The null hypothesis is that there is a unit root (non-stationarity) in relative 
employment. After Decressin and Fatas (1995) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) I test 
for this hypothesis by running the following regression:
Equation 9 An jt =  CCU +  OC2in it_x +  CC2jn jt_2 +  1Jjt
n jt is defined as explained in 5.3.1. Applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test15 for
unit root16 at levels with 2 lags and intercept, I could reject the null hypothesis for 15 
out o f 17 regions in Spain at 1% significance and for 16 regions at 10% significance. 
At 1st differences I could reject the null hypothesis in all 17 regions. In Polish regions 
the null hypothesis o f a unit root at levels was rejected in 11 out o f 16 regions at 10% 
significance and in 1 out o f 16 regions at 1% significance. At 1st differences I could 
reject it for 15 out o f 16 regions at 10% significance. It is satisfactory that in case of 
Spain the rejection of unit root provides a solid ground for further analysis. However, 
in the case of Poland the non-stationarity o f the data in 5 out o f 16 regions (when a 
stronger 1% threshold is applied) may suggest some degree of caution when 
interpreting the results.
Next, I estimate the univariate process followed by regional relative employment 
growth in Spain and Poland. Over the period 1976-2004 for Spain and 1999-2004 for 
Poland, allowing for two lags, I run the following regression:
Equation 10 An jt — OCu -I- (Z-, A n jt_x + CC2A n it_~, + l)jt
The D ickey-Fu ller (D F ) test tests whether a unit root is present in an autoregressive m odel. The  
augm ented D ickey-Fu ller test (A D F ) rem oves all the structural effects (autocorrelation) in the tim e  
series and then tests using the sam e procedure as D F (D ickey  and Fuller (1 9 7 9 ).
16 If the tim e-series is stationary (do not contain a unit root), then it has a tendency to return to a 
constant (or determ inistically  trending) mean. A ccordingly , the level o f  the series w ill be a significant 
predictor o f  next period's change. If the series contains unit root, then changes w ill occur with  
probabilities that do not depend on the current level o f  the series.
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It pools the entire sample per country and allows for region-specific fixed effects. nt 
stands for the logarithm of employment in region i minus the p  -adjusted logarithm of 
national employment in each of the countries. Table 15 shows the results and Figure 
21 the impulse response function of employment to a one standard deviation shock 
(standard deviation o f regression from the pool sample). For detailed results see 
Appendix 2.
Table 15 Regional relative employment growth, pooled sample17
An,, A n „ -1 A nit_2
Spain (17 regions) 0.011546 -0.298074
(0.022988) (0.022982)
Poland (16 regions) -0.456308 -0.194549
(0.063801) (0.063852)
Table 16 Regional relative employment growth. Results for EU and US states for the period of 
1966-1987 by Decressin and Fatas (1995)
A/i,, A"„-i An«-2
EEC (51 regions) -0.0017 0.0466
(0.0371) (0.0372)
US (51 regions) 0.6481 -0.0845
(0.0333) (0.0354)
From the estimation of Equation 10 we can observe that employm ent in both Spain
D ^and Poland is scarcely persistent with for Spain of 0.10 and 0.22 for Poland. There 
is a negative relation between the present and the past values of em ploym ent growth in 
Poland (coefficient in lag one of -0.46). In Spain we can observe a very weak positive 
coefficient in lag one (0.01) indicating poor impact of the past value o f em ploym ent in 
relation to the present value. In the lag 2 in turn, similarly to Poland the coefficient is 
negative. Therefore the positive effect o f the shock is being lost. In lag 2, the 
coefficient for Spain amounts to -0.30 and -0.20 for Poland, showing the reverse effect 
of the shock.
17 Standard error in parenthesis.
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From Figure 21 we can see that the response of relative employment level to 
employment shock is stronger in Poland than in Spain. It is mostly due to the initial 
reaction to the shock being much stronger in Poland (three times higher) than in Spain, 
even if it falls substantially starting from the second period. The overall long run effect 
in Poland is higher as well as the shock (0.056). It stabilises at the long run value of 
0.034. In Spain it stabilises at the level of 0.015, while the initial shock has the value 
of 0.02. This shows that a large part of an immediate, potentially very positive effect 
in Poland is lost, probably prim arily due to lack o f (internal) migration. The policy 
makers should make efforts to maintain the positive effects of the shocks, as it occurs 
in the US or European states (see Figure 22). A similar pattern may be observed in 
Spain, but at a smaller scale than in Poland, as overall more adjustments have taken 
place than in Poland.
In turn for the US, Blanchard and Katz (1992) report, the persistence o f employment 
growth, which is reflected in the initial shock of 1.5 percentage points and the long run 
effect of 3.4 percentage points. For the EU according to Decressin and Fatas (1995), 
the initial shock has the value of 1.7 percentage points and it stabilises at the same 
level in the long run (see Table 16). They explain this as a result of a stronger response 
of interregional migration flows to labour demand shocks in the US. In Europe the 
initial shock does not produce an initial growth like it does in the US.
To sum up, the most positive response to the shock can be observed in US, followed 
by EU average. In Poland, even though the initial shock is the highest, the positive 
effect in lost by half. The Spanish response falls between European average (51
European regions o f EU-15 defined by Decressin and Fatas) and Poland.
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Figure 22 Univariate response of employment to one standard deviation shock. Pooled sample for 
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5.3.4 Trends for the unemployment rate in Poland and Spain
The aim of this section is to briefly indicate what were the trends in the regional 
unemployment rates in Poland and Spain and to provide some more background to the 
further analysis of unemployment persistence.
An informal behaviour of relative unemployment in Spain is provided in Figure 23,
which presents correlation between the regional unemployment rates minus the
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national unemployment rate U between (a) 1976 and 1986 (year of EU accession, with 
one of the highest unem ploym ent rates in Spanish history), (b) 1986 and 2004 and (c) 
the long run com parison between 1976 and 2004 annual averages. The Polish case in 
presented in Figure 24. Only one regression is run between the periods 199-2004, due 
to the shorter time series available. All coefficients are significant.
The fitted regression line indicates that unemployment rates in the Spanish regions 
grew substantially between 1976 and 1986 (chart a) from an average between all the 
regions o f 4.1 to 19.6. The regression line has a slope o f 1.7 (with a standard deviation
of 0.32). R~ for regression between these periods is at a high level o f 0.66. For 1986 
and 2004 (chart b) we can observe a recovery with a slope o f the regression line of
D  10.47 (with a standard deviation of 0.15), showing more regional desegregation. for 
regression between these years is at a lower level of 0.39. The third graph for 1976 
and 2004 shows much higher stability with the slope o f the regression line of 0.93 and
for regression of 0.34 (with a standard deviation o f 0.33).
Even though we are looking at different periods (much longer than in the case of 
Poland) it is interesting to see a similar trend as in Spain for the periods of 1976 and 
2004 (chart c) period in Spain, can be observed in Poland in the period of 1999 and 
2004 (Figure 24), where the unemployment rates remained stable, with the slope of the
regression line of 0.85 (with a standard deviation of 0.20) for regression between 
these periods is at a higher than in Spain level of 0.55.
All this shows that the regional differences are more pronounced in Poland than in 
Spain, which additionally reinforces the results from my empirical work presented
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earlier in this chapter. As highlighted in the section 5.4, this could indicate that the 
Polish transition amplified regional differences far more than the Spanish transition 
did.
Figure 23 Regional relative unemployment rate in Spain in periods (a) 1976-1986, (b) 1986-2004, 
(c) 1976-2004 (annual averages).
(a)
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Relative unemployment rate 1977
Figure 24 Regional relative unemployment rate in Poland in periods of 1999 and 2004 (annual 
averages).
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The results for Europe and US from Decressin and Fatas ( l 995) for 1968 to 1987 
show for the 15 European states o f EU15 a slope o f regression line o f 1.09 (with a 
standard deviation of 0.28) and the R 2 of 0.23. For the US the slope o f the regression 
line is 0.67 and the R 2 equals 0.38. An important problem with the regression for 51 
European states of EU15 may be that unemployment is measured differently across 
countries in Europe.
Also, the estimation for the European regions was made over the period from 1968 to 
1987. They found an R 2 o f 0.01 and a slope of 0.20. However, this result was almost 
entirely driven by the Spanish regional unemployment data, and upon excluding them
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the slope rose to 1.18 (with a standard error of 0.26) and the R 2 equalled 0.32. They 
concluded that differences in relative unemployment rates between regions seem to be 
more persistent in Europe than in the US.
5.3.5 Univariate response of unemployment to one standard deviation shock
To assess the degree o f persistence o f national and regional variables, as in the case of 
employment, I estimate the univariate process followed by regional unemployment 
rate in Spain and Poland. Over the period 1976-2004 for Spain and 1999-2004 for 
Poland, allowing for two lags (after having tested for the optimal number o f lags), I 
run the following regression:
Equation 11 Ujt CC]( +  Ci2lli t[  + CCyiUjt_2j +
Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas (1995) discovered that deviations 
of regional relative unemployment rates from their long-term means are not persistent 
both in European Union and in the US. Also, the differences in relative unemployment 
rates between regions seem to be more persistent in the European Union than in the 
US, suggesting that regional employment shocks may not be absorbed by changes in 
regional unemployment rates. Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that in the US the fast 
return to the long-term means happens because labour force participants migrate into 
states which have benefited from a favourable demand shock (see Table 18). In the 
case o f Spain and Poland, unemployment is persistent in both countries, however 
stronger persistence resulting from shocks can be observed in Spain. This is a positive 
news for policy makers in Poland providing some comfort that the unemployment 
persistency is not as high as in Spain. We can observe it in the unemployment rate 
data. Spanish unemployment fell to a one digit number only in 2005 after over 20
years of double digit rate. Polish unemployment rate has fell below 10% in 2007 after 
15 years o f double digit levels o f this indicator. In Spain the coefficient in lag 1 is 0.77 
showing a very strong persistence of unemployment, stabilising in lag 2 to the level of 
0.16. In the case o f Poland coefficients are lower than in Spain, 0.41 in lag 1 and -0.07 
(see Table 17). Unlike in the US, in Poland and Spain interregional migration is very
low. R~ is very similar in both countries, in Spain 0.992298 and in Poland 0.995815. 
This indicates that shocks are largely common to all regions. In Decressin and Fatas 
(1995) the coefficients were higher than in the case o f Poland and Spain, amounting to 
0.98 for EU and 0.88 for US in lag 1 (see Table 18). Figure 25 presents the above 
results for Poland and Spain in the form of univariate response o f unemployment rate 
to one standard deviation shock, while Figure 26 shows the results o f Decressin and 
Fatas (1995) for EU 15 regions and US states.
Table 17 Regional relative unemployment rate, pooled sample18
“ it “  i t - \ “ i t - 2
Spain (17 regions) 0.773038 0.157780
(0.023468) (0.023578)
Poland (16 regions) 0.410653 -0.076479
(0.062331) (0.060799)
Table 18 Regional relative unemployment rate. Results for EU for the period of 1966-1987 and 
for US 1970-1990 by Decressin and Fatas (1995)_________________________________________
“ n “ i t -1 “ i t - 2
EEC (51 regions) 0.9787 -0.4858
(0.0337) (0.0331)
US (51 regions) 0.8770 -0.1630
(0.0322) (0.0320)
The sizes of the shocks are fairly similar, 0.72 percentage points in Europe and 0.84 in 
the US, but have less persistent effects in European Union than in the US. Similarly in
18 Standard error in parenthesis
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Spain the shock amounts to 6.7 percentage points and in Poland to 5.8 percentage 
points. This substantial difference is due to the fact that the European figure was 
estimated on all the European countries, including those with very low unemployment. 
Decressin and Fatas (1995) made some separate estimations for particular countries. 
The result o f the estimation for Italy gave the initial shock as three times higher than 
for the whole Europe. As can be seen from Figure 25, in Poland the effect o f the 
shock is lost much faster than in Spain. In period 5 the effect of the shock has 
disappeared completely while in Spain 70% of the initial effect is still left and it 
decreases gradually.
Figure 25 Univariate response of unemployment rate to one standard deviation shock. Pooled 
sample for Poland and Spain
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Figure 26 Univariate response of unemployment rate to one standard deviation shock. Pooled 
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5.3.6 Univariate response of participation rate to one standard deviation shock
In order to investigate the response o f labour force participation to shocks, allowing 
for two lags I run:
Equation 12 p it = au + a2pit_x +  a3pit_2i +  Tjit
The results of pools sample of this regression with fixed effects are shown in Table 19. 
We can observe that the participation rate in Spain is persistent with a coefficient of 
0.85. The results for Poland show no persistence, but should be treated with caution, 
as they are statistically insignificant. The results obtained by Decressin and Fatas show 
a low persistence in participation rates in Europe (0.66) and US (0.48) (see Table 20). 
Again, R 2 is very sim ilar in both countries, in Spain 0.999985 and in Poland 
0.999902.
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Table 19 Regional relative participation rate, pooled sample19
P i, P it-1 P i,-2
Spain (17 regions) 0.851783 0.056138
(0.023986) (0.023364)
Poland (16 regions) -0.050466 -0.034333
(0.066687) (0.066543)
Table 20 Regional relative participation rate. Results for EU for the period of 1975-1987 and for 
US 1976-1990 by Decressin and Fatas (1995)
Pi, P „ -1 P i,-2
EEC (51 regions) 0.476 -0.015
(0.054) (0.047)
US (51 regions) 0.665 -0.197
(0.040) (0.040)
Figure 27 presents the results for Poland and Spain in the form of a univariate 
response of participation rate to one standard deviation shock. W e can observe a 
stronger response in case of Spain than for Poland. Despite the fact that the shock is 
three times larger in Poland than in Spain, participation rates comes back to its initial 
level after 4 periods, while in Spain it moves back very gradually, showing some 
persistence o f this measure. Again, as in the case of analysing persistence of 
unemployment rate, the situation o f the Polish case looks more positive than the 
Spanish.
|l> Standard error in () parenthesis
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Figure 27 Univariate response of participation rate to one standard deviation shock. Pooled 








Spain Participation rate *  Poland Participation ratej
5.3.7 The response to region-specific labour demand shocks, VAR analysis20
W e now estimate the typical dynamic response of the average region to a transitory 
one-standard deviation region-specific labour demand shock in its relative 
employment growth. Following Blanchard and Katz (1992), I estimate a VAR with the 
employment growth, unemployment rate and participation rates:
Equation 13 X  jt = A( + B (L )X  it[ + E /f
where X jt = [An ,U ,p a ]  with variables as deviations from the national average, and
where E is a vector o f shocks. I allow for region-specific fixed-effects, taking into 
consideration the fact that some regions will have, more than others, perm anently high 
relative unemployment rates and others will have low relative unemployment rates. It 
is preceded in this way for comparability with previous research. Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) have however pointed out that the estimates from pooled data may be 
inconsistent. Therefore I also ran a separate VAR for each region.
20 For panel data A rellano Bond (xtabond) is used instead o f  V A R , w hich does not work on panel data. 
A s V A R s are autoregressions o f  a set o f  y variables on a set o f  lags o f  each o f  those variables, they can  
be effic ien tly  estim ated by O LS. T herefore, since it is a dynam ic panel data setting, w e run xtabond.
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Following other researchers, I examine the responses o f the three variables to an 
innovation in employm ent of the Choleski orthogonalization21 of the VAR, with the 
following ordering o f the variables: An, u, pa. This implies that employment only 
responds contem poraneously to labour demand shocks. The results of the responses of 
the employment level and of the unemployment and participation rates are shown in 
Figure 28 for Spain and in Figure 29 for Poland.
Figure 28 Spain. Impulse responses to labour demand shocks.
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T he C holesky m ethod is com m on ly  used in the M onte Carlo m ethod for sim ulating system s w ith  
m ultiple correlated variables. For more details see Horn and Johnson (1 9 8 5 ).
Figure 29 Poland. Impulse responses to labour demand shocks.
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In addition, a comparison o f the responses to the similar shocks in US states and EU 
regions, reproduced from Decressin and Fatas (1995) are made (see Figure 31 for 
Europe and Figure 32 for US). According to Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) the 
responses o f regional relative unemployment and participation, to regional labour 
demand shocks are much slower in Spain than elsewhere, while the long-run effects 
on relative employment levels are lower slightly below those in the EU, and much 
smaller than in the US (see Figure 30). Their results in the medium term indicate that 
on average approximately 50% of the variance across regions is explained by 
aggregate shocks. Therefore, it makes sense to analyze regional labour market 
variables expressed as deviations from the corresponding national means. Jim eno and 
Bentolila provide us with a comprehensive explanation of the effects of a positive 
shock to a region’s relative employment level. The workers who fill jobs created as a 
result of such a shock may come from three sources: the region’s unemployed, 
previously non-participant workers and immigrants. Therefore, the behaviour of 
migration is captured by the difference between the change in employment, on the one
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hand, and those of unem ploym ent and participation, on the other. According to the 
authors:
“the main feature in the Spanish pattern is that the joint response of migration and 
participation to shocks is small. As in the case of EU regions, the lower response of 
migration than in the US explains the low long-run effect on the employment level 
mentioned above. Note that if there was no interregional migration, there would be no 
relative employment effects, while the latter would be large with highly elastic 
migration flows.” (p. 33)
A lack of persistence o f employment growth was also found for US states by 
Blanchard and Katz 1992 and for EU regions by Decressin and Fatas 1995. But the 
persistence of regional unemployment and participation rates shocks observed in 
Spain is significantly higher than those found elsewhere. The fact that the
unemployment is more persistent in Spain than in Poland might be due to lower labour
22  ^2 force participation" , higher strictness of labour market regulations" or lower
migration, which as earlier mentioned in Chapter 4, is one of the lowest among the
OECD countries.
22 In Spain the average annual participation rate over the m easured period o f  1 976-2004  w as o f  63%  
w hile for Poland for the m easured period o f  1999-2004 o f  67% .
23 According to the O E C D  E m ploym ent Protection L egislation indicator (see  O E C D  E m ploym ent 
O utlook 2004 , Chapter 2 for more details), Spain has one o f  the highest indicators am ong the O E C D  
countries with the level o f  3.1 in 200 3  in a scale o f  1-6. Country with the h ighest strictness is Portugal 
with the indicator o f  3 .5 . Poland is in the m iddle range with the strictness indicator o f  1.7. T he indicator  
is com posed  o f  three com ponents: overall strictness o f  protection against (ind ividual) d ism issa ls, on  
temporary em ploym ent and on co llective  dism issals.
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Figure 30 Impulse responses to region-specific labour demand shocks in Spain 1976-1994, 
according to Jimeno and Bentolila (1996)
q u a r te rs
To sum up the results o f Decressin and Fatas, (1995), Blanchard and Katz, (1992) and 
Jimeno and Bentolila (1996), they show that a one percent point labour demand shock 
has a long-run effect on the relative regional employment level o f about 1.4 percent in 
the US (Blanchard and Katz, 1992), about 0.6 percent in the EU (Decressin and Fatas, 
1995), and about 0.4 percent in Spain (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1996). M oreover, the 
effects of this shock on regional relative unemployment and participation rates have 
vanished after six years in both the US and the EU, while in Spain, at that time 
horizon, about one fourth of the original effect o f the shock on these variables still 
remains (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1996).
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5.4 Summary of the results
W hen analysing the developm ents of regional labour markets in Poland and Spain, I 
have demonstrated that on average 32% of the changes in regional employment are 
shared by all regions in Spain and 17% in Poland. 20% of the year to year changes in 
regional employment are shared by all regions in the European Union, whereas in the 
US 60% of the changes are common to all the states.
In terms of the changes in regional unemployment rates, on average 89% changes are 
shared by all regions in Spain and 74% in Poland. As for the changes in regional 
participation rate, on average 65% of changes are shared by all regions in Spain and 
46% in Poland.
In both Poland and Spain we can observe strong differences in labour market 
indicators at the regional level. However, in general the regional differences are 
smaller in Spain than in the case of Polish voivodeships. As earlier mentioned, this 
could indicate that the Polish transition amplified regional differences far more than 
the Spanish transition did.
W hen examining the degree of persistent effects of shocks on the regional relative 
unemployment in Poland and Spain, I have demonstrated that shocks to 
unemployment are persistent in both countries, however stronger persistence can be 
observed in Spain. In Spain the coefficient in lag 1 is 0.77 showing a very strong 
persistence of unemployment, stabilising in lag 2 to the level o f 0.16. In the case of 
Poland coefficients are lower than in Spain, 0.41 in lag 1 and -0.07. Here, Poland 
comes across better than Spain: even if the regional differences have been more 
pronounced, in Poland, the regions respond better to shocks and return to equilibrium
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faster. The fact that the unemployment is more persistent in Spain than in Poland, as 
mentioned in the previous section, might be due to lower labour force participation, 
more strict labour m arket regulations or lower migration. In particular, we observed in 
the descriptive chapters on labour markets in Spain and Poland that the initial female 
participation rate and therefore also the overall participation rate has been much higher 
in Poland than in Spain. This remains an important factor differentiating between the 
labour markets outcomes in both countries.
In the EU-15 regions and the US, a region-specific increase in the demand for labour 
permanently raises the em ployment share of a region, in Spain the reaction is sim ilar 
to Europe. The strongest effect o f the shock is observed in Poland. In addition, shocks 
are distributed less symm etrically across regions in Poland and Spain than in other 
EU-15 regions. In Europe, in the initial period, a region-specific increase in labour 
demand is mainly met by higher labour force participation, whereas in the US 
immigration plays the most important role in the adjustment. In Poland and Spain 
there is no effect of the shock on unemployment rate and participation rate.
It can be concluded that the behaviour of regional relative variables is very sim ilar in 
Poland and Spain, but the adjustment mechanism on the regional level works better in 
the former than in the latter economy, which is a good sign. On the other hand, a small 
scale of adjustment via internal migration is a point of concern, even if both 
economies share the problem with most of the EU countries.
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Chapter 6 Assessment of the active labour market policies applying 
the Augmented Matching Function approach
This chapter provides an analysis of Polish active labour market policies (ALMPs), 
with the emphasis on training programmes, as seen from a regional perspective. The 
effectiveness o f labour market policies has been widely discussed in the literature.- 
Many results demonstrated that ALMPs are not always a solution to labour market 
problems. The basic approach in assessing the effectiveness of these methods is to 
measure their influence on the future employment prospects o f their participants. It is 
also important to consider the m acroeconomic context: the efficiency of the 
programmes on the micro level does not necessarily translate into their 
macroeconomic effect due to the indirect m acroeconomic effects resulting from these 
policies. ALMPs may not only have an effect on the participants, but may very well 
have effects on the non-participant unemployed population or even on the employed 
population.
Therefore, assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs using an appropriate fram ework of 
reference is crucial for policy makers as these efforts may have no effects on the 
labour market at all, constitute a deadweight loss (when programme participants are 
primarily the unemployed who could find a job even without such assistance), create a 
substitution effect (when programme participants are employed at the expense o f other 
unemployed, excluded from the programme) or a displacem ent effect (when 
programme participants are employed at the expense of the people employed in this 
job before, and who in consequence become unemployed).
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In particular, the substitution effect was described by Haskel and Jackm an (1988). If 
substitution effects are prevailing, ALMPs do not increase the total outflows from 
unemployment into em ployment, but merely alter the composition o f the outflows. Yet 
the analysis of the other effects require more empirical work, and this is where I aim to 
contribute to the existing literature, also taking into account, the “transition” context of 
the Polish labour market, as discussed in the previous chapters.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.1 and 6.1.1, I will introduce the 
concept of the augmented matching function extending the discussion in Chapter 1. 
The data and variables used in the empirical study are presented in Section 6.2. 
Section 6.3 provides the main estimation results. An extension of the benchmark 
analysis is that in order to measure the effects o f the ALMPs in different types of 
voivodeships, I run the matching function model on three types of voivodeships: 
modem, industrial and agricultural. The results of these regressions are described in 
Section 6.3.1. Finally, Section 6.4 provides the conclusions.
Empirical evaluations o f active labour market programmes (ALM Ps) have utilised 
both, a microeconometric and a macroeconometric approach. M icroeconom etric 
analysis estimates the impact of a programme on the individual’s re-em ploym ent 
chances, while the macroeconometric approach’s advantage is its capability of 
capturing externalities by looking at aggregate data. The analysis provides a 
macroeconometric approach to the evaluation of ALMPs in Poland. The key 
modelling concept is based on the augmented matching function.
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6.1 The Ordinary Matching Function
Following the description and formulations used by Puhani (1999), the matching 
function can be written:
Equation 14 h = A m (U ,V )
where h are new hirings (matches, outflows from unemployment into employment), U 
and V  are the stocks o f unemployed persons and vacancies, respectively, and m is a 
continuous non-constant function. A  is the mismatch parameter (the higher A, the 
smaller the mismatch between the unemployed and vacancies). Thus A  can capture a 
variety of factors. Am ongst the most important are occupational mismatch, 
geographical mismatch, the efficiency o f labour market institutions (like the public 
employment service) in creating matches, as well as preferences and institutionally set 
incentives which influence the search behaviour o f the agents.
Specifying the matching process by a Cobb-Douglas type production function I get 
Equation 15 h = A U pV y
Taking logarithms on both sides and allowing for some random variation in hiring, the 
following regression equation can be formulated:
Equation 16 In (ht ) = a  + In (Ut ) + y\n(Vt ) + St + £t
where ln(At)=a+flt+£t . S is the coefficient on the deterministic time trend which 
accounts for changes in matching efficiency over time.
6.1.1 The Augmented Matching Function
In the ordinary matching function, the unemployed are treated as a hom ogenous pool 
of people. Lehmann (1995), taking up the concept of the search effectiveness o f the
unemployed by Layard, Nickell, and Jackm an (1991, Chapters 5 and 10), formulates 
the augmented matching function as 
Equation 17 h = A{ysU)^Vr
where WU denotes the search effective stock of the unemployed, and T  is the average 
search effectiveness of the unemployed people. The search effectiveness o f the 
unemployment stock may be reduced by a higher share of the long-term unemployed 
in the total unemployment stock. ALMPs, on the other hand, can be viewed as 
measures to increase the search effectiveness of the unemployment stock.
Following Lehmann (1995), we can thus decompose T  as 
Equation 18 \f/ — y/{) (1 +  K T ) , with
Equation 19 T — wrTr and
ZR ,w r = 1 so that
Equation 21 y/ = y/{) + y/^KWJ^ + y/{)KW2T2 + ... + 1//QKWRTR
where %  (0< %  < 7) is the search effectiveness index without any ALM Ps treatment, 
T  is a weighted ALMPs index of the set of R  different ALMPs program m es Tr. The Tr 
variables can be expenditures on ALMPs, stocks or outflows of participants, or a 
combination of expenditures and participants in the programmes. P^qK  is the effect of 
the ALMPs programmes on the search effectiveness of the unemployed.
Inserting the decomposition of W into the Cobb-Douglas specification and taking 
logarithms we get:
Equation 22 ln(/z) = ln(A) + J3X l n ( ^ ( l  + KT))  + y3 In(U)  + j'ln(V)
For small K T  we can approximate the equation by
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Equation 23 In{h) ~  ln(A) + /?, \n(ys{)) + p K T  + /?2 ln(f/) + /ln (V ) 
which is equal to Equation 24
In (h) = ln(A) + yffln(^0) + 0 K W J x + 0K W 2T2 + ... + pK W RTR + j3\n(U) + y \n(V)
W e can therefore write the following regression equation:
Equation 25 ln(/i) — (X +  /3\vi(JJt ) + 'y\n(Vt) + 0\T\t + +... + + St + € t
where = /?AWr and ln(At)=a+filn(,I/o)+St+St. Thus we can estimate the effects 
of the active labour market programmes 1 to R  on the outflows from 
unemployment to em ploym ent h.
6.2 Data and variables
We are using monthly regional panel data from the Polish M inistry of Labour and
Social Policy on outflows from unemployment, unemployment and vacancy stocks,
and on participants in ALM P programmes like training, intervention works, public 
works and start-up loans. Other authors use also the expenditure on ALM P24, but for 
the chosen time series this data was not available in the regional dimension. The panel 
is split in two parts due to the administration reform in 1999, which changed the 
number of voivodeships from 49 to 16. The first panel is for the period between 
January 1995 and December 1998 for 49 voivodeships and the second for the period 
between January 1999 and October 2005 for 16 voivodeships.
There is a measurement problem as outflows from unemployment into any ALM Ps, 
apart from training, are measured as outflows into employment, i.e., an inflow into a 
works programme leads to an outflow from unemployment. Regressing any type of 
outflows on works programmes variables would yield spurious estimates. Therefore,
'4 U sed  data is in d ifferences o f  logarithm s (In) o f  thousands in order to avoid the stationarity problem . 
W hen running D ickey-Fu ller test on leve ls, we were finding unit root in the majority o f  series.
148
the proposed solution is to adjust the m easured outflows from unemployment by 
subtracting the inflows into public works and intervention works. However, this 
method carries a risk o f underestimating the possibility of intervention works turning 
into a genuine outflow. The resulting net outflows measure is the dependent variable 
of interest. I will interpret the coefficients of ALM Ps in the following way:
if the coefficients are negative and significant, we face clear-cut substitution/ 
displacement effects25,
if the coefficients are insignificant, the policies have no indirect effects on 
other outflows,
if the coefficients are positive, we face some positive external effects o f 
ALMPs on other outflows.
Following Puhani and Steiner (1996; 1997), I will alleviate the endogeneity problem 
by lagging the ALMPs variables. Lagging the ALM Ps policies variables also accounts 
for the fact that it takes some time until these expenditures can have an effect on the 
labour market.
In addition, to avoid the seasonality problem, I have augmented the estimations with 
11 monthly dummy variables. All the variables are presented as logarithms of 
thousands.
6.3 Results of the effects of ALMPs on the outflows from unem ployment
The following section presents the estimation results of effects of ALM Ps on outflows 
from unemployment.
D ue to data lim itations w e are unable to distinguish w hether w e deal w ith substitution or 
disp lacem ent effect.
Table 21 presents the results of the augmented matching function estimates for old 
voivodeships and Table 23 for new voivodeships. The cumulative significances are 
shown in Table 22 and Table 24. I estimate each regression for both robust fixed and 
random effects models and by applying the Hausman (1978) test I indicate the 
preferred estimation. W hen the Hausman test26 does not reject the random effects 
model, then the random effects estimates, which are more efficient than the fixed 
effects estimates, are likely to be consistent. I have also carried out dynamic 
specification by Arellano Bond (1991) estimation, to account for the lagged dependant 
variable but the results on the lagged dependent variable were not significant, so I did 
not adopt a dynamic model.
In the model I have also included lagged ALMPs variables. For the intervention works 
I account for six lags, for public works for 4 lags and for loans for start ups (old 
voivodeships only) for five lags. The cut-off points for the number o f lags were based 
on the significance o f the lags. Lagging training proved to be insignificant, therefore I 
only account for the current value of this measure.
"6 The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coeffic ien ts estim ated by the e ffic ien t random  
effects estim ator are the sam e as the ones estim ated by the consistent fixed  e ffec ts  estim ator. If they are 
(insign ificant P -value, Prob>chi2 larger than 0 .0 5 ) then it is safe to use random effects.
Table 21 Augmented matching function estimates for old voivodeships (49).
Fixed Effects Random Effects
outflows Coefficient Std. Error T-statistics P>|t| Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistlcs Z>|t|
In unemployment (t-1) 0.451 0.030 15.260 0.000 0.484 0.028 17.590 0.000
In vacancies (t-1) 0.054 0 . 0 1 1 5.000 0.000 0.059 0 . 0 1 0 6 . 0 1 0 0.000
training 0 . 0 0 2 0.007 0.330 0.744 0 . 0 1 0 0.007 1.420 0.155
In Intervention Works 0 . 0 2 0 0.015 1.360 0.174 0 . 0 2 1 0.015 1.410 0.157
In Intervention Works (t-1) -0.067 0.016 -4.220 0.000 -0.066 0.016 -4.120 0.000
In Intervention Works (t-2) -0.009 0.015 -0.600 0.548 -0.007 0.016 -0.470 0.637
In Intervention Works (t-3) 0.006 0.014 0.430 0.669 0.007 0.015 0.470 0.637
In Intervention Works (t-4) -0 .0 1 1 0.013 -0.790 0.431 -0.008 0.014 -0.610 0.541
In Intervention Works (t-5) 0.009 0.014 0.660 0.506 0 . 0 1 0 0.014 0.740 0.462
In Intervention Works (t-6 ) -0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 1 2 -1.860 0.063 -0.015 0 . 0 1 2 -1.260 0.206
In Public Works 0.032 0.008 3.830 0.000 0.032 0.008 3.940 0.000
In Public Works (t-1) 0.013 0.008 1.750 0.079 0.014 0.008 1.800 0.072
In Public Works (t-2) -0.005 0.008 -0.660 0.508 -0.004 0.008 -0.550 0.583
In Public Works (t-3) 0.007 0.008 0.970 0.333 0.008 0.008 1.040 0.298
In Public Works (t-4) -0.023 0.007 -3.300 0 .0 0 1 -0 . 0 2 2 0.007 -3.200 0 .0 0 1
In Startup Loans -0 . 0 0 2 0.008 -0.300 0.764 -0 . 0 0 1 0.008 -0.070 0.947
In Startup Loans (t-1) 0 . 0 0 2 0.008 0.310 0.756 0.003 0.008 0.440 0.659
In Startup Loans (t-2) 0.009 0.007 1.150 0.249 0 . 0 1 1 0.008 1.410 0.158
In Startup Loans (t-3) -0 . 0 0 1 0.007 -0.130 0.893 0.000 0.007 0.040 0.968
In Startup Loans (t-4) -0 . 0 1 0 0.007 -1.410 0.159 -0.009 0.008 -1.170 0.244
In Startup Loans (t-5) -0.025 0.007 -3.830 0.000 -0 . 0 2 2 0.007 -3.330 0 .0 0 1
d1 0.000 0.000 6.360 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.710 0.000
d2 0.000 0.000 7.730 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.770 0.000
d3 0.000 0.000 13.630 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.390 0.000
d4 0.000 0.000 15.340 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.170 0.000
d5 0 .0 0 1 0.000 21.940 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 21.880 0.000
d6 0.000 0.000 19.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 19.310 0.000
d7 0.000 0.000 19.750 0.000 0.000 0.000 19.730 0.000
d8 0.000 0.000 15.390 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.040 0.000
d9 0 .0 0 1 0.000 26.350 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 25.480 0.000
d1 0 0 .0 0 1 0.000 25.740 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 25.310 0.000
d11 0.000 0.000 16.970 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.450 0.000
employment share in state (dropped) 0 . 0 0 2 0.000 7.200 0.000
employment share In agriculture (dropped) 0 .0 0 1 0.000 3.870 0.000
_cons 0 . 0 0 2 0.000 6.940 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 3.330 0 . 0 0 1
Number of observations 1967 1967
Number of groups 49 49
Min Observations per group 1 0 1 0
Avg Observations per group 40.1 40.1
Max Observations per group 54 54
R square within 0.687 0 . 6 8 6
R square between 0.834 0.840
R square overall 0.696 0.774
Hausman Test 0 0
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Table 22 Cumulative significance of coefficients for old voivodeships.
type of ALMPs joint effects for old voivodeships
1 fixed effects random effectsIntervention Works F( 7, 1886)= 5.22 Prob > F = 0.0000 ch!2( 7)= 31.43 Prob > ch!2 = 0.0001
Public Works F< 5, 1886)= 8.15 Prob > F = 0.0000 Chi2( 5)= 44.05 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Loans F( 6 , 1886)= 3.75 Prob > F = 0.0010 chi2( 6 )= 17.77 Prob > Chl2 = 0.0068
Table 23 Augmented matching function estimates for new voivodeships (16).
Fixed Effects Random Effects
outflows Coefficient Std. Error T-statisttcs P>|tt Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistics Z»|t|
In unemployment (t-1) 0.346 0.047 7.340 0.000 0.852 0.019 45.740 0.000
In vacancies (t-1) 0.058 0.008 7.200 0.000 0.015 0.008 1.770 0.077
training 0.065 0 .0 1 1 5.890 0.000 0.062 0 .0 1 1 5.570 0.000
in Intervention Works -0.024 0 . 0 1 0 -2.340 0 . 0 2 0 -0.035 0.013 -2.800 0.005
In Intervention Works (t-1) -0.034 0.016 -2 . 1 2 0 0.034 -0.036 0.018 -1.960 0.050
In Intervention Works (t-2) 0.071 0.016 4.480 0.000 0.065 0.018 3.640 0.000
In Intervention Works (t-3) 0 .0 0 1 0 . 0 1 2 0.060 0.948 -0.007 0.014 -0.530 0.598
In Intervention Works (t-4) 0.014 0 .0 1 1 1 . 2 1 0 0.227 0.003 0.013 0 . 2 2 0 0.826
In Intervention Works (t-5) -0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 1 0 -2 . 0 1 0 0.045 -0.017 0 . 0 1 2 -1.410 0.157
In Intervention Works (t-6 ) 0.017 0.008 2.230 0.026 0.019 0.009 2.150 0.032
In Public Works 0.019 0 .0 1 1 1.740 0.082 0.034 0 . 0 1 2 2.780 0.005
In Public Works (t-1) -0.032 0 . 0 1 2 -2.580 0 . 0 1 0 -0 . 0 2 0 0.014 -1.470 0.140
In Public Works (t-2) 0.014 0 .0 1 1 1.350 0.178 0 .0 2 1 0.013 1.650 0.098
In Public Works (t-3) -0 .0 1 1 0.009 -1.240 0.216 -0.003 0 .0 1 1 -0.230 0.815
In Public Works (t-4) 0.018 0.008 2.150 0.032 0.031 0 . 0 1 0 3.130 0 . 0 0 2
d1 0.000 0.000 12.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.770 0.000
d2 0.000 0.000 5.660 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.190 0.000
d3 0.000 0.000 21.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.290 0.000
d4 0 .0 0 1 0.000 30.300 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 23.850 0.000
d5 0 .0 0 1 0.000 27.630 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 23.610 0.000
d6 0 .0 0 1 0.000 24.820 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 2 1 . 2 0 0 0.000
d7 0.000 0.000 19.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 17.990 0.000
d8 0.000 0.000 15.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.930 0.000
d9 0 .0 0 1 0.000 26.560 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 22.690 0.000
d1 0 0 .0 0 1 0.000 26.180 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 22.990 0.000
d11 0.000 0.000 10.770 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.630 0.000
_cons 0.003 0 .0 0 1 5.440 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -17.700 0.000
Number of observations 1204 1204
Number of groups 16 16
Min Observations per group 69 69
Avg Observations per group 75.3 75.3
Max Observations per group 76 76
R square within 0.7656 0.7423
R square between 0.9463 0.9487
R square overall 0.7929 0.8781
Hausman Test n/a n/a
Table 24 Cumulative significance of coefficients for new voivodeships.
type of ALMPs joint effects for new voivodeships
fixed effects random effects
Intervention Works F( 7, 1162)= 6.99 Prob > F = 0.0000 chi2( 7)= 32.84 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Public Works F( 4, 1162)= 2.25 Prob > F = 0.0622 phi2( 4)= 14.19 Prob > chi2 = 0.0067
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The coefficient on unemployment is significant in all specifications and larger than the 
one on vacancies. This has also been found in the other studies on Poland using panel 
data (Boeri, 1994a; 1994b; Boeri and Scarpetta, 1995; Lehmann, 1995; and 
Kwiatkowski and Tokarski, 1997). The Hausman test in all cases rejected the random 
effects. The estimates show a weak positive effect o f training on outflows from 
unemployment. As earlier mentioned, this result indicated some positive external 
effects of ALMPs on other outflows. For old voivodeships the coefficient for training 
is 0.002 and for new voivodeships 0.065. Training seems to be the most efficient 
ALMP in the new voivodeships; a comparison with the results for old voivodships 
suggests some efficiency improvement over time.
As for the intervention works there is a negative net effect on outflows from
unemployment with the cumulative coefficient of -0.073 for old voivodeships,
creating substitution/displacement effects. According to Sztanderska and Piotrowski
(1999), for the most numerous group of the unemployed with basic vocational
education the most effective measure in finding a permanent job  was to take part in
programmes of intervention works, in which they gained direct contact with an
employer and in practice acquired new vocational skills. For new voivodeships the
cumulative coefficient is positive and amounts to 0.024, which could suggest some
positive external effects. This change in results might signify a change in the
efficiency of this policy, but should be taken with caution as it might be simply
sensitive to the change in classification of voivodeships, or may result from the fact
that the macroeconomic environment changed significantly between the two periods.
W hile in the first period the Polish economy was growing fast, for much of the later
period, the economy experienced a considerable slowdown. It is possible that the
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programmes created substitution/displacem ent effects when employment was growing 
anyway, but led to genuine employment gains in the period, when there was little 
alternative employment creation. I will explore this issue in more detail below.
The results of estimation show a weaker positive external effect of public works with a 
cumulative coefficient o f 0.024 for old voivodeships and 0.009 for new voivodeships. 
For old voivodeships I also measure the effect of loans for start ups which seem to 
have substitution/displacement effects, with a cumulative coefficient o f -0.028.
As the Polish Economy went through a considerable slowdown in 2001-2002 (for 
details see Table 25), I also m easured whether the exclusion of this period in the 
estimation for new voivodeships provides us with more similar results to those 
obtained for old voivodeships. The exclusion period accounts for quarters with lower 
than 2% growth, calculated on an annual basis, which is taken as an empirical proxy 
for the economic slowdown.
Table 25 GDP growth in Poland in 2000-200527
GDP »n>wth I quarter II quarter III quarter IV quarter 1-1V quarters
2000 106 105.2 103.3 1 0 2 . 6 104.2
2001 102.3 1 0 1 .1 100.9 100.4 1 0 1 .1
2002 1 0 0 . 6 100.9 1 0 1 .8 1 0 2 . 2 101.4
2003 102.4 104 104.2 104.7 103.8
2004 106.8 105.9 104.8 104 105.3
2005 102.4 103 104.1 104.5 103.5
Source: G U S, Central Statistical O ffice, 2006
The results confirm the hypothesis. The results for the estimation o f augmented 
matching function estimates for new voivodeships excluding the slowdown period
27 corresponding period o f  previous year=100
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between August 2001 and April 2003 are presented in Table 26. Cum ulative 
significances for the cumulative coefficients are presented in Table 27.
Table 26 Augmented matching function estimates for new voivodeships (16) excluding the
slowdown period between August 2001 and April 2003.
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Outflows Coefficient Std. Error T-statistics P>|t| Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistiCS z>|t|
In unemployment (t-1) 0.455 0.045 10.090 0.000 0.970 0.026 37.470 0.000
In vacancies (t-1) 0.048 0.008 5.640 0.000 -0 .0 0 1 0.009 -0 . 1 0 0 0.917
Training 0.048 0 .0 1 1 4.330 0.000 0.029 0.016 1.850 b.064
In intervention Works -0.026 0 . 0 1 1 -2.340 0.019 -0.034 0.016 -2.070 0.039
In Intervention Works (t-1) -0.023 0 . 0 1 2 -2.040 0.042 -0.019 0.018 ■1 . 0 1 0 0.314
In Intervention Works (t-2) -0.008 0 .0 1 1 -0.680 0.498 -0.015 0.018 -0.810 0.416
In Intervention Works (t-3) -0.024 0 .0 1 1 -2 . 2 0 0 0.028 -0.033 0.018 -1.880 0.060
In Intervention Works (t-4) 0 . 0 1 0 0 .0 1 1 0.870 0.384 0 . 0 0 2 0.017 0 . 1 1 0 0.914
In Intervention Works (t-5) -0.018 0 .0 1 1 -1.640 0 . 1 0 1 -0.023 0.017 ■1.350 0.176
In Intervention Works (t-6 ) 0.018 0 . 0 1 0 1.750 0.081 0 . 0 2 0 0.014 1.450 0.148
In Public Works -0.006 0.007 -0.770 0.441 0.006 0 .0 1 1 0.500 0.616
In Public Works (t-1) 0 .0 1 1 0.007 1.580 0.115 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 1 2 1.810 0.070
In Public Works (t-2) 0.003 0.008 0.460 0.648 0.003 0 . 0 1 2 0.280 0.779
In Public Works (t-3) 0.009 0.008 1.090 0.278 0.015 0.013 1.160 0.244
In Public Works (t-4) 0.007 0.007 0.980 0.329 0 . 0 2 2 0 .0 1 1 2.070 0.038
dl 0.000 0.000 7.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.470 0 . 0 0 1
d2 0.000 0.000 7.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.000 0.000
d3 0.000 0.000 15.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.020 0.000
d4 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 23.710 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 15.190 0.000
d5 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 25.750 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 16.640 0.000
d6 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 22.600 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 15.520 0.000
d7 0.000 0.000 18.350 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.420 0.000
d8 0.000 0.000 13.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.730 0.000
d9 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 22.870 0.000 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 16.370 0.000
d1 0 0.000 0.000 18.560 0.000 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 14.660 0.000
d1 1 0.000 0.000 6.760 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.960 0.000
_cons 0 . 0 0 2 0.000 4.900 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -18.300 0.000
Number of observations 720 720
Number of groups 16 16
Min Observations per group 45 45
Avg Observations per group 45 45
Max Observations per group 45 45
R square within 0.880 0.742
R square between 0.957 0.949
R square overall 0.851 0.878
Hausman Test 0 0
Table 27 Cumulative significance of coefficients for new voivodeships w ithout the recession
period.
type of ALMPs joint effects for new voivodeships without the recession period
fixed effects random effects
Intervention Works |F( 7, 442)= 11.25 Prob > F = 0.0000 chl2( 7)= 70.06 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Public Works F( 4, 442) = 2.79 Prob > F = 0.0260 chi2( 4)= 14.87 Prob > chi2 = 0.0050
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The effects o f intervention works and public works are almost the same as for the old 
voivodeships with corresponding cumulative coefficients of -0.072 (cumulative 
significance o f 11.25) and 0.025 (cumulative significance of 2.79). The effect of 
training is also positive but the effect is stronger with a coefficient of 0.048. The 
comparative study of the results is presented in Table 28 below.
6.3.1 ALMPs effects on modern, industrial and agricultural voivodeships
Due to significant differences between the Polish regions, following Boeri and 
Scarpetta (1995) and Burda and Profit (1996), I estimate separate regressions for 
modem, industrial, and agricultural voivodeships. I follow the division of 
voivodeships elaborated by Kwiatkowski and Gawronska (1995) and Kwiatkowski, 
Lehmann and Schaffer (1992). The division is based on the em ploym ent structure 
from 1989. All the regions were first divided into two groups: agricultural and non- 
agricultural voivodeships. The cut-off point was taken as a mean plus half o f standard 
deviation of employment share in agriculture. The voivodeships above this critical 
value were declared agricultural. The remaining voivodeships (non-agricultural) were 
subsequently divided into three further groups. Firstly, the authors calculated the mean 
share of industry in non-agricultural employment. Voivodeships were declared 
strongly industrialised if the corresponding share of industry was above the mean 
minus half standard deviation. Finally, for the non-agricultural non-strongly-industrial 
voivodeships, the standard deviation and mean were calculated for the share of 
employment in the private sector in relation to the overall employment in non- 
agricultural sector. Voivodeships with the private sector share at least half of standard
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deviation above the mean were declared m odem . The residual group (non-agricultural,
28non-strongly-industrialised, non-modem) was labelled others.
The geographical distribution of voivodeships is depicted in the map of Figure 33. 
Figure 33 Modern, Industrial, and Agricultural Voivodeships
N otes: The striped vo ivodesh ip s are m odem , the black ones industrial, the patterned on es agricultural, 
and the white ones belong to none o f  these categories.
Source: K w iatkow ski and G aw ronska (1995).
28 In case o f  old  vo ivodesh ip s structure, as agricultural vo ivodesh ip s w e c la ssify  B ia lskop od lask ie , 
C helm skie, C iechanow skie, K oninskie, K rosnienskie, L eszczynsk ie, L ubelskie, L om zynsk ie , 
N ow osadeck ie, O stroleckie, P iotrkow skie, P lockie, Przem yskie, R adom skie, S ied leck ie , S ieradzkie, 
S k iem iew ick ie , Suw alsk ie, T am obrzesk ie, T am ow skie, Z am ojskie. A s industrial v o iv o d esh ip s w e  
classify: B ielsk ie, B ydgosk ie , C zestoch ow sk ie, Jeleniogrrskie, K alisk ie, K atow ick ie, K ieleck ie, 
L egnick ie, L odzkie-m iejsk ie, O polsk ie, R zeszow sk ie , Torunskie, W albrzyskie, W loclaw sk ie , 
W roclaw skie, Z ielonogorsk ie. And finally  the m odem  voiv iod h ips are: W arszaw sk ie-sto leczne, 
G danskie, G orzow skie, K oszalinsk ie, K rakow skie-m iejskie, Poznanskie, S lupsk ie and Szczecin sk ie . 
B ialostock ie, E lblaskie, O lsztynsk ie  and P ilskie were left outside the classification .
In the new  adm inistration d iv ision , for agricultural vo ivodesh ip s w e c lassify: L ubelsk ie, M alopolsk ie, 
Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, W arm insko-M azurskie, for industrial voivodesh ips: D olnosl^ sk ie , K ujaw sko- 
Pom orskie, Lodzkie, O polsk ie, Sl^skie, Sw i^tokrzyskie, W ielkop olsk ie  and for m odern voivodesh ips:  
Lubuskie, M azow ieck ie, Pom orskie, Zachodniopom orskie.
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The summary o f all coefficients obtained in the estimations are presented in Table 28. 
Table 28 Summary of cummulative coefficients obtained from estimations (fixed effects)
Region jtraining & PW Loans
old voivodeships
G eneral 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03
Agricultural -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.05
Industrial 0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.05
Modern 0.02 -0.14 0.10 0.00
new voivodeships
G eneral 0.06 0.02 0.01 n/a
general without recessio n  period 0.05 -0.07 0.02 n/a
Regression results are presented in Table 29, Table 30 and Table 32. The cumulative 
significances for cumulative coefficients are presented in Table 30, Table 32 and 
Table 34. These estimates are made for old voivodeships only, due to smaller samples 
for new voivodeships. The estimation by type of voivodeship with the exclusion o f the 
recession period was not practical due to the small sample size. The Hausman test 
rejected the random effects model in all the estimations.
Overall, again the coefficients for unemployment and vacancies are positive in all 
cases; the figures for unemployment are considerably higher than those for vacancies.
The results for agricultural voivodeships provide the evidence supporting the claim 
that the training programmes are the least efficient there, with a negative coefficient of 
-0.015. The estimation results for intervention works show the strongest substitution/ 
displacement effects for all the types of voivodeships with the cumulative coefficient 
o f -0.023 and overall significance of 1.47. The effects o f public works are the weakest 
of all the types with the cumulative coefficient o f 0.001 and overall significance of 
4.13. Overall, the ALMPs in agricultural voivodeships seem to be rather inefficient.
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Table 29 Augmented matching function estimates for old agricultural voivodeships.
Fixed Effects Random Effects
outflows Coefficient Std. Error T-statlstics P>|t| Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistics Z>|t|
In unemployment (t-1) 0.431 0.068 6.360 0.000 0.669 0.037 18.080 0.000
In vacancies (t-1) 0 . 0 2 2 0.019 1.130 0.260 0.098 0.013 7.550 0.000
training -0.015 0 . 0 1 1 -1.410 0.158 0.044 0 . 0 1 2 3.580 0.000
In Intervention Works 0.018 0 .0 2 1 0.850 0.394 0.026 0.026 0.980 0.326
In Intervention Works (t-1) -0.054 0.024 -2.270 0.023 -0.060 0.029 -2.060 0.039
In Intervention Works (t-2) 0.000 0.023 0 . 0 1 0 0.996 0.009 0.029 0.320 0.750
In Intervention Works (t-3) 0.003 0.023 0.140 0.887 0.004 0.029 0.130 0.896
In Intervention Works (t-4) -0.014 0 . 0 2 2 -0.620 0.533 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.997
In Intervention Works (t-5) 0.041 0 . 0 2 2 1.900 0.058 0.032 0.027 1 . 2 2 0 0.224
In Intervention Works (t-6 ) -0.017 0.019 -0.920 0.357 -0 . 0 0 2 0.023 -0 . 1 0 0 0.920
In Public Works 0.025 0 . 0 1 2 2.080 0.038 0.003 0.014 0.240 0.813
In Public Works (t-1) 0 . 0 2 2 0.013 1.660 0.098 0.008 0.016 0.480 0.633
In Public Works (t-2) -0 . 0 1 2 0.014 -0.860 0.389 -0.013 0.016 -0.850 0.394
In Public Works (t-3) 0 . 0 0 2 0.013 0 . 1 2 0 0.904 -0.005 0.014 -0.340 0.737
In Public Works (t-4) -0.036 0 . 0 1 2 -3.130 0 . 0 0 2 -0.038 0.013 -2.910 0.004
In Startup Loans 0.000 0 . 0 1 2 -0 . 0 1 0 0.990 0.016 0.015 1.040 0.298
In Startup Loans (t-1) -0.004 0.013 -0.310 0.754 0.007 0.017 0.400 0.689
In Startup Loans (t-2) 0.015 0.014 1.070 0.285 0.031 0.019 1.660 0.097
In Startup Loans (t-3) 0.003 0.014 0 . 2 1 0 0.835 0.014 0.017 0.800 0.424
In Startup Loans (t-4) -0.023 0.014 -1.680 0.094 -0.005 0.017 -0.310 0.753
In Startup Loans (t-5) -0.037 0 . 0 1 2 -3.110 0 . 0 0 2 -0.014 0.015 -0.920 0.360
d1 0.000 0.000 4.670 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.680 0.000
d2 0.000 0.000 3.930 0.000 0.000 0 . 0 0 0 2.610 0.009
d3 0.000 0.000 7.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.970 0.000
d4 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 10.270 0.000 0 . 0 0 0 0.000 7.250 0.000
d5 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 14.000 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 11.420 0.000
d6 0 .0 0 1 0.000 12.850 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 1 0 . 0 1 0 0.000
d7 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 13.920 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 1 1 . 2 1 0 0.000
d8 0.000 0.000 11.640 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.970 0.000
d9 0 .0 0 1 0.000 18.760 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 12.770 0.000
d1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 17.760 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 13.580 0.000
d11 0.000 0.000 11.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.930 0.000
employment share in state industry (dropped) 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 2.830 0.005
employment share in agriculture (dropped) 0.000 0.000 -2.990 0.003
_cons 0 . 0 0 2 0 .0 0 1 3.090 0 . 0 0 2 -0 .0 0 1 0.000 -3.570 0.000
Number of observations 743 743
Number of groups 2 1 2 1
Min Observations per group 1 0 1 0
Avg Observations per group 35.4 35.4
Max Observations per group 53 53
R square within 0.706 0.663
R square between 0.742 0 . 8 6 6
R square overall 0.634 0.771
Hausman Test 0 0
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Table 30 Cumulative significance of coefficients for old agricultural voivodeships.
Itype of ALMPs joint effects for old agricultural voivodeships
fixed effects random effects
llntervention Works |F( 7, 690)= 1.47 Prob > F = 0.1746 Ichi2( 7)= 7.06 Prob > chi2 = 0.4223
Public Works F( 5, 690)= 4.13 Prob > F = 0.0010 chi2( 5)= 14.44 Prob > chi2 = 0.0130
Loans F( 6 , 690) = 2.50 Prob > F = 0.0214 ch!2 ( 6 )= 1 2 .0 1 Prob > chi2 = 0.0616
In the case of the industrial voivodeships, the results indicate the medium-range 
efficiency of ALMP o f all the groups. The results for this group can be found in Table 
31. The results have the same pattern as general results with a positive effect in case of 
training (cumulative coefficient of 0.011) and positive external effect o f public works 
(cumulative coefficient o f 0.02) and a negative external effect in case of intervention 
works (cumulative coefficient o f -0.107). Start up loans have a cumulative coefficient 
of -0.051, indicating substitution/ displacement effects.
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Table 31 Augmented matching function estimates for old industrial voivodeships.
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Outflows Coefficient Std. Error T-statistics P*|t| Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistics Z>|t|
In unemployment (t-1) 0.380 0.049 7.750 0.000 0.576 0.035 16.420 0.000
In vacancies (t-1) 0.070 0.017 4.190 0.000 0.054 0 . 0 1 0 5.140 0.000
Training 0 .0 1 1 0.013 0.860 0.391 0.063 0 . 0 1 1 5.950 0.000
In Intervention Works 0.045 0.026 1.730 0.085 0.036 0.028 1.300 0.193
In Intervention Works (t-1) -0.084 0.026 -3.190 0 . 0 0 2 -0.079 0.029 -2.680 0.007
In Intervention Works (t-2) -0 . 0 1 2 0.023 -0.530 0.595 -0.006 0.029 -0.190 0.846
In Intervention Works (t-3) -0.016 0 . 0 2 2 -0.730 0.467 -0 . 0 1 0 0.025 -0.380 0.707
In Intervention Works (t-4) -0 . 0 1 2 0.019 -0.660 0.511 -0.003 0.024 -0 . 1 2 0 0.905
In Intervention Works (t-5) -0 .0 1 1 0 . 0 2 0 -0.530 0.598 -0.005 0.024 -0 . 2 0 0 0.845
In Intervention Works (t-6 ) -0.016 0.019 -0.880 0.378 0.013 0 . 0 2 2 0.610 0.542
In Public Works 0.023 0.015 1.550 0.123 0.016 0.014 1.150 0.249
In Public Works (t-1) 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 2 0.880 0.379 0.017 0.014 1.250 0 . 2 1 2
In Public Works (t-2) -0.006 0 . 0 1 2 -0.540 0.590 -0.005 0.014 -0.350 0.724
In Public Works (t-3) 0.009 0 . 0 1 2 0.740 0.460 0 . 0 1 0 0.014 0.690 0.491
In Public Works (t-4) -0.015 0 .0 1 1 -1.370 0.170 -0.017 0 . 0 1 2 -1.420 0.157
in Startup Loans 0.003 0.014 0 . 2 1 0 0.833 0 .0 0 1 0.014 0.070 0.945
In Startup Loans (t-1) 0.003 0.013 0.230 0.818 0.000 0.015 -0 . 0 2 0 0.983
In Startup Loans (t-2) 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 1 2 0.940 0.348 0 . 0 1 0 0.014 0.710 0.480
In Startup Loans (t-3) -0.014 0 .0 1 1 -1.290 0.196 -0 . 0 2 0 0.013 -1.570 0.117
In Startup Loans (t-4) -0.016 0 . 0 1 2 -1.360 0.173 -0.019 0.013 -1.470 0.142
In Startup Loans (t-5) -0.037 0 . 0 1 0 -3.640 0.000 -0.046 0 . 0 1 1 -4.140 0.000
d1 0.000 0.000 3.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.020 0.000
d2 0.000 0.000 4.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.960 0.000
d3 0.000 0.000 8.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.780 0.000
d4 0.000 0.000 8.340 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.130 0.000
d5 0 . 0 0 1 0.000 12.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.810 0.000
d6 0.000 0.000 9.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.300 0.000
d7 0.000 0.000 9.920 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.320 0.000
d8 0.000 0.000 8.840 0.000 0.000 0.000 8 . 2 2 0 0.000
d9 0 .0 0 1 0.000 15.180 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 14.170 0.000
dIO 0 .0 0 1 0.000 15.440 0.000 0 .0 0 1 0.000 13.520 0.000
d11 0.000 0.000 9.940 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.710 0.000
employment share in state industry (dropped) 0 .0 0 1 0.000 6.830 0.000
employment share in agriculture (dropped) 0 .0 0 1 0.000 8.670 0.000
_cons 0.003 0 .0 0 1 6 . 1 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.510 0.612
Number of observations 692 692
Number of groups 16 16
Min Observations per group 28 28
Avg Observations per group 43.3 43.3
Max Observations per group 54 54
R square within 0 . 6 8 6 0.664
R square between 0.842 0.944
R square overall 0.695 0.827
Hausman Test 0 0
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Table 32 Cumulative significance of coefficients for old industrial voivodeships.
type of ALMPs joint effects for old industrial voivodeships
fixed effects random effects
Intervention Works F( 7, 644) = 4.70 Prob > F = 0.0000 chi2( 7)= 16.27 Prob > chi2 s  0.0227
Public Works F( 5, 644) = 1 .94 Prob > F = 0.0854 chi2( 5)= 10.87 Prob > chi2 3  0.0540
Loans F( 6 , 644) = 3.92 Prob > F = 0.0007 chi2( 6 )= 44.02 Prob > chi2 3  0.0000
The results for m odem  voivodeships region can be found in Table 33. The estimation 
results for modern voivodeships show the highest efficiency between all types for 
training with a coefficient o f 0.024. The highest efficiency is also demonstrated by the 
estimation results on public works with the cumulative coefficient o f 0.097, showing 
positive external effects. Intervention works are the least efficient in the modem 
voivodeships with a cumulative coefficient of -0.14, indicating substitution/ 
displacement effects. Start up loans have the highest efficiency, but still show 
substitution/ displacem ent effects with the cumulative coefficient o f -0.002.
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Table 33 Augmented matching function estimates for old modern voivodeships.
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Outflows Coefficient Std. Error T-statistiCS P>|t| Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistics Z>|t|
In unemployment (t-1) 0.500 0.047 10.590 0.000 0.514 0.040 12.980 0.000
In vacancies (t-1) 0.086 0.027 3.220 0.001 0.089 0.013 6.640 0.000
Training 0.024 0.019 1.260 0.207 0.030 0.015 1.910 0.057
In Intervention Works -0.014 0.042 -0.340 0.734 0.027 0.038 0.720 0.473
In Intervention Works (t-1) -0.062 0.043 -1.440 0.152 -0.056 0.044 -1.250 0.210
In Intervention Works (t-2) -0.028 0.034 -0.830 0.409 -0.028 0.036 -0.800 0.425
In Intervention Works (t-3) 0.027 0.035 0.780 0.437 0.042 0.037 1.120 0.263
In Intervention Works (t-4) -0.037 0.036 -1.030 0.304 -0.025 0.038 -0.650 0.513
In Intervention Works (t-5) -0.014 0.035 -0.390 0.695 -0.004 0.036 -0.120 0.907
In Intervention Works (t-6) -0.012 0.030 -0.410 0.684 0.011 0.030 0.370 0.710
In Public Works 0.047 0.019 2.530 0.012 0.040 0.017 2.280 0.022
In Public Works (t-1) -0.008 0.014 -0.540 0.589 -0.011 0.016 -0.660 0.507
In Public Works (t-2) 0.004 0.016 0.270 0.787 0.002 0.016 0.130 0.896
In Public Works (t-3) 0.034 0.016 2.100 0.037 0.026 0.017 1.510 0.132
In Public Works (t-4) 0.019 0.017 1.120 0.264 0.007 0.016 0.400 0.688
In Startup Loans -0.006 0.018 -0.320 0.746 0.010 0.018 0.550 0.581
In Startup Loans (t-1) 0.013 0.015 0.820 0.414 0.021 0.016 1.350 0.176
In Startup Loans (t-2) -0.012 0.015 -0.860 0.392 -0.007 0.015 -0.490 0.625
In Startup Loans (t-3) -0.002 0.014 -0.120 0.904 0.002 0.016 0.120 0.903
In Startup Loans (t-4) 0.005 0.016 0.320 0.752 0.011 0.018 0.580 0.564
In Startup Loans (t-5) 0.000 0.014 0.010 0.990 0.012 0.015 0.790 0.428
dl 0.000 0.000 2.210 0.028 0.000 0.000 2.670 0.008
d2 0.000 0.000 4.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.570 0.000
d3 0.000 0.000 6.540 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.980 0.000
d4 0.000 0.000 6.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.940 0.000
d5 0.001 0.000 11.250 0.000 0.001 0.000 9.960 0.000
d6 0.001 0.000 9.800 0.000 0.001 0.000 9.690 0.000
d7 0.000 0.000 7.650 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.590 0.000
d8 0.000 0.000 3.830 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.900 0.000
d9 0.001 0.000 8.060 0.000 0.001 0.000 8.110 0.000
d10 0.001 0.000 8.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.970 0.000
d11 0.000 0.000 6.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.990 0.000
employment share in state industry (dropped) -0.001 0.001 -1.420 0.155
employment share in agriculture (dropped) 0.000 0.000 1.920 0.055
_cons 0.001 0.000 2.960 0.003 0.001 0.000 1.900 0.057
Number of observations 358 358
Number of groups 8 8
Min Observations per group 29 29
Avg Observations per group 44.8 44.8
Max Observations per group 54 54
R square within 0.741 0.729
R square between 0.573 0.923
R square overall 0.695 0.769
Hausman Test 0.9998 0.9998
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Table 34 Cumulative significance of coefficients for old modern voivodeships.
type of ALMP joint effects for old modern voivodeships
fixed effects random effects
Intervention Works F( 7, 318)= 2.13 Prob > F = 0.0401 chi2( 7) = 5.29 Prob > chi2 = 0.6241
Public Works F( 5, 318)= 2.18 Prob > F = 0.0561 chi2( 5)= 8.63 Prob > chi2 = 0.1246
Loans F( 6, 318) = 0.20 Prob > F = 0.9755 Chl2( 6)= 7.76 Prob > chi2 = 0.2566
Comparison of ALMPs results for the three types o f voivodeships provides a mixed 
picture. Clearly, ALM P seems to be most efficient in the modem voivodeships and 
least efficient in local economies characterised by ‘old’ types of economic structures. 
This would indicate that some policies supporting structural adjustment like incentives 
for investors, or infrastructure upgrade, may be more effective than ALM P to com bat 
unemployment in the regions that are economically “backward” .
6.4 Conclusions
Overall, the results demonstrate some of the ALMPs as having a negative substitution/ 
displacement effects. In particular that relates to intervention works, which is a very 
crude policy measure. On the other hand, more sophisticated policies, especially the 
training programmes seem to be efficient. M oreover, there is a positive change in the 
results of the training programmes when compared with the results for the earlier and 
for the more recent period. However, another policy, which has also a clear-cut 
positive external effect, is public works.
The results obtained for new voivodeships, with the exclusion o f the recession period
o f 2001-2002 match the results for old voivodeships. The coefficients for public works
and intervention works are almost the same, and the effect of training has a stronger
positive effect in the case of new voivodeships, showing the improved efficiency of
this policy. These tests, lead to an important conclusion that the impact of the ALMPs
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is conditional on the overall macroeconomic conditions, being weaker when the 
overall level of economic activity is weaker. The policy implication o f this finding is 
that while some types o f ALM Ps (see above) may be efficient with dealing with 
specific social unemployment related problems, the ALMP cannot be used as an 
effective countercyclical macro policy tool, or any sort of automatic macro stabiliser.
Another important result is obtained when I analyse groups o f voivodeships, divided
into agricultural, modem  and industrial voivodeships. I demostrate that the differences
between regions lead to different patterns o f policy impact. The type o f regional
structure which is most different to the others is the agricultural type, where also the
unemployment level is the highest. The effects o f training, unlike in the other types (in
the earlier period, i.e. in the old voivodeships) are negative, while the effect of
intervention works is positive. The policies such as training are the most efficient in
the modern voivodeships, where the efficiency of intervention works is the lowest.
This strongly suggests that the policy measures should be calibrated according to the
type of the regional economic structures and that the more sophisticated types of
ALMP are not very effective in the more traditional structural environment. In
contrast, even if perheps not surprisingly, some of the more crude policy measures
(especially: intervention works) perform better there. In short, more sophisticated
policies are more appropriate to more sophisticated sectoral structures.
These findings are in line with the results of VAR analysis of regional labour market
dynamics, which showed a great persistence in unemployment, especially in the
poorer regions, indicating that these regions do not respond in the same way as the
other regions do. I now offer a novel explanation to this structural outcome: the
existing persistence in inter-regional differences in unemployment may be (partly)
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resulting from the fact that the policy measures are not adjusted and are not used 
selectively consistent with the local economic environment.
The results permit the drawing out of a tentative conclusion that ALM Ps in Poland 
should be reassessed as for their efficiency, as many of the measures used might 
constitute a loss of tax payers money, substitution or displacement effect. Also, these 
policies should be carefully designed and should take into account different types of 
regions, which might have different needs and requirements.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions
In the thesis I have aimed to analyse the regional labour market dynamics and 
effectiveness o f active labour market policies in alleviating the regional differences in 
unemployment. My main research focus was to assess the effectiveness o f the 
elements of ALMPs and to suggest possible explanations of the heterogeneity in their 
outcomes. These explanations focused on the process of economic transition 
(liberalisation) highlighting its impact on restructuring and on labour markets, 
especially on their spatial dimension. My objective was to combine the existing labour 
market- and transition theory with new empirical research and to arrive at 
recommendations regarding the appropriate mix of policy response to the 
unemployment problem. In addition, I analysed the experiences of the Spanish labour 
market reforms to understand the likely trajectory induced by a similar liberalisation 
process and labour market institutional reform in Poland. That enabled me to see the 
post-communist transition process in the comparative context of the post-fascist 
liberalisation programme. A related policy objective was to explore if and which of 
the institutional reforms in Spain led to better labour market performance and if the 
same outcome may be expected in Poland if similar reforms are implemented.
This research programme was successfully implemented. Through the empirical 
(econometric) part of thesis, where the persistence of unemployment in the Polish and 
Spanish labour markets was investigated, I demonstrated that the unemployment 
problem cannot be understood just by looking at the aggregate figures. This is because 
the results indicate very strong regional unemployment persistence, especially in 
poorer regions. I also measured the effectiveness of the labour market policies and
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combining these results with the theoretical perspective on restructuring in transition, I 
drew conclusions for the policy makers, arguing that the unemployment problem  can 
be alleviated if the appropriate policy mix is applied.
In my empirical design, I focused on the Polish economy. The Polish labour market 
has been subject to a very powerful transformation since 1989. The introduction of 
market principles apart from the positive results was accompanied by side effects, 
most significantly unemployment. I argued that the rise in unemployment in Poland 
was primarily an effect o f job  destruction through deindustrialisation and the 
restructuring process, which resulted from the political and economic transition. The 
main challenge for the economy as a whole was to match this with job  creation in the 
new sector, which was in turn dependent on a high rate of growth in production and a 
high rate of labour productivity growth. The economy faced and still faces 
restructuring challenges o f specific industrial branches including coal mining, 
metallurgy, energy production, the arms industry, the shipbuilding industry, rail 
transport and agriculture. In this thesis I have sought to demonstrate that this structural 
dimension cannot be neglected, as it translates into the heterogeneity o f regional 
outcomes. However, I argue that while the adequately addressed labour m arket policy 
tools may reduce inter-regional differences, the overall success o f labour market 
policy may be conditional on implementing the labour market reforms similar to those 
recently implemented in Spain. In particular, lifting of some institutional barriers like 
the limitations in the labour code should be reconsidered.
Moreover, some policies intended to alleviate the problem of unemployment, do not
necessarily produce the expected results, either because they have undesired indirect
effects (that includes relatively easy access to early retirement, and other social
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benefits) or seem to be inefficient or not calibrated according to the local needs (that 
relates to some elements o f ALM Ps as documented by my empirical results).
Overall, improving the Polish labour market is an enormous challenge for the 
country’s government. However, over the past 30 years, there were a number of 
OECD countries (Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United States) 
that have succeeded in raising overall em ploym ent rates by 10 or more percentage 
points. The nature o f those countries’ problem s was different in each case. 
Nevertheless, the improvements were the results o f a fundamental labour market 
reform.
As discussed, the country whose situation was the most comparable with that of 
Poland is Spain. Even though, the level o f developm ent and the international 
macroeconomic scenarios were different when Spain entered the EU in 1986, to those 
encountered almost 20 years after, when Poland and other 9 countries joined the EU in 
2004, the transformations of both countries required substantial labour reallocation 
from resource-intensive to labour intensive activities, and from agriculture and 
manufacturing to services. Therefore, it is argued that the analysis o f the Spanish 
experiences could be o f benefit in the Polish case and more generally, that the focus 
on the restructuring process is essential for any successful theoretical analysis of the 
corresponding labour market outcomes.
Based on the Spanish experience it can be concluded that too rigid labour legislation
impedes employment growth or even contributes to employment destruction. A rigid
institutional framework may convert temporary shocks into permanent ones creating a
hysteresis effect, and this is the institutional context of my results on regional
persistence in unemployment rates in both countries. A flexible labour market allows
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for a better accom modating o f the labour reallocation. The Spanish case shows that 
restrictive employment protection legislation in the times of deindustrialisation and 
shifts in the sectoral composition o f employment was one of the reasons for rising 
unemployment levels. In addition, generous and long-lasting unemployment benefits 
were also contributing to hysteresis and unemployment persistence.
Through the analysis o f the developments o f regional labour markets in Poland and 
Spain since their transition to democracy and the open market I have highlighted the 
similarities between these two economies. By investigating the extent to which labour 
market shocks are shared by all regions and how regional employment, unemployment 
and labour force participation adjust to labour demand shocks which are region- 
specific, I have shown that on average 32% of the changes in regional employment are 
shared by all regions in Spain and 17% in Poland. In terms of participation rate, on 
average 65% of the changes in regional participation rate are shared by all regions in 
Spain and 46% in Poland.
More importantly, for the unemployment rates, through this research, I have obtained 
results which suggest a very high level of persistence of this variable in both Spain and 
Poland. On average 89% of the changes in regional unemployment rate are shared by 
all regions in Spain and 74% in Poland.
When comparing these results with results obtained by other researchers on different
regions, specifically EU and US, it is possible to conclude that the differences in
relative unemployment rates between regions seem to be more persistent in Europe
than in the US, suggesting that regional employment shocks may not be absorbed by
changes in regional unemployment rates. Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that in the
US the fast return to the long-term means happens because labour force participants
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migrate into states which have benefited from a favourable demand shock. However, 
in case of Spain and Poland, unemployment is persistent in both countries. Unlike in 
the US, in Poland and Spain interregional migration is very low. The strongest initial 
effect of the shock is observed in Poland. However, in the Polish regions, 
employment returns to equilibrium relatively faster than in Spain, which is a positive 
sign.
However, a worrying result is the fact that both in Poland and Spain, the poorer 
regions do not respond in the same way as the other regions do. Polish regional labour 
markets respond in a more diversified way than the Spanish regions. This fact 
indicates that the Polish transition led to more regional contrasts in labour markets 
than the Spanish one. I attribute this result to the specific challenge o f sectoral 
restructuring in Poland. My unique contribution is to demonstrate that the sectoral 
profile of the region correlates strongly with the effectiveness of the policy tools. This 
result is likely to be o f a more general nature and deserves further research based on 
other countries samples.
In order to improve the labour market situation in Poland, a num ber o f reforms should
be carried out. To facilitate an increase in effective labour supply, policy makers need
to reduce the passive income support measures provided through the disability system
and other premature labour market withdrawal schemes in order to reduce inactivity
traps. The policy agenda needs to address unemployment issues through better fiscal-
monetary policy mix, through greater flexibility in the wage structure, and, through tax
reductions on labour income, and changes in the labour code. The challenge for the
social protection system is to design social protection schemes with the correct
incentives, which would not discourage employment participation. My empirical
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results indicate that the investm ents in worker's education and training need to be 
im proved and m ore im portantly, the choice o f the programmes should be consistent 
with the regional characteristics. Accordingly, ALM Ps should be reassessed, well- 
designed, properly evaluated, and most importantly, well-targeted and diversified.
I have approxim ated the effectiveness o f the active labour market policies using the
augm ented m atching function approach. Overall, the results obtained through my
research indicate that som e of the ALM Ps have negative substitution/displacem ent
effects. In particular, the use o f intervention works is problematic and should be
reassessed. The policy, which has the strongest positive external effect, is public
w orks and the worst negative external effect relates to intervention works, through its
substitution/displacem ent effects. Training has a positive, but weak effect. M ost
im portantly, my contribution is to show that the effects o f ALMPs are conditional on
regional characteristics. W hen analyzing Polish regions divided into agricultural,
m odem  and industrial voivodeships, strong differences in the effectiveness o f the
analysed m easures are discovered, with agricultural voivodeships differing more than
other types. The effects o f training, unlike in the other types, in the old voivodeships
are negative, while the effect o f intervention works is positive. The policies like
training are the m ost efficient in the m odem  voivodeships, where the efficiency of
intervention works is the lowest. This strongly suggests that the policy measures
should be calibrated according to the type o f regional economic structures and that the
m ore sophisticated types o f ALM P are not very effective in the more traditional
structural environm ent. These findings are in line with the results of VAR analysis o f
regional labour m arket dynam ics, which showed a great persistence in unemployment,
especially in the poorer regions, indicating that these regions do not respond in the
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same way as the other regions do. I now offer a novel explanation to this structural 
outcome: namely the existing persistence in inter-regional differences in
unemployment may be (partly) resulting from the fact that the policy measures are not 
adjusted and are not used selectively and consistent with the local economic 
environment.
The results allow drawing a tentative conclusion that ALMPs should be reassessed as 
for their efficiency. Also, the policies should be carefully designed and take into 
account different types o f regions, which might have different needs and requirements. 
However, it needs to be emphasised that the solution to the unemployment problem  
requires a combination o f well-designed ALMPs and a more fundamental labour 
reform. These results have more general implications, and are likely to extend to other 
transition economies. It is with respect to the latter that Poland and other transition 
economies may learn from the recent positive experience of Spain. I claim that while 
the structural change in Poland makes the unemployment problem particularly 
difficult, by learning from the Spanish experience, Poland may introduce adequate 
labour market policies and institutions much earlier in its transition cycle than the 
Spain did. Learning from others is always beneficial.
The limitations of this research were related to constraints on the data availability.
Large effort was put into obtaining the data. Because o f the lack of data, the empirical
literature on ALMPs remains very limited and the current study makes an important
contribution to it. Nevertheless, its analysis is based on the Polish case only. For a
future research it would be interesting to investigate the ALMPs of other Eastern
European countries to test my suggestion that the lessons that relate to Poland may
also be applied to other countries undergoing a process of deep structural changes.
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Appendix 1 Results of regressions of regional employment growth, unemployment rate and the 
logarithm of the participation rate.
Table 35 Regressions of regional employment growth, unemployment rate and the logarithm of 
the participation rate for Spain (1976-2004) and Poland (1999-2004). Quarterly data.
Spain participation rate Unemployment rate em ploym ent
Region c 5 R2 c 5 R2 c P R2
A ndalucia -2.055 1.508 0.770 1.037 0.782 0.953 0.000 1.432 0.456
Aragon 0.782 0.792 0.781 -0.956 1.199 0.912 -0.002 1.095 0.444
Asturias 6.664 -0.713 0.133 -0.569 1.172 0.935 -0.003 0.741 0.227
B alears (llles) -2.555 1.665 0.834 -0.261 0.936 0.841 0.002 0.975 0.195
C anarias -0.288 1.083 0.775 0.633 0.821 0.838 0.003 1.058 0.281
C antabria 2.171 0.439 0.137 -0.792 1.238 0.931 0.000 0.662 0.102
Castilla y Leon 1.574 0.584 0.530 -0.406 1.100 0.957 -0.002 0.793 0.455
Castilla - La M ancha -1.116 1.262 0.931 0.015 0.935 0.964 0.000 0.842 0.304
C ata luha -0.814 1.222 0.899 -0.350 1.081 0.878 0.000 1.026 0.583
C om unidad V alenciana -0.304 1.085 0.917 -0.712 1.227 0.982 0.001 1.082 0.548
Extrem adura -0.969 1.227 0.793 0.579 0.908 0.887 -0.003 1.247 0.205
Galicia 6.710 -0.693 0.142 -1.435 1.393 0.759 -0.002 0.575 0.205
Madrid (Com unidad de) -1.121 1.289 0.859 0.101 0.907 0.820 0.002 0.922 0.366
Murcia -1.850 1.470 0.780 -0.107 1.027 0.950 0.002 1.043 0.197
Navarra -0.654 1.168 0.782 -0.344 0.976 0.690 0.001 0.840 0.248
P ais  V asco 0.740 0.817 0.773 -0.380 1.140 0.948 0.000 0.812 0.351
Rioja (La) 0.779 0.795 0.273 -2.027 1.540 0.955 -0.001 0.992 0.235
max 6.710 1.665 0.931 1.037 1.540 0.982 0.003 1.432 0.583
min -2.555 -0.713 0.133 -2.027 0.782 0.690 -0.003 0.575 0.102
average 0.453 0.882 0.653 -0.351 1.081 0.894 0.000 0.949 0.318
Poland participation rate Unemployment rate em ploym ent
Region c R2 c 5 R2 c P R2
Dolnoslqskie -1.080 1.262 0.532 -0.044 1.109 0.942 0.002 2.292 0.269
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 4.458 -0.107 0.008 0.121 0.994 0.801 -0.005 -1.187 0.122
Lubelskie 1.165 0.721 0.377 0.517 0.761 0.803 -0.006 -0.172 0.005
Lubuskie 1.951 0.508 0.237 0.323 0.977 0.882 0.005 0.963 0.097
Lodzkie -0.654 1.165 0.889 0.122 0.966 0.827 -0.011 -1.840 0.239
Malopolskie 1.046 0.746 0.471 -1.714 1.512 0.799 -0.011 -1.578 0.301
Mazowieckie -3.539 1.894 0.145 -0.581 1.128 0.662 0.018 5.169 0.145
Opolskie -7.703 2.907 0.918 1.088 0.616 0.513 -0.021 -2.243 0.191
Podkarpackie -2.232 1.560 0.503 0.905 0.645 0.592 -0.012 -0.485 0.009
Podlaskie -3.410 1.857 0.831 -0.858 1.307 0.936 -0.003 1.345 0.110
Pom orskie -0.116 1.027 0.354 -0.081 1.041 0.808 0.008 3.164 0.266
Slqskie 0.780 0.785 0.357 -0.081 1.041 0.808 0.026 6.329 0.588
Swi^tokrzyskie -4.070 2.002 0.480 0.499 0.822 0.721 0.001 0.751 0.022
W arminsko-M azurskie -2.084 1.512 0.656 2.119 0.364 0.414 -0.011 -1.002 0.042
W ielkopolskie 2.782 0.315 0.201 -0.952 1.290 0.865 -0.008 -2.069 0.238
Zachodniopom orskie -7.050 2.745 0.320 0.571 0.890 0.475 -0.015 -0.822 0.003
max 4.458 2.907 0.918 2.119 1.512 0.942 0.026 6.329 0.588
min -7.703 -0.107 0.008 -1.714 0.364 0.414 -0.021 -2.243 0.003
average -1.235 1.306 0.455 0.122 0.967 0.740 -0.003 0.538 0.165
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Appendix 2 Results of pooled sample regressions.
Table 36 Spain, pooled data from the sample of 17 autonomous communities, with common 
intercept, employment
Sample(adjusted): 1977:1 2004:1 
Included observations: 109 after adjusting endpoints 
Number of cross-sections used: 16 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1744
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.003159 0.000472 6.691818 0.0000
EMPL(-1) 0.022920 0.022975 0.997618 0.3186
EMPL(-2) -0.286335 0.022962 -12.46985 0.0000
R-squared 0.082214 Mean dependent var 0.002555
Adjusted R-squared 0.081160 S.D.dependent var 0.020310
Table 37 Spain, pooled data from the sample of 17 autonomous communities, with fixed effects, 
employment
Sample(adjusted): 1977:1 2004:1
Included observations: 109 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 16
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1744_________




























0.097057 Mean dependent var 




Table 38 Spain, pooled data from the sample of 17 autonomous communities, with fixed effects,
participation rate
Sample: 1977:1 2004:1 
Included observations: 109 
Number of cross-sections used: 16
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
PART(-1) 0.851783 0.023986 35.51166 0.0000



















R-squared 0.999985 Mean dependent var 0.385221
Adjusted R-squared 0.999985 S.D. dependent var 2.456468
Table 39 Spain, pooled data from the sample of 17 autonomous communities, with common 
intercept, participation rate
Sample: 1977:1 2004:1 
Included observations: 109 
Number of cross-sections used: 16 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1744
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 9.87E-06 0.000182 0.054357 0.9567
PART?(-1) 0.914148 0.023755 38.48236 0.0000
PART?(-2) 0.085722 0.023751 3.609147 0.0003
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.999984 Mean dependent var 0.383238
Adjusted R-squared 0.999984 S.D. dependent var 2.464218
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Table 40 Spain, pooled data from the sample of 17 autonomous communities, with fixed effects,
unemployment rate
Sample(adjusted): 1977:1 2004:2 
Included observations: 110 after adjusting endpoints 
Number of cross-sections used: 16 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1760
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
^ ^ ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ s s s s s e s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s s s s a x s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s ^ ^ s s s ^ s s s s s e s a ^ ^ s s s s ^ & ^ ^ s s s s s s s s s s ^ s s s s s a
UNEMPL?(-1) 0.773038 0.023468 32.94009 0.0000


















R-squared 0.992298 Mean dependent var -0.374827
Adjusted R-squared 0.992223 S.D. dependent var 0.756334
Table 41 Spain, pooled data from the sample of 17 autonomous communities, with common 
intercept, unemployment rate
Sample(adjusted): 1977:1 2004:2 
Included observations: 110 after adjusting endpoints 
Number of cross-sections used: 16 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1760

























Table 42 Poland, pooled data from the sample of 16 voivodeships, with fixed effects, employment
Sample(adjusted): 2000:2 2004:2
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 255_________



























0.216614 Mean dependent var
0.163950 S.D. dependent var
-0.001252
0.061265
Table 43 Poland, pooled data from the sample of 16 voivodeships, with common intercept, 
employment
Sample(adjusted): 2000:2 2004:2
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 15

























Table 44 Poland, pooled data from the sample of 16 voivodeships, with fixed effects, participation
rate
Sample(adjusted): 2000:2 2004:2 
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints 
Number of cross-sections used: 15 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 255



























0.999902 Mean dependent var 
0.999895 S.D. dependent var
-0.803095
2.905697
Table 45 Poland, pooled data from the sample of 16 voivodeships, with common intercept, 
participation rate
Sample(adjusted): 2000:2 2004:2 
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints 
Number of cross-sections used: 15 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 255
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.000501 0.002322 0.215942 0.8292
PART(-1) 0.494101 0.054752 9.024291 0.0000
PART(-2) 0.505530 0.054754 9.232696 0.0000
R-squared 0.999850 Mean dependent var -0.803095
Adjusted R-squared 0.999849 S.D. dependent var 2.905697
179
Table 46 Poland, pooled data from the sample of 16 voivodeships, with fixed effects,
unemployment rate
Sample(adjusted): 2000:2 2004:2
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 15
Total panel (balanced) observations: 255_________



























0.995815 Mean dependent var 
0.995533 S.D. dependent var
0.057678
0.866445
Table 47 Poland, pooled data from the sample of 16 voivodeships, with common intercept, 
unemployment rate
Sample(adjusted): 2000:2 2004:2 
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints 
Number of cross-sections used: 15 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 255

























Appendix 3 Population of the regions
Table 48 Population of Spain by regions in 2004




Asturias (Principado de) 920.1 2.7
Balears (Illes) 709.5 2.1
Canarias 1,526.9 4.4
Cantabria 458.4 1.3
Castilla y Leon 2,102.5 6.1
Castilla - La Mancha 1,440.1 4.2
Cataluna 5,338.3 15.5
Comunidad Valenciana 3,545.5 10.3
Extremadura 896.2 2.6
Galicia 2,386.7 6.9
Madrid (Comunidad de) 4,506.2 13.1
Murcia (Region de) 953.5 2.8
Navarra (Comunidad Foral de) 460 1.3
Pais Vasco 1,786.9 5.2
Rioja (La) 230.8 0.7
Ceuta y Melilla 113.2 0.3
Table 49 Population of Poland by regions in 2004



















Appendix 4 Labour market reform in Poland.
T able 5 0  M ain Labour Law C hanges Introduced in 1996
The number of the 
Labour Code 
article
Subject Direction of change
Art. 23 par. 6 An em p lo y ee  is autom atically ex lege 
transferred to a new  em ployer after a 
m erger or take over
Preventing em p lo y ee  firing w hen a 
m erger takes place
Art. 25 M andatory transform ation o f  a third 
defin ite em ploym ent contract into an 
indefinite one
B efore no lim it ex isted  as to the 
number o f  em ploym en t contracts for a 
definite tim e
Art. 25 par. 2 L engthening o f  the m axim um  
probation period from 2 w eek s to 3 
m onths
Facilitating the se lection  o f  em p lo y ees
Art. 98 R em oving  the obligation  to issue an 
op in ion  about an em p lo y ee ’s work
Such a m andatory op in ion  w as not 
credible and in practice w as rep laced  
by a letter o f  reference issu ed  to 
support an em p lo y ee
Art. 101 Ban on  conducting com peting  
activ ities to the activ ities o f  an 
em ployer during and, conditionally , 
after the term ination o f  em ploym ent 
contract
B efore the 1996 Labour Law nothing  
sim ilar ex isted
Art. 104 O bligation to create a working cod e  in 
com panies em p loy in g  more than 5 
persons
T he law reduced the threshold for 
writing a working co d e  from  5 0  to 5 
E m ployees
Art. 129 Shortening w eek ly  w orking tim e from  
42  to 4 0  hours
Increased labour costs
Art. 154 A ccording to the Labor C ode an 
em p loyee  has the right to: a) 18 days  
after having worked for at least 1 
year; b) 2 0  days after 6 years; c) 26  
days after 10 years
T he length o f  annual leave w as 
increased from  14 to 18 days on ly  for 
the first group
Source: Surdej A., (2004). M anaging Labor M arket Reform s: Case Study o f  Poland. B ackground paper 
for the W orld D evelopm ent Report 2005
T able 51 M ain Labour Law C hanges in 2002
The number of the 
Labour Code 
article
Subject Direction of change
Art. 22 T he definition o f  em ploym ent 
contract
L im iting the substitution o f  se lf-  
em ploym ent for dependent work
Art. 25 D efin ite  and substitution em ploym ent 
contract
Suspending the third contract rule and 
introducing flex ib le  substitution  
em ploym ent contract
Art. 37 L im iting the right for a paid leave for 
the search o f  a new  job
T he right is lim ited to em p lo y ees w ho  
are d ism issed  by an em p loyer  (3 days 
w hen a d ism issal period is 3 m onths 
and 2 days if  the d ism issa l period is 
shorter)
T he change requires from  an em ployer
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to consult an enterprise unions and not 
their local (or regional) o ffice s
Art. 38 L im iting the scope  o f  union  
consultation  in case o f  an em p lo y ee ’s 
D ism issa l
T he change requires from  an em ployer  
to consult an enterprise unions and not 
their local (or regional) o ffice s
Art. 77  par. 2 Rem uneration code T he obligation o f  preparing a 
remuneration cod e  lim ited to 
enterprises with m ore than 20  
em ployees
Art. 77 Travel on duty E m ployers outside the public sector can 
set the travel reim bursem ent about the 
officia l m inim um  level
Art. 86 Paym ent o f  salaries N o  longer an em ployer is required to 
ask an em p loyee  for a perm ission to 
transfer
his salary to his bank account
Art. 92 Sickn ess pay T he law shortened the em p loyer’s 
paym ent period from  35 to 33 days and 
introduced a rule than an em p loyee  
d oes not receive a salary for the first 
day o f  h is sick  leave, i f  the sick  leave if  
for a period o f  less than 6 days
Art. 93 D eath bonus E m ployer can d iscount the insurance 
prem ium  the fam ily  o f  dead em p loyee  
gets from  a m andatory death bonus, in 
case he insures his work force (the 
regulation boosts interest in insuring 
em p loyees)
Art. 97 W ork certificate E m ployer does not have to issue a work  
certificate if  an em p lo y ee  renew s the 
contract with him
Art. 104 W orking code The obligation  o f  preparing a working  
code lim ited to enterprises w ith more 
than 20  em p loyees
Art. 108 Financial fines Financial fines im posed  on em p lo y ees  
counted as spending to im prove  
working  
C onditions
Art. 129 E xtension o f  work duration
calculation
Period
A w eek ly  working tim e should  be 
calculated and should  stay within  
m axim um  lim its in the period o f  4 
(instead o f  3) m onths
Art. 129 (par. 5a) Extension o f  the p ossib ility  o f  having  
an interrupted working tim e
Interrupted w orking tim e is not lim ited  
any longer to the transportation sector, 
but can be used in all sectors o f  the 
E conom y
Art. 129 (par. 8) E m ploym ent arrangem ents for task 
oriented work
Task oriented w orking tim e w ill a llow  
to work at hom e (for instance  
telecom m uting)
Art. 129 (par. 10) Break in w orking tim e An em ployer can introduce one (up to 
6 0  m inutes) working break w hich does  
not count to the working tim e
Art. 133 Annual w orking tim e In an em ploym ent contract both sides  
can expand the lim it o f  yearly  
overtim e, but w eek ly  w orking tim e  
cannot exceed  48  hours
Art. 134 Supplem ent for overtim e T he supplem ent for overtim e was
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low ered to 50% for normal days, but 
kept 100% for overtim e for work on  
Sundays and holidays
Art. 143 Free tim e for overtim e E m ployer can grant free tim e  
in exchange for work  
overtim e
Art. 154, 155, 162 Principle for granting annual holidays Free days falling in the period o f  
annual holidays are counted in the 
duration o f  
annual holidays
Art. 163 Plan o f  annual holidays R egulation lifts the ob ligation  to 
com pile  the enterprise’s plan o f  annual 
holidays
Art. 209 Reporting to inspection agencies R egulation extends the periods in 
w hich an em ployer starting his 
activ ities has to
report this fact to the local work  
inspection  o ffice  and h ygiene  
inspection  o ffice
Art. 229 M edical check up E m ployees re-hired by the sam e  
em ployer are freed from  the obligation  
to repeat m edical check  ups
Art. 237 Sanitary education E m ployees re-hired by the sam e  
em ployer are freed from  the ob ligation  
to repeat sanitary education
Source: Surdej A ., (2 0 0 4 ). M anaging Labor Market Reform s: Case Study o f  Poland, Background paper
for the W orld D evelop m en t Report 2005
Table 52 M ain Labour Law C hanges in 200 3
The number of the 
Labour Code 
article
Subject Direction of change
Art. 18 Broadening the list o f  factors o f  
D iscrim ination
Ban o f  discrim ination has been  
extended on ethnic, faith, sexual and 
form o f
em ploym ent reasons
Art. 37 L eave for search a new  job During a d ism issal period an em p lo y ee  
can take two days o f  leave  to search for 
a new  job , only i f  he is covered  by a 
shortened (one month or a tw o w eek  
notice)
Art. 92 Paym ent for sickness leave E m ployer pay 80 percent o f  
remuneration yearly for first 33 days o f  
sickness leave
Art. 132 and 133 D aily  and w eekly statutory rest E m ployees get the right for an 
uninterrupted 11 hour daily  and 35 
w eek ly  rest
Art. 154 Length o f  annual holidays Since 1 January 2004 each  em p loyee  
has the right to 20 days o f  annual leave  
before his cum ulative work period  
reaches 10 years, and 26 days
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___________________________________________________________________afterwards.______________________________
Source: Surdej A ., (2 0 0 4 ). M anaging Labor Market Reform s: C ase Study o f  Poland, Background paper 
for the W orld D evelop m en t Report 2005
Labour market reforms after 2003 (based on Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy 2005, 2006).
After the labour reform of 2003 there have been new regulations introduced, which 
relate to individual labour law. They came into force on 1st January 2004 and on 1st 
May 2005. These include:
• regulations of the law of 14th Novem ber 2003 on amendments to the Labour 
Code and to some related laws (Journal o f Laws no. 213, item 2081);
• regulations of the law of 13th M arch 2003, on special rules for terminating 
labour relations for reasons not tied to the employees (Journal of Laws no. 90, 
item 844),
• provisions of the law of 9th July 2003 on the hiring o f tem porary workers 
(Journal of Laws no. 166, item 1608).
The first one offers a number of legal solutions which increase the flexibility o f labour 
organisation and facilitate the execution of the em ployee’s vacation entitlements. The 
introduced solutions include:
•  introduction of new working time systems (the system of shortened work week 
and the system of weekend work)
• the introduction of the balanced working time system, which allows work 
under significantly extended daily working hours norms;
• increasing the accessibility of work performed only on Sundays and holidays
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• more flexible rules o f payment for work performed on Sundays and holidays
•  facilitating taking up part-time work
• granting the holidays on hourly basis, corresponding to the daily working 
hours
The second one placed a stress on the process of information and broad consultations 
with representation o f employers at the stage which precedes group lay-offs; and on 
stronger participation o f the county labour offices in preparations concerning offer of 
active forms of assistance to the laid-off workers. The most important solutions which 
influence the labour market situation include:
•  obligation for the employer to notify the appropriate county labour office of 
the plans for group lay-off;
•  the possibility to hand in notices, under the group lay-off, only after
notification of the labour office and terminating the employment relationship
not earlier than after 30 days from the date o f notification.
The third of the laws listed above, legalises the flexible form of employment. The 
temporary work is aimed at:
• regulating the legal status o f a temporary work agency, and o f its custom er the 
employer;
• determining the scope of application of labour law provisions to the temporary 
workers;
• indicating the rights and obligations of the employer using the services o f the 
temporary work agency;
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• determining the scope o f application of labour law provisions to the temporary 
workers, hired under civil law contracts.
In the period of 2004-2005, three amendments have been also introduced to the 
Labour Code. They covered the following areas:
• special protection for the employment o f employees at the pre-retirement age;
• the thresholds for financial deductions which can be made from remuneration 
upon written approval of the employee;
• definition of the protection period before terminating employment contract 
without notice, without the employee's fault, and setting the level of 
remuneration for work incapacity period caused by necessary medical tests for 
candidates for donors o f cells, tissues and organs, and by undergoing the 
procedure of donating cells, tissues and organs.
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Appendix 5 The Labour Reforms in Spain
The transition process established the framework and basis for the labour market 
legislation. The 1978 Constitution recognised basic social and labour rights and the 
1980 W orkers’ Statute organised the industrial model. The 1980 Basic Law on 
Employment regulated employment policies and the 1984 Organic Law on Union 
Freedom regulated trade union activity (Gonzalez-Calvet, 2002). The 2003 Law on 
Employment has replaced the former Basic Law on Employment.
Dolado and Bentolila (1994) have analysed the effects o f labour reforms introduced in 
the 1980s and the first half o f 1990s and they concluded that the Spanish labour 
market has become m ore "dualistic". It was a result o f liberalization o f fixed-term 
employment contracts. Instead of easing the employment protection legislation, 
temporary contracts were introduced. This caused a shift from a model which favoured 
indefinite contracts and considered temporary ones as exceptional, towards a model in 
which temporary contracts became the norm. (Tascon, 2000). The conversion of 
temporary contracts into those in general use is based on the modifications introduced 
in the Statute of W orkers by the 32 Law, passed in August 1984.29 The reform created 
a gap between the cost of dismissal of temporary and permanent contracts, and the 
scope of temporary contracts was subsequently increased.
The Labour Reform introduced in 1994 (the second most important labour market 
reform in Spain) increased labour market flexibility in response to the new demands
29 In 1985 the percentage o f  workers with temporary contracts w as o f  4.8%  in Italy, 4.7%  in France and 
5.7%  in UK. In Spain in 1987 there were 15.6% o f  temporary workers. See Juan M ayoral, Gestion de  
personal, p. 436.
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for greater competitiveness arising from globalisation, economic restructuring and the 
single market. (Gil M artin, 2002). New forms of contracts were introduced (low-cost 
or high-flexible). The deregulation of labour market was expanded through easing 
labour mobility and working hour flexibility. In addition dismissals were made easier 
and temporary work agencies were introduced. Furthermore, the role o f collective 
negotiation was increased. (Gonzalez-Calvet, 2002; Segura, 2004; M unoz de Bustillo, 
2002).
W orkers have a constitutional right to be covered by a collective bargain, 
independently of union affiliation (Bentolila and Jimeno, 2003). Trade union
membership is generally thought to be “low” in Spain. W hat matters is that trade 
union members are legally enabled to bargain for wages and other working conditions 
on behalf o f all workers, trade union members or not. The collective bargaining 
system is based on elections held every 4 years, where delegates (who may belong to a 
trade union confederation or be “independent”) are elected in a process held within 
firms and promoted by trade unions themselves. Once delegates are elected, 
bargaining takes place at three levels: firms, sectors-province, and sector-national. 
(Toharia, 2001)
The third major labour reform took place in 1997. This reform included the 
Agreement for Permanent Employment, which enhanced the competitiveness of 
Spanish firms by improving the quality of the labour market through the reduction of 
temporality and rotation. At the same time it promoted continuous training (Gonzalez- 
Calvet, 2002). The reform also introduced a new permanent contract, with lower
189
dismissal costs and tax benefits. As a consequence 80% of net employment created 
after the reform has been permanent, reversing the previous trend (Martin, 2004).
The objective of the reform  of 2001 was to promote stable and indefinite contracts. In 
addition it promoted the em ploym ent of part-time, female and groups with special 
difficulties. It increased flexibility by widening the applicability and scope of the new 
permanent contracts. It also further reduced the dismissal costs for permanent 
contracts. It also introduced limited compensation for the dismissal o f temporary 
workers.
The 2003 Law on Em ploym ent adapted Spanish employment policies to the new 
institutional environm ent o f European policies and decentralisation towards 
autonomous communities. (Gonzalez-Calvet, 2002)
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Appendix 6 Types of employment contracts in Spain
(by Toharia, 2001)
Public servants, who eniov full employment protection (around 16% of total 
employees); they cannot be dismissed and they are outside the unemployment benefit 
system.
Permanent employees, protected by a dismissal cost amounting to 20 days’ wages per 
year of seniority (with a maximum of 12 m onths’ wages) in the case o f individual 
redundancy; this cost increases to 45 days’ wages (with a maximum of 48 m onths’ 
wages) if the dismissal is declared unfair; dismissed workers have the right to a 1 
month warning period and can sue the employer; should the latter occur, as happens in 
almost all cases, there is a negotiation meeting before going to court, where severance 
payment may be agreed (which occurs in 70% of the cases), the amount agreed 
depending on the probability that the dismissal be declared unfair by the court, and 
generally thought to be close to the maximum of 45 days’ wages; in the case of 
collective dismissals, different rules apply, as firms have to bargain with workers, a 
social plan has to be presented, and the dismissal has to be approved by the authorities, 
which would happen automatically in case of agreement.
Emplovment-promotion permanent employees (in existence since 1997); this is the 
same as above, with the only difference being that dismissal costs in case o f an unfair 
ruling is 33 days’ wages with a maximum of 24 m onths’ wages; initially created for a 
4 year-period, it has now been made permanent; specific groups of people could be 
hired under this contract (youngsters between 18 and 30, unemployed registered with 
the PES for more than 12 months, people older than 45), although the groups affected
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have been extended (now all youngsters under 31 may be hired, women in specific 
occupations where they are “underrepresented” may also be hired); workers 
previously hired under temporary contracts given a permanent status can also be hired 
under this new contract. In addition, for most of these groups, the government 
established a reduction in social contributions (initially for a 2-year period, but later 
extended yearly). The relative weight o f the two kinds of permanent workers is not 
known, although some estimates indicate that between 25 and 30% of them (i.e. 16- 
18% of total employees) would correspond (by mid-2001) to the newer regulation. 
W orkers under fixed-term or temporary contracts (some 32% of total employees). In 
principle, as already mentioned, they can only be hired to undertake temporary tasks, 
but it is generally accepted that they can do anything.
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